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ABSTRACT. 
The three central assertions of this thesis are: (1) that there are no 
moral grounds for the belief that lesbian and gay sexualities are 
inferior to heterosexualities, (2) that lesbians, gays, bi-sexuals and 
heterosexuals are equally valuable and worthy of respect as 
autonomous human beings with life plans of their own which they 
have the right to pursue, as long as they do not harm others, (3) that 
a philosophically informed rationale for arguing for lesbian and gay 
equality is required in today's aspiring democracies. 
The concepts of personal autonomy, participatory democracy and the 
democratic virtues are familiar themes within the Philosophy of 
Education. This thesis brings these themes to bear on the question of 
the place of lesbian and gay issues within a democratic education 
system. In doing so, it places the oppression of lesbians and gays 
within the broader context of the oppression of other members of 
the democratic community. It examines these complex and diverse 
powers of oppression with the aid of philosophical literature and 
with reference to the philosophical concepts of personal autonomy 
and participatory democracy. 
In the light of the previous discussions, philosophical skills, 
concepts and literature are employed to develop a critique of the 
educational policies of the British government in the 1980s and 90s 
and offer alternative policy suggestions based on more adequate 
accounts of human nature and social values. Finally, both the manner 
in which education should be controlled, and the form and content of 
education within a democratic state are critically examined. 
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A sympathetic liberal might well ask why the majority of 
heterosexual students should learn about lesbian and gay issues. 
What's in it for them personally, apart from the obvious need for 
heterosexuals to learn tolerance towards lesbians and gays and thus 
make their lives less difficult? Identifying lesbian and gay issues in 
education is not simply a matter of supporting lesbian and gays as 
the unfortunate victims of heterosexism. Heterosexism is a complex, 
powerful and destructive force, threatening the democratic 
community as a whole. This makes coming to terms with it 
important for everyone in the democratic community for the 
following reasons: 
1. Heterosexism has an important role in the formation and policing 
of sexualities. 
The lesbian and gay political movements of recent years have 
encouraged many people to reject the view that lesbian and gay 
sexualities are somehow disordered or 'unnatural'. This movement 
towards an acceptance of lesbian and gay equality with 
heterosexuality has led to an understanding of the power of 
heterosexism: the beliefs, attitudes and institutional arrangements 
which reinforce the view that heterosexualities are superior to 
lesbian, gay, or bi-sexualities. 
Heterosexism emanates primarily, though not exclusively, from 
heterosexuals. It is important that we understand the diverse and 
complex ways in which heterosexism operates and tackle 
heterosexist attitudes and values in schools and colleges. This must 
be done within the wider context of challenging all forms of 
oppression. 
At its most basic and pervasive level, heterosexism operates by 
means of what Epstein and Johnson (1994, pp. 198 ff.) call 'the 
heterosexual presumption', namely the presumption (by individuals, 
cultures and institutions) that everyone is heterosexual and that 
heterosexuality is, in a sense, compulsory for 'normal' human beings. 
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Debbie Epstein and Richard Johnson (1994) note the many ways in 
which heterosexism is manifested. "It operates through silences and 
absences as well as through verbal and physical abuse or through 
overt discrimination. Indeed, one form of heterosexism 
discriminates by failing to recognise differences. It posits a totally 
and unambiguously heterosexual world in much the same way as 
certain forms of racism posit the universality of whiteness. In this 
way, the dominant form is made to appear 'normal' and 'natural' and 
the subordinate form perverse, remarkable or dangerous." (p. 199). 
Epstein and Johnson see heterosexuality itself as problematic in the 
sense that it is often constructed and reinforced negatively through 
the 'policing' or control of masculinities and femininities. For 
example, men and boys often use homophobic abuse against each 
other when they are perceived as deviating from the norm of 
heterosexual masculinity (e.g. 'poof', 'queer', 'pansy', etc.). They cite 
examples where academically capable young men who have a good 
relationship with their teachers are often perceived as 'gay' 
regardless of their heterosexual relationships (p. 204). Girls are 
similarly pressurised into assuming stereotypical 'feminine' roles, 
thus ensuring the perpetuation of a heterosexuality that exists as a 
negative social construct, largely at the expense of other 
sexualities which it represses in order to ensure its own survival 
and propagation. "It is because, in our society, heterosexuality is 
culturally and psychically enforced that homosexualities are 
stigmatised and expelled." (Op. cit., p. 225). 
Epstein and Johnson believe that, "...homophobia can be seen as a 
constitutive part of heterosexual masculinities. It is not some 
incidental feature. Heterosexual masculinities are actually produced 
through different forms of homophobia, and this involves the 
expulsion or denial of homoerotic desire." (p. 204). This underlines 
the importance for the whole of society of coming to understand 
lesbian and gay oppression. In attempting to understand the powers 
of heterosexism we all (lesbians, gays, bi-sexuals and 
heterosexuals) come to understand something of the way our own 
sexualities have been negatively influenced. 
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Even the very young need to be taught in ways that avoid male and 
female heterosexist stereotypes. Thus, we shall provide a context 
within which young people will later be able to learn about 
sexualities which differ from their own and question societal 
attitudes and values with respect to lesbian and gay sexualities. 
This examination of the power and complexity of heterosexism 
indicates the scope of this thesis: although much of what is said 
here relates to secondary, further and higher education, I 
acknowledge the importance of anti-sexist and anti-heterosexist 
education from an early age. The reinforcement of negative 
heterosexual stereotypes damages all children. Much work needs to 
be done in devising curricula and approaches which will lay the 
foundations for exploring and learning about sexualities in later life. 
2. Heterosexism is a violation of individual citizens' exercise of 
personal autonomy. 
All citizens have the right to plan and live, as far as possible, their 
own ways of life, unless such ways of life harm others. 
Heterosexism negatively affects lesbians and gays' abilities and 
opportunities to live their distinctive ways of life. This is a 
violation of personal autonomy. 
The challenge for democratic education is to encourage 
heterosexuals to understand the need for lesbian and gay liberation 
from oppression. This is rooted in three propositions essential to 
the survival and continuation of participatory democracy: (i) that 
lesbians, gays and heterosexuals are all equally valuable and worthy 
of respect as autonomous human beings, (ii) that my right to live the 
life I choose entails that other individuals have the same right, (iii) 
that lesbians and gays should therefore be allowed to formulate 
their own life-plans and live them out in peace and harmony with 
other members of the democratic community. 
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3. Heterosexism silences the voices of the oppressed and thus 
prevents the development of participatory democracy. 
In order to achieve full participatory democracy, the aspiring 
democratic community must understand the ways in which oppressed 
people are discriminated against and are thus deprived of effective 
participation. This means that all oppressed groups, including 
lesbians and gays, must be listened to and taken account of. 
Participatory democracy can never be fully realised until this 
happens. 
4. Heterosexism damages fraternal relationships within the 
democratic community, 
Heterosexism and homophobia hurt heterosexuals as well as lesbians 
and gays by engendering fear of lesbians and gays and preventing 
civic friendship among citizens in the democratic community. In this 
way, heterosexism undermines the very foundations of participatory 
democracy by preventing citizens from working together to 
establish fundamentally important common democratic goals such as 
freedom and equality, as I shall argue more fully in chapter one. 
The reality of prejudice. 
Although I argue in chapter three that there are no substantive 
arguments to support the view that lesbians and gays are inferior to 
heterosexuals, it would be foolish to deny that many people believe 
this to be the case. There is also a significant number of people who 
have feelings of revulsion and disgust towards them. These are very 
deeply held views within our society and its cultures. It is 
important for us to understand the sheer complexity and diversity of 
the powers of oppression. There is still much work to be done in 
understanding the elaborate array of attitudes, beliefs and cultures 
of the young people we are educating. 
Heterosexism is not uniform or entirely predictable in its 
manifestations. Epstein (1994) notes that, "...we are living through a 
time and in a society which is not homogeneously homophobic. The 
contradictions, and even polarisations...are manifold, in public 
policy, between different people and even within the same person. 
7 
For example, the British government is currently restating Section 
28 in a variety of ways, but John Major has entertained gay activist 
and actor, Ian McKellan, at 10 Downing Street. The same police force 
may be simultaneously engaged in harassing gay men and appointing 
community liaison officers to work with the lesbian and gay 
community and actually increasing police presence in areas near gay 
pubs and clubs officially to protect lesbians and gays from 'queer 
bashing'. British Social Attitudes (1992/3) shows that the majority 
of those surveyed both favoured a lowering of the age of consent for 
gay men and found the sight of two men kissing in the street 
offensive..." (p. 7). 
Michel Foucault's concept of 'normalisation' provides us with a 
further analysis of the ways in which institutionalised 
heterosexism works as a powerful tool of oppression. In this 
analysis, the use of concepts such as 'normal' or 'abnormal' are not 
simply chance happenings or random phenomena, they expose one of 
the major powers used by society to manipulate and regulate its 
citizens. 
Stephen Ball (1990, p. 2) defines Foucault's concept of normalisation 
as, "...the establishment of measurements, hierarchy, and regulations 
around the idea of a distributionary statistical norm within a given 
population- the idea of judgement based on what is normal and thus 
what is abnormal." The research of Kinsey in the 1960s is a good 
example of this process. It postulated that approximately one in ten 
of the population is lesbian or gay. 
The purpose of this classification is the exercise of power over the 
human body; in Foucault's terms, Bio-power. "...a power whose task is 
to take charge of life needs continuous regularity and corrective 
mechanisms...such a power has to qualify, measure, appraise and 
hierarchise, rather than display itself in its murderous splendour..." 
(Foucault, 1984, p. 144). 
Foucault uses the term 'technologies of power' to refer to a set of 
operations or procedures which combine knowledge and power. In 
this instance, they combine to produce disciplinary technologies 
whose aim is to normalise anomalies through corrective or 
therapeutic procedures. 
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They involve a specialised and extensive, detailed knowledge of the 
human subject which has gradually taken shape since the nineteenth 
century within such disciplines as the law, medicine, psychiatry, 
and by means of detailed dossiers, case studies, investigations, 
enquiries and surveys, etc. 
Foucault thinks that it is by means of the definition and cataloguing 
of 'perversions' as part of the normalisation process that different 
forms of sexuality are exposed in detail. In the past, this led to 
attempts to 'cure' certain types of perversion and to increased state 
censorship, repression and control, but it also encouraged people to 
think about them and even try them out. Thus, Foucault 
characteristically identifies both the negative and the positive 
effects of normalisation as a particular exercise of power. 
Foucault believed that this normative rationality has gradually 
undermined and infiltrated the law. It is parasitic in the sense that 
it undermines the law without actually destroying it. Indeed, it 
depends upon the law and its procedures for its existence. Foucault 
notes a steady increase in the use of medicine, psychiatry and social 
sciences in legal deliberations during the nineteenth century. This 
led to what he describes as 'normalisation of the law'. This meant 
that there was an increased emphasis on statistical measures and 
judgements about what is normal and what is not in a given 
population, rather than adherence to absolute measures of right and 
wrong. 
In Britain, a clear example of this process of normalisation occurs 
in a D.E.S. circular issued in September, 1987 (discussed fully later 
in chapter four) which states, "There is no place in any school in any 
circumstances for teaching which advocates homosexual behaviour 
or presents it as the 'norm' " (no. 11/87, Sept. 1987, no. 22, p. 4). As 
I shall argue fully in chapter four, this is evidence of the deeply held 
contemporary belief that lesbians and gays are 'abnormal'. 
The use of the term 'gay' appeared in the early seventies and can be 
seen, in part, as a reaction against the supposed abnormality of 
lesbian and gay sexualities. People who labelled themselves 'gay' had 
decided to 'come out', to reveal their sexualities to the world. The 
term 'gay' was intended to signify a new consciousness of what it 
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means to be homosexual and, most importantly of all, a pride in that 
consciousness. 
It is important to appreciate that the mere coining of such terms as 
'lesbian' or 'gay' did not in itself prevent people from seeing 
homosexuals as unnatural, abnormal or perverse. On the contrary, 
these terms are still often used pejoratively. 
Whatever concepts are used to describe lesbian or gay sexualities, 
Foucault's 'technologies of power' remain at work, applying new 
labels to old prejudices. A graphic illustration of this is provided by 
Tony Kushner's play, Angels in America (Nick Herne, 1992). 
In Act I, scene 9, Roy (a very powerful, influential, but crooked 
lawyer) has a consultation with his physician, Henry: 
HENRY. 	 Roy Cohn, you are...You have had sex with men, many 
many times, Roy, and one of them, or any number of 
them, has made you very sick. You have AIDS. 
ROY. 	 AIDS. Your problem, Henry is that you are hung up on 
words, on labels, that you believe they mean what 
they seem to mean. AIDS. Homosexual. Gay. Lesbian. 
You think these are names that tell you who someone 
sleeps with, but they don't tell you that. 
HENRY. 	 No? 
ROY. 	 No. Like all labels they tell you one thing and one thing 
only: where does an individual so identified fit in the 
food chain, in the pecking order? Not ideology, or 
sexual taste, but something much simpler: clout. Not 
who I fuck or who fucks me, but who will pick up the 
phone when I call, who owes me favours. This is what 
a label refers to. Now to someone who does not 
understand this, homosexual is what I am because I 
have sex with men, but really this is wrong. 
Homosexuals are not men who sleep with other men. 
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Homosexuals are men who in fifteen years of trying 
cannot get a pissante anti-discrimination bill through 
the City Council. Homosexuals are men who know 
nobody and who nobody knows. Who have zero clout. 
Does this sound like me, Henry? 
HENRY. 	 No. 
ROY. 	 No. I have clout. A lot. I can pick up this phone, punch 
fifteen numbers, and you know who will be on the 
other end in under five minutes, Henry? 
HENRY. 	 The president? 
ROY. 	 Even better, his wife. 
HENRY. 	 I'm impressed. 
ROY. 	 I don't want you to be impressed. I want you to 
understand. This is not sophistry. And this is not 
hypocrisy. This is reality. I have sex with men. But 
unlike nearly every other man of whom this is true, I 
bring the guy I'm screwing to the White House and 
President Reagan smiles at us and shakes his hand. 
Because what I am is defined entirely by who I am. 
Roy Cohn is not a homosexual. Roy Cohn is a 
heterosexual man, Henry, who fucks around with guys. 
HENRY. 	 OK, Roy. 
ROY. 	 And what is my diagnosis, Henry? 
HENRY. 	 You have AIDS, Roy. 
ROY. 	 No, Henry, no. AIDS is what homosexuals have. I have 
liver cancer. 
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There are important implications for education here. The 
stereotypes and misinformation connected with lesbian and gay 
sexualities will not disappear simply because we teach children to 
refer to homosexuals as 'lesbian' or 'gay', or because we examine the 
bases for the prejudices which abound in this area, demonstrating 
them to be groundless and unjust. What is also needed is a positive 
attempt at consciousness-raising. This involves, not simply an 
examination of the bases of prejudice, but a radical re-consideration 
of one's moral position, leading to a shift in values, perspectives and 
behaviour. 
The theory and practice of lesbian and gay liberation. 
This thesis attempts to provide effective ways of countering the 
kind of prejudice I have highlighted within the aspiring democracies 
of today. It is, in part, a consideration of possibilities, of what 
could be in the ideal democratic community and its educational 
establishments. 
The architects of the 1960s viewed their urban planning from a 
distance. They began with theories relating to ideal forms of housing 
which would have the advantage of saving space. They surveyed 
available space from a height, with little or no regard for the down-
to earth consequences of what they were doing. The outcome was the 
creation of a kind of urban jungle which alienated the inhabitants of 
the sky-scrapers that resulted. 
Despite its necessarily theoretical focus, this thesis is not intended 
to be so remote as to ignore the everyday realities of life for 
lesbians and gays today or the imperfections of the aspiring 
democracies in which they live. Prejudice and discrimination are 
freely acknowledged and solutions are sought, but it is important 
that responses to lesbian and gay oppression include a carefully 
constructed vision of the future. 
One cannot speak of lesbian and gay liberation without considering 
the ways in which society might develop and improve in order to 
make such liberation a reality. Social and educational change needs a 
focus. We must look at the problems that now exist in our society 
and its institutions and have a clear conception of societal and 
12 
institutional change. This is why this thesis emphasises both theory 
and practice. 
The broad framework of my thesis (including the necessary societal 
and educational conditions for change) can be used to address and 
counter discrimination on grounds of race, sex, disability, religion, 
class and every other form of oppression. This wide range of 
application supports my argument for lesbian and gay liberation as 
an integral part of the wider struggle against all forms of unjust 
discrimination. 
Core concepts used in this thesis. 
Much of the subject matter of this thesis deals with people who 
have same-sex sexual relationships. The lives and loves of these 
people are articulated through the familiar concepts of 'sexuality', 
'homosexuality' and 'lesbian and gay sexualities'. 
I use the term 'lesbian' to denote women whose primary erotic 
and/or sexual interest is their own sex and 'gay' to denote similarly 
disposed men. Thus the term 'lesbian and gay sexualities' is used, for 
the most part, instead of 'homosexuality' because the latter term 
fails to distinguish between lesbians and gays whose sexualities are 
very different. 
It is important to appreciate that the terms 'homosexuality' and 
'heterosexuality', as we currently understand them, are modern, 
Western constructions. The term 'homosexuality' was invented by 
C.G. Chaddock, an early translator of Krafft-Ebing's Psychopathia 
Sexualis (1892). Before this time, there was no 'homosexuality', only 
'sexual inversion'. They were not the same phenomenon, as George 
Chauncey argues, " 'Sexual inversion' referred to a broad range of 
deviant gender behaviour of which homosexual desire was only a 
logical but distinct aspect, while 'homosexuality' focused on the 
narrower issue of sexual object choice. The differentiation of 
homosexual desire from 'deviant' gender behaviour at the turn of the 
century reflects a major reconceptualisation of the nature of human 
sexuality, its relation to gender, and its role in one's social 
definition." (in Boyess & Steiner 1982-3, p. 116). 
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Throughout the nineteenth century, preference for one's own sex was 
not clearly distinguished from other sorts of non-conformity to 
one's culturally defined sex role: 'deviant' object choice was seen as 
one of a number of pathological symptoms exhibited by those who 
reversed or 'inverted' their 'proper' sex roles by adopting a masculine 
or feminine style at variance with what was seen as natural and 
appropriate to their anatomical sex. 
The disjunction, identified by Halperin (1990), of 'inversion' and 
'homosexuality' was an important conceptual and political shift. The 
age of the 'invert' is over, even though it has left its mark on the 
popular consciousness and its prejudices. It is becoming clear that 
sexual activity need no longer be related to gender roles. For 
example, the identification of 'active' sexual roles with masculinity 
and 'passive' sexual roles with femininity is being eroded. 
The term 'gay' was coined after the Stonewall riots in New York in 
the 1960s when homosexuals fought a pitched battle with police 
who raided a gay bar. This is seen by many lesbians and gays as the 
beginning of the struggle for liberation. The term 'gay' was coined to 
indicate the homosexual who was proud of her or his sexuality and 
was determined to make this known to everyone. The struggle for 
gay liberation was taken up and reinforced by organisations such as 
the Gay Liberation Front. A new gay consciousness was formed as a 
result of these important political events and movements. Gays 
perceived themselves as ordinary women and men who had same-sex 
relationships and were proud to admit it. 
The centrality of sexuality in our personal development. 
There are some differences in the ways that gender, race, class and 
sexualities manifest themselves within the individual and society. 
But are discrimination and oppression on the grounds of sexuality 
exceptionally abhorrent, more so than perhaps racial or other forms 
of discrimination, since many of us intuitively believe sexuality to 
be an elemental part of our psyche, helping to define our character 
and personality at a very fundamental level? 
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The exploration and articulation of our sexual identities is of 
obvious importance to the development of every human being, but I 
shall argue that it is not necessarily more important and profound 
than other discoveries we make about aspects of our identity, for 
example, our gender, class, culture or ethnicity. Discrimination and 
oppression on the grounds of sexuality is therefore no more or less 
abhorrent than oppression and discrimination in these other 
important areas of our lives. 
At first glance, sexuality, race and gender seem to be very different 
aspects of our personal identity in the sense that lesbians and gays, 
unlike people of colour, are often 'invisible' in society. They can and 
sometimes do choose to identify publicly as heterosexual and thus 
avoid the disapproval, prejudice and oppression of society on a legal 
and/or personal level. But on closer scrutiny, the same process of 
invisibility can also be seen at work in at least some ethnic 
minorities, such as Irish people or some black people, who often 
choose to hide their precise ethnic origins for fear of adverse 
reactions, so there are some parallels here. 
On another level, Dale Spender (1982) documents the ways in which 
girls and women are rendered 'invisible' by the way they are 
systematically ignored and marginalised by male dominated society 
and its repressive cultures. Debbie Epstein (1994) also 
acknowledges this marginalisation and invisibility, even for those 
lesbian and gays who choose to come out. 
Although sexuality and race are very similar, there is one difference: 
in chapter three, I argue against the claim that lesbian and gay 
sexualities are necessarily 'given' and fixed for life because there is 
no conclusive scientific evidence at present to support this claim 
and since many lesbian feminists claim they have genuinely chosen 
their sexualities, largely as a reaction against patriarchy. Thus, 
there remains the possibility that some people can choose their 
sexualities. This is obviously not true in the case of race or colour. 
Class seems to have more in common with sexuality: one can see 
that it is possible both to hide one's class origins, should one choose 
to do so, and to move successfully from one class to another. Take, 
for example, the working class person who adopts an 'educated 
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accent' and pretends to be middle or upper class, or who moves into 
the middle class through education or economic success. One can 
also imagine a situation where a young child is born into one class 
and then adopted by members of another. In this sense, class differs 
from sex or colour in that a complete change of identity in this 
former area is possible. 
Sexuality has a broadly biological base, in the sense that most 
human beings (like other animals) are motivated to engage in some 
sort of sexual activity, but these other aspects of human identity 
also have obvious biological bases: race is based on one's parentage 
and the circumstances in which one is born, sex is also based on 
parentage in the sense that it is determined by the genes of both 
parents. 
One thing that distinguishes sexuality from other important 
constituents of our personal identity is that sexuality seems to be a 
basic human drive, defined as including, "...instinctive and other 
impulses, or motive forces, prompting an animal to directed activity 
towards an end." (J. Dreyer, 1973). Thus, it tends to be experienced 
as a basic human need, in the same way as we experience the need 
for food and water. This is clearly not the case with class, sex, 
culture or ethnicity, but I do not believe that this characterisation 
of sexuality as a drive makes it more significant or important than 
other aspects of our selves. 
We all possess this drive towards expressing some form of 
sexuality. This does not make sexuality particularly problematic in 
itself. The problem is that society polices our expression of 
sexuality to such an extent that only the heterosexual variety is 
regarded as acceptable. There are parallels between ethnicity, class 
and culture at this point. These parallels can be seen when we 
consider how society also polices our expression of ethnicity and 
class. Thus, we are encouraged to adopt the kind of monocultural 
view of life identified by Cole (1989). We are encouraged to reduce a 
diverse range of cultures and traditions into one monocultural 
'melting-pot'. Or else the white culture is seen as the dominant (and 
superior) culture to which all others must conform or become 
integrated within. Similarly, we are encouraged to ignore class 
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differences (and thus unequal power relations) in favour of 'the 
classless society', where everyone is believed to have equality of 
opportunity economically, educationally and socially. 
On a personal level, what makes one form of identity more 
significant and important to us than others is the extent to which it 
is accepted or rejected by the society in which we live. Thus, our 
exploration and acceptance of our own culture or sexuality will be 
important but unproblematic if it is acknowledged and valued by 
society. In our society, how many white heterosexuals are worried 
about their culture or sexuality? How many even think about them? 
Conversely, if our culture or sexuality are rejected by society, our 
acceptance of them and our exploration of them become a matter of 
some importance for us. In this case, we have to come to a realistic 
appreciation of the prejudices and discrimination that exist with 
regard to them and seek to form alliances with other oppressed 
groups in order to combat and overcome them. 
On a societal level, ethnicity, class, sexuality or gender are 
unproblematic as long as they do not threaten the dominant societal 
expression of these aspects of personal identity. However, if this 
happens, society will try to regulate our expression of these 
fundamental constituents of our selves. Within this context, any 
group- heterosexual women or men, people of colour, or the working 
class- who insist on challenging traditional societal ideas and 
institutions (e.g., the family) are as dangerous as lesbians and gays 
who do likewise. All are perceived as deviant or transgressive to 
some extent, and all will suffer the censure of society, on either an 
institutional level (through the law and its enforcers) or a personal 
level (through negative societal attitudes and behaviour). 
Sexuality, race and class are fundamentally important aspects of our 
personal identity. Why then do we intuitively suspect that sexuality 
is so pre-eminent? 'Sexuality' is a powerful social construct. Since 
the invention of the term 'homosexuality' and the immense increase 
in scientific and pseudo-scientific interest that accompanied it, 
sexuality has come to be seen as a mysterious, elemental force 
which shapes our lives in diverse and not always observable or 
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obvious ways. Certainly, this is the kind of popular view of sexuality 
projected in the Freudian and post-Freudian era. 
David Halperin observes that, in the nineteenth century, sexuality 
became a singular "instinct" or "drive", a force shaping our conscious 
life according to its own unassailable logic, determining, in part, 
our character and personality. Sexuality becomes, "...a mute power 
subtly and deviously at work throughout a wide range of human 
behaviours, attitudes, tastes, choices, gestures, styles, pursuits, 
judgements, and utterances. Sexuality is thus the inmost part of an 
individual human nature...Sexuality holds the key to unlocking the 
deepest mysteries of the human personality: it lies at the centre of 
the hermeneutics of the self." (Halperin, 1990, p. 26). 
Halperin explores the concept of sexuality as a social construct, not 
a natural or essential feature of 'human nature'. Before the 
scientific construction of 'sexuality', certain types of sexual acts 
could be individually evaluated and categorised as could certain 
tastes and inclinations. To some past generations, and for many 
individuals and cultures today, 'sexuality' is not a coherent concept. 
What has more importance is a diverse variety of experiences and 
concepts such as sexual practices and tastes, and diverse individual 
and communal beliefs held in relation to such sexual activity. 
Halperin points out that in the ancient world there was no 
conceptual apparatus to identify a person's fixed and determinate 
orientation, much less for assessing it or classifying it. 
It is therefore inappropriate to assume that our categories of 
'sexuality', 'lesbian', 'gay' or 'bi-sexual' will be readily understood in 
societies or cultures other than ours, or even by all individuals, 
cultures or groups within our own society. This indicates the 
considerable educational task ahead of us in acknowledging, 
discussing and teaching about lesbian and gay sexualities within 
historical contexts. 
"The real issue confronting any cultural historian of antiquity, and 
any critic of contemporary culture, is, first of all, how to recover 
the terms in which the experiences of individuals belonging to past 
societies were actually constituted and, second, how to measure and 
assess the differences between those terms and the ones we 
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currently employ. For, as this very controversy over the scope and 
applicability of sexual categories illustrates, concepts in the human 
sciences- unlike, in this respect, perhaps, concepts in the natural 
sciences (such as gravity)- do not merely describe reality but, at 
least partly, constitute it...although there have been, in many 
different times and places (including classical Greece), persons who 
sought sexual contact with the same sex as themselves, it is only 
within the last 100 years or so that such persons (or portions of 
them, at any rate) have been homosexuals." (Halperin, 1990, pp. 28- 
9). 
Thus, we should not be looking for 'the history of homosexuality'. 
This approach is far too reductive, 'sexuality' is far more complex. 
Sexual relationships have happened throughout history between 
members of a variety of highly diverse communities, societies and 
cultures. Halperin remarks that an historical analysis of what we 
now call sexuality will lead us to, "..a plurality of only partly 
overlapping social and conceptual territories, a series of cultural 
formations that shift as their constituents change, combine in 
different sequences, or compose new patterns." (Op. cit., p. 29). 
One can imagine a scenario in which various diverse forms of 
sexuality are accepted and valued, in much the same way as they 
were in ancient Greece. If this came about, one could see that our 
notions of lesbian, gay, bi-sexual or heterosexual would no longer 
have the significance that they hold for us now. It is important for 
lesbians and gays to identify as such in contemporary society, 
largely because they are treated as 'other' by the dominant 
heterosexual society. But if sexuality was seen as a continuum of 
sexual experience over time, including lesbian, gay, bi-sexual and 
heterosexual experiences, one can see that sexuality might well lose 
the central place it now seems to hold in our personal development. 
Sexual tastes and preferences might well come to be seen as no 
more important than a preference for lager rather than bitter, 
popular music, rather than classical. 
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Outline of the structure and argument of the thesis. 
The first part of the thesis adopts an explicitly philosophical 
perspective. In chapter one, I discuss at length the wider 
democratic, social and educational framework within which 
initiatives centring on lesbian and gay liberation should take place, 
acknowledging the short-comings of present democratic 
arrangements. My distinctive contribution to lesbian and gay issues 
in education is, in part, presenting this democratic social and 
educational framework as the necessary context within which such 
issues can be effectively addressed. 
Chapter one begins by examining the promotion of socially 
responsible autonomy as an important social, educational and 
political aim. Human beings, unlike other animals, are capable, in 
principle, of making independent judgements. Within the context of 
our society which is, in the broadest sense, multi-cultural, citizens 
should be educated to make informed, responsible and independent 
judgements and decisions in all areas of life. 
In a society which aspires to freedom and democracy, citizens 
therefore have the right to choose the lives they wish to live, 
providing they do not harm others. Individuals who possess and 
cherish this essential right should be led to a recognition of the 
right of others to live autonomous lives. 
Using contemporary literature in political philosophy, I critically 
examine elitist theories of democracy. I argue, by contrast with 
these elitist models, that participatory democracy provides the best 
social and political context within which socially responsible 
autonomy can be effectively exercised. I then examine the social and 
psychological conditions necessary in order for democracy to 
survive and flourish. 
Aspiring democracies must acknowledge oppressed groups and work 
towards their full participation if they are to attain democracy in 
its fullest sense. Participatory democracy recognises and respects 
group differences, working towards the liberation of the oppressed. 
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Personal autonomy and participatory democracy are inter-dependent 
in the sense that participatory democracy provides the best context 
in which socially responsible autonomy can be fostered. Conversely, 
participatory democracy depends on socially responsible autonomy 
for its own existence and development. 
Chapter two examines the concept of 'the democratic personality' 
and explores some key virtues which are the necessary conditions 
for establishing participatory democracy as a way of life. 
Chapter three addresses the central issue of lesbian and gay equality 
with heterosexuality. Are sexualities in some sense 'given' or are 
they are chosen? How important is the given/chosen debate? 
My distinctive contribution to the given/chosen debate is to point 
out that radical educational reform can be achieved, whichever view 
is adopted. 
I critically examine the claims, made by many people, that lesbians 
and gays are unnatural, perverted, ill, evil or mad. I ask whether 
there are any aspects of lesbian or gay moral or sexual behaviour 
that would support such claims. 
The second part of the thesis (Chapters 4-8) is concerned with 
education within a democratic setting. It includes a critical 
evaluation of our aspiring democracy in Britain, its educational 
policies and institutions. It also puts forward a detailed vision of 
the kind of education that should be provided within a truly 
participatory democracy. 
It critically examines recent British government legislation and 
advice on sexuality and exposes its heterosexist bias. It goes on to 
specify the form and content of education within a democratic 
setting. It also considers the practical implications and questions 
which arise from the central assertion of lesbian and gay equality 
with heterosexuality. There are important implications for 
education here: should lesbian and gay sexualities be discussed? 
Should such ways of life be positively promoted? If lesbians and 
gays are to be treated on a par with heterosexuals, what sort of 
steps should educational institutions take to ensure that this 
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message is conveyed through the informal and formal curricula of 
schools and colleges? Should lesbian and gay issues be treated as 
part of an equal opportunities initiative on a par with anti-racist 
and other anti-sexist attitudes and approaches? 
Chapter four acknowledges the complex forms of oppression 
experienced by lesbians and gays as exhibited by individuals, society 
and its institutions. It examines the institutionalised heterosexism 
which is fuelled through recent United Kingdom government 
legislation and circulars. It considers section 28 of the Local 
Government Act 1988, and looks at the positive and negative effects 
of this legislation. It ends with a critical evaluation of circular 
11/87 and its replacement. 
Sex education is highlighted as an effective means of encouraging 
students to exercise their personal autonomy by critically examining 
and coming to terms with their own sexualities and the sexualities 
of others, which might differ from their own. It is also an effective 
means of countering heterosexist societal attitudes, beliefs and 
structures. 
Building on the arguments, developed in chapter one, for the 
centrality of socially responsible autonomy and participatory 
democracy as fundamental political and educational ideals, chapter 
five sets out the ways in which a state, built on these principles, 
should control the education of its citizens. In so doing, it asks 
questions such as: what are the rights of parents with respect to the 
determination of their children's education? What rights do their 
children have? Should the state be able to overrule or ignore these 
rights? These issues are important, especially when one considers 
situations where parents might well vehemently object to their 
children being taught about lesbian and gay sexualities on moral 
and/or religious grounds. 
Chapter six examines the hidden curriculum and its relationship 
with certain key policies which reflect the ethos of an institution 
and insure that its fundamental principles are adhered to. Four key 
policies and their interrelationships are developed and highlighted. 
Practical advice is then offered for their effective formulation and 
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implementation. The importance of the organisation and development 
of educational institutions is discussed. 
Chapter seven focuses on the identification of lesbian and gay issues 
within the overt curriculum. Certain essential features and areas of 
education are highlighted. The place of lesbian and gay issues within 
the core and foundation subjects of the National Curriculum is then 
briefly examined. 
The concluding chapter draws together the main arguments of the 
thesis, focusing on the concept of citizenship. The central question 
here is: do lesbians and gays have the right to be treated as the 
equals of other citizens in the democratic community? 
I argue for Iris Marion Young's model of citizenship as a coalition of 
various diverse groups who retain their own individual identities 
whilst sharing the essential ideals of citizenship. 
This vision of ideal citizenship must be counterbalanced by a 
realistic appraisal of the notion of citizenship promoted by the 
British government of the 1990s. Do we possess real democracy in 
this country or is it a sham? I go on to examine Curriculum Guidance 
8 on citizenship in order to clarify how this government sees 
democracy and which model it appears to be using. 
This thesis seeks to place the reality of oppression on the grounds 
of sexuality within the wider social and political contexts of 
oppression and discrimination on other grounds, such as gender, race 
or class. Although the powers of oppression may operate, or be 
experienced, slightly differently in each of these areas, we can draw 
strong parallels between them. Oppression in these areas operates 
by using the same mechanisms. For example: stereotyping, 
misinformation, myths, irrational prejudices, fears and beliefs. 
Therefore, the imperative political task is to work towards building 
coalitions of all oppressed groups within the democratic community, 
recognising the forms of oppression we have in common and working 
together to expose and counter them by education, rational 
argument, consciousness-raising, the promotion of positive images 
and radical social and political change. 
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CHAPTER 1. 
AUTONOMY WITHIN A DEMOCRATIC SETTING. 
Introduction. 
This necessarily lengthy chapter situates the discussion of 
autonomy within the context of a discussion of a democratic state 
because this is demanded by the treatment of the topic. My central 
concern is the flourishing of lesbian and gay citizens within a 
culturally plural democratic community. 
I examine the wider social and educational frameworks within which 
lesbian and gay issues can be effectively addressed. This also 
provides the basis for my later critique of current arrangements and 
policy suggestions. 
Human beings are capable, in principle, of reflecting on their 
experience and making independent judgements within social, 
political, moral and sexual spheres of life. This is what 
distinguishes them from other animals. 
In a democratic society, citizens should be educated to reflect on 
their experience and to make well-informed, responsible and 
independent judgements and decisions in all areas of life. The 
justification for this argument is the fact that contemporary 
society is inescapably multi-cultural in every sense of the word. 
Within this context, individuals are faced with important political, 
moral and social conflicts, opportunities and choices which will 
affect their well-being and that of others. 
It is important that people are not unduly influenced by powerful 
forces within our society such as local and national politicians, the 
media and societal traditions and values, some of which may be ill-
conceived and wrong. Citizens must therefore be able to 'think for 
themselves', critically to evaluate the many societal, cultural and 
other influences of contemporary society. Joseph Raz (1990) notes 
that personal autonomy as an ideal is, "...particularly suited to the 
conditions of the industrial age and its aftermath with their fast 
changing technologies and free movement of labour. They call for an 
ability to cope with changing technological, economic and social 
24 
conditions, for an ability to adjust, to acquire new skills, to move 
from one subculture to another, to come to terms with new 
scientific and moral views." (pp. 369-70). 
Citizens have the right freely to choose their own ways of life and 
views of life, providing that no harm is done to other members of 
the democratic community. It is desirable that, within a democratic 
setting, valuing one's own personal autonomy might lead to a 
recognition of the right of others to exercise their personal 
autonomy and therefore to the socially responsible exercise of 
autonomy. 
I shall argue that lesbian and gay equality and liberation can best be 
achieved within a democratic society based on participatory 
principles because it encourages this kind of independent reflection, 
judgement and choice with regard to societal traditions and norms. 
Such a society must also listen to the voices of the oppressed if it 
is to reach maturity. Aspiring democracies will never fully develop 
unless oppressed minorities are allowed fully to participate within 
the life of the democratic community. 
Participatory democracy also creates the conditions necessary for 
certain group differences to be recognised, valued and respected. 
There is an important inter-relationship between personal autonomy 
and the kind of democratic framework discussed here. Participatory 
democracy provides the best social and political context within 
which socially responsible personal autonomy can flourish. At the 
same time, participatory democracy depends on this kind of socially 
responsible autonomy for its own existence and continued survival. 
'Autonomy' involves the self-rule of the individual person in society. 
This concept is well expressed in Isaiah Berlin's idea of positive 
liberty. We all wish to be an instrument of our own wills and not 
others'. This involves, "The wish to be a subject not an object, not to 
be affected by extraneous causes. I wish to be somebody not no-
body, a doer, deciding, not being decided for, self-directed, not acted 
upon as if I were a thing, an animal or a slave. I want to conceive 
policies and goals of my own and try to realise them. Above all, I 
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wish to be an active, conscious being, bearing responsibility for my 
own choices and able to explain them by reference to my own ideas 
and purposes." (Berlin, 1969, p.131). 
Yet, how is personal autonomy possible when the world and its 
inhabitants seem controlled by factors which are largely beyond 
their power? Each human being has a given character, a set of 
predispositions, motivations, intellectual abilities. Individuals are 
located within a given social context, not of their choosing, from 
which they derive the standards and values which govern their 
choices. I am reminded here of R.F. Dearden's observation that, "The 
most autonomous of men owes far more to what he socially inherits 
than to what he makes of himself, and the ideal of personal 
autonomy is itself a product of one particular social tradition." 
(Dearden, 1984, p.111). 
One can acknowledge the many given societal and psychological 
factors which, to a large extent, make me the kind of person I am. 
Yet, I can also point to the human being's capacity to assess these 
given elements and decide whether to accept or reject them. Of 
course, 'the self' that reflects on and assesses these given elements 
of society and character is not unencumbered, as Callan (J. P. E., vol. 
28, 1994) acknowledges later in our discussion. Nevertheless, some 
assessment and reflection is possible. Thus, Norman (J.P.E., 1994) 
characterises 'stepping back' from one's circumstances, not as a 
detachment from one's situation and circumstances, but "...the 
capacity to take up a perspective on one's circumstances, to bring 
them into focus within consciousness." (p. 31). 
Norman and Callan are defending something like a Sartrean or 
Hegelian view of consciousness as the condition for autonomous, 
free or independent activity. "It is by becoming conscious of our 
circumstances that we are able to assess them, to act in the light of 
our assessment of them and therefore, in the appropriate sense, 
control them instead of being at the mercy of them." (Ibid.). 
One of the defining characteristics of human beings is that they are 
able, in principle, to reflect on their experience and exercise 
freedom of thought and action unless prevented by internal or 
external restraints. This is essentially what separates humans from 
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other animals who are driven or controlled by instinct alone. In this 
respect, people define and assert their humanity through their 
reflection, the independent judgements they make and the actions 
they perform. 
Of course, there are degrees of autonomy. A prisoner confined within 
a very strict custodial regime has her or his autonomy severely 
limited. Prisoners cannot choose to leave their prisons. 
Nevertheless, all prisoners are autonomous to some degree: they can 
choose when to eat (regardless of when their food is delivered to 
them), when to exercise within the confines of their cells, when to 
speak and when to remain silent and whether or not to exercise a 
whole host of other minor freedoms. It may well be asked, though, 
whether such minor freedoms are significant, whether they are 
worth possessing at all. 
The degree to which a person is autonomous therefore depends on a 
variety of different environmental, personal and societal factors. It 
is difficult if not impossible to measure the actual extent of an 
individual's autonomy. "Autonomy is like baldness. We know what 
perfect baldness would consist in, but we use the word 'bald' to 
describe people who have lost a substantial amount of hair..." 
(Lindley: 1986, p. 69). 
R.F. Dearden puts forward three criteria of variability (S.C. Brown, 
1975, Ch. 1). A person can be more or less autonomous depending on: 
(i) the extent to which initiative is shown in forming judgements of 
her or his own, (ii) the firmness with which he or she adheres to 
such judgements, (iii) the depth of ramifying reflection which lies 
behind the criteria which she or he employs in making those 
judgements. 
An education system based on participatory principles should strive 
to develop capacities for reflection and for independent choice and 
action by, amongst other things, maximising opportunities for its 
students to exercise their personal autonomy. In this way students 
are trained gradually in the necessary personal or psychological 
skills, encouraging them to reflect on their experience and make 
important independent judgements and decisions relating to their 
individual goals and plans in later life. 
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This kind of democratic education has important implications for 
lesbian and gay citizens in two respects: firstly, all citizens, 
whatever their sexualities, will be encouraged to respect the freely 
chosen life-plans of others. Within a democratic setting, the right to 
make one's own autonomous choices involves an acceptance that 
others have the right to do likewise. This basic climate of 
acceptance and respect for others' life-plans is important if the 
need for lesbian and gay liberation is to be understood and 
eventually realised. Secondly, within such a climate, lesbians and 
gays will be encouraged to make independent and reflective 
judgements. In doing so, they may come to understand the negative 
views society holds about their sexualities. On this basis, they can 
form realistic life-plans of their own, appreciating the difficulties 
they may face and asserting their right to independent thought and 
action in these important areas of their lives. 
Autonomous reflection. 
I do not wish to exaggerate the importance of this kind of reflection 
and judgement in our everyday lives. I am not suggesting that we 
have to constantly make independent judgements about every aspect 
of life. The idea of forcing oneself relentlessly to question every 
minute aspect of life is unattractive, even abhorrent. 
What, then, is the role of reflection in our lives and how is this 
related to our personal autonomy? Eamon Callan (J. P. E., vol. 28, 
1994) stresses that seeing reflective autonomy as an ideal of 
practical reason does not entail that all action has to be preceded by 
protracted deliberation. To illustrate this point, he uses the example 
of the rescuers of Jews during the second world war. Many of these 
rescuers acted with unreflective goodwill. They did not see 
themselves as choosing to help, they simply had to help. Such 
'spontaneous rescuers' (as Callan calls them) should not be seen as 
witless moral innocents. "Their altruism was something that had 
grown out of their lives to become a fixed and virtually unalterable 
state of character." (p. 36). 
Callan contrasts the goodwill of spontaneous rescuers with that of 
reflective rescuers who carefully deliberate whether or not they 
should help the Jews. Some people might claim that the reflective 
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rescuers exercised autonomy whilst the spontaneous rescuers did 
not. 
It is important to note that the spontaneous rescuers were likely to 
have held a whole set of convictions about the evils of Nazism, the 
persecution of Jews and the wrongness of racism, etc. These 
convictions can be regarded as true or acceptable moral beliefs. 
Furthermore, the spontaneous rescuers can be presumed to have 
engaged in general reflection on these important matters. Indeed, it 
is difficult to make sense of their spontaneous actions without 
presuming that some sort of general reflection along the lines 
indicated had taken place at some stage prior to their rescue 
attempts. 
This kind of general reflection is not the disengaged deliberation of 
the reflectively autonomous agent. "For it is not as if she embarks 
upon an intellectual exercise that cuts her adrift from her moral 
decency, and then, from the lofty height of her disinterested vantage 
point, she opts for decency rather than indecency; it is rather that 
she discovers the pre-emptory authority in her life of her own moral 
commitment." (p. 37). 
Callan examines the notion of reflective autonomy in greater depth. 
In doing so, he raises two fundamental questions: can human beings 
reflect, to any significant extent, on their experiences? If so, what 
is the nature of this kind of reflection? 
He discusses Michael Sandel's Hegelian distinction between 
encumbered and unencumbered selves. "An encumbered self is 
someone understood as comprising the contingent attachments, 
projects and the like that make her the particular, historically 
situated being she is; an unencumbered self is someone construed as 
having an identity abstracted from all such contingencies, an 
identity confined to abstract rational and volitional powers." (p. 38). 
For Sande!, the notion of an unencumbered self is an illusion. In 
reality, the self has certain commitments or attachments. These 
may include love, friendship, patriotic sentiments, communal 
affiliations and cultural and intellectual interests, etc. One may 
value these commitments and attachments, but later modify, reject 
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and replace them with others. This is a matter of choice and here 
the central role of autonomy can be seen. 
Callan goes on to make a distinction between revocable and 
irrevocable constitutive attachments. Irrevocable constitutive 
attachments are those which are vital to my sense of identity. These 
are, "..things that cut so deep that I cannot acknowledge the 
possibility that their forfeiture could ever be for the best, at least 
outside of situations that verge on science fiction..." (p. 39). 
Callan believes that acceptance of revocable and irrevocable 
commitments entails the abandonment of 'reflective autonomy'. "For 
even though the revocability of commitment means that in certain 
circumstances I will stand apart from this or that aspect of the 
self, and reorientate my life in a way that alters who I am, what 
prompts the reorientation will be found in other constitutive 
attachments from which I do not prescind at the time. So one might 
give up Philosophy because one has children to feed and Philosophy 
buys no food or one might give it up to fight a war because one is a 
patriot who thinks the war is just. " (Ibid.). 
This reflection does not involve 'stepping outside' our experience and 
the constituent attachments derived from it. On the contrary, I use 
my constitutive attachments precisely to engage with, modify, 
develop and change other constitutive attachments. 
Whilst I agree that autonomous people will constantly submit their 
constitutive attachments to self-criticism and reflection at some 
point in their lives and that it is not possible to 'step outside' their 
experience in order to do this, I do not agree that this necessarily 
means that we have to abandon the concept of 'reflective autonomy'. 
It entails only the recognition of an on-going creative and reflective 
process through which human beings exercise their autonomy and 
that nothing is immune from reflection or criticism. 
Personal autonomy as expressed in people's life-plans. 
Richard Norman (J.P.E., 1994) believes that 'respect for autonomy' is 
closely connected to the idea of 'respect for life'. He uses Rachels' 
distinction between the 'biological' and the 'biographical' concept of 
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life to illustrate this connection. Respect for life is not respect for 
the simple fact of being alive, a condition we share with animals 
and plants. It is rather respect for having a life. "Each person shapes 
and constructs his or her own life in his or her own way and thereby 
creates his or her biography." (p. 28). 
This capacity for autonomy is linked to the capacity for seeing one's 
life as a whole. However, Norman warns against having an 
excessively intellectualist notion of the autonomous person as 
someone who has a 'life-plan'. The problem with this notion of life-
plans is that it suggests that only the insightful, sensitive and 
consistent are capable of living autonomous lives. On this model, 
people who drift through life would be neither autonomous nor 
respected. The other problem with this model is that although people 
vary in the degree to which they plan their lives and commit 
themselves to their plans, almost no-one actually lives from day to 
day. 
Although our life-plans may not be sophisticated or detailed, we 
still have some conception of 'life as a whole', "...one has a 
consciousness of one's past and a consciousness of possible futures, 
one has memories and one has hopes and one lives one's life in the 
light of these." (Ibid.). Only a person who is mentally ill or deficient 
would live from day to day. Even someone who drifts through life 
without any sense of direction is still living her or his own life. 
Such a person would have an awareness of their past as a 
disconnected sequence and a consciousness of a future which may 
continue as before or change. Though she or he may not have life 
plans, they may still be seen as shaping their lives to some degree. 
The "universal stages of life" are important, e.g., the progression 
through birth, childhood, youth, maturity and old age. These features 
are what give shape to our idea of life as a whole. "It is the 
conjunction of the universal form of a human life as a progression of 
stages, and the unique individual content which each person gives to 
that universal form, that makes up our idea of 'living one's own 
life'." (Ibid.). 
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This emphasis on "seeing one's life as a whole" is important and 
must include an appreciation of the complexity and pervasiveness of 
societal prejudices and misinformation that lead to oppression. For 
the oppressed, 'seeing one's life as a whole', in this sense, is a 
necessary pre-requisite for understanding one's place in society and 
for formulating realistic life-plans which may challenge such 
oppression and lead to a more fulfilling and autonomous way of life. 
Objections to autonomy as a major educational aim. 
Some people live in groups which do not value autonomy and yet 
claim to live fulfilling ways of life. A good example of this is 
fundamentalist religion. Does this count against autonomy as a 
universally desirable ideal or goal? 
It is important to appreciate that for most world religions, the 
believer is expected to listen to God's message and respond to it 
freely. Those who do not respond freely, either because they are 
coerced or ignorant, etc., are deemed not to have freely chosen to 
follow the will of God. In an important sense, they have not 'made 
their religion their own'. Theologically, emphasis on freedom of 
choice with regard to the acceptance or rejection of religious faith 
is usually based on the premise that humans were created with free 
wills, enabling them to choose good or evil. In most world religions, 
God's message is offered to people, not forced upon them, though one 
would be forgiven for misunderstanding this point when one 
considers, for example, the kind of atrocities committed during the 
crusades. 
Barrow (1975: Ch. 8) feels that the pursuit of autonomy as an 
educational aim militates against accepting tradition and authority, 
particularly as enshrined within age-old institutions such as 
cultures, communities and families. 
"Not only is the concept of autonomy very difficult, if not impossible 
to make use of in practice, it is also questionable whether it is an 
ideal of any worth. To aim to promote autonomy in this sense is to 
do no more than to attempt to bring people to hold opinions and to 
behave as they see fit. If we were to sincerely commit ourselves to 
this ideal, it is difficult to see what education has to do with it and 
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why it should be regarded as an educational ideal." (Barrow, 1975: 
p.137). 
On the contrary, I see the development of personal autonomy as a 
safeguard against authoritarianism. People who are used to making 
autonomous choices in their lives are far less likely to succumb to 
authoritarian styles of government and are less vulnerable to 
exploitation in other areas. In learning to be autonomous, we learn to 
be self-reliant and to seek answers for ourselves. 
R.T. Allen believes that the promotion of rational autonomy is more 
likely to destroy the freedom of the individual by: (i)"inculcating the 
desire for an absolute freedom which is impossible and which leads 
only to demolition and not to construction, (ii) destroying the bonds 
of community in which alone freedom can exist, (iii) uprooting the 
individual from tradition and thus (iv) leaving him without any firm 
guides and foundations for his life." 
Allen goes on to claim that people who are educated to be 
autonomous will want to "..completely make themselves. 
Consequently, those aspects of themselves and of their situation 
which they have not chosen or made, will be seen by them as alien. 
They will resent whatever has not been chosen by themselves, and 
will want to be radically free, as Sartre says we are." (J.P.E., 1982, 
p. 202). 
He believes that this will lead to the destruction of traditional 
values, "Yet rational autonomy would have the apprentice judge for 
himself and critically assess his master's competence and 
performance. Hence it must overthrow the communal bond of trust 
and acknowledgement of authority which links apprentice to master 
and disciple to doctor, and all tradition by which the tacit 
dimensions of what we explicitly know (and thus that explicit 
knowledge itself) are transmitted from one generation to the next." 
(Op. cit., p. 203). 
He thinks that this kind of education for autonomy, "...cannot 
consistently prepare the young for any set of social roles in adult 
life, not even those of male and female, as we have recently been 
told." (Ibid.). He warns us that "...if everyone were to choose all his 
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rules in adult life, then there would be no social order and no sets of 
mutual expectations at all." (Ibid.). 
Allen bases these assumptions on a theistic conception of the 
cosmos which accepts that, "...in large measure, we are already 
defined by our historical and cultural context, which, within the 
limits of universal moral principles, we should accept, continue, 
develop and pass on to our successors." (Op. cit., p. 206). 
Allen fails to specify these "universal moral principles" or their 
bases and in so doing he leaves himself open to some fundamental 
criticisms. Our histories and cultures include views which often 
fuel oppression. We should not pass on such traditions and cultures 
uncritically. For example, must we be prepared to accept that women 
are the subordinates of men, a role defined for them by 'nature' or by 
a creator who has pre-determined their roles in life? Are we 
prepared to see black people defined as subordinates in these terms? 
Must we accept that lesbians and gays are unnatural or perverted 
because they too do not measure up to this pre-ordained scheme of 
things? 
The oppression of these people is universal in the sense that it has 
always existed and continues to exist in all cultures and societies. 
It is important that the beliefs and ideologies which lead to such 
oppression continue to be identified and effectively countered. 
Allen's view offers no hope for the liberation of oppressed peoples, 
many of whom suffer precisely because society has, for generations, 
sought to enslave or oppress them, often through the social roles it 
has constructed for them. This does not entail a denial of the very 
many aspects of our societies and cultures that are worth passing 
on. 
We should educate people to evaluate and to choose those aspects of 
our cultures, beliefs and morals that are worth handing on and those 
which must be developed, modified or directly opposed. Allen's 
account does not give sufficient weight to this crucially important 
process of critical reflection and independent judgement. 
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K. Ward is of the opinion that, "Insofar as it is taken to represent a 
distinctive principle, autonomy is not an ideal at all, and its use in 
this sense is a mistake." (E.A., 1983, p. 47). Ward believes that the 
concept of autonomy can be broken down into a large number of 
diverse moral and intellectual principles. 
He rightly asserts that, "One must counterbalance the value of self-
determination with the values of social obligation and 
responsibility." (Op. cit., p. 47). However, these obligations and 
responsibilities have to be spelt out and questioned, they cannot be 
taken for granted or presumed. 
Ward concludes by saying that autonomy, taken alone, "...denudes 
morality of content (leaving that to our decision). It may breed a 
kind of arrogance, which rejects tradition just because it is old or 
unfashionable." (Op. cit., p. 54). 
Independent judgement in moral matters does not necessarily denude 
the content of morality. On the contrary, it may be that one decides 
to accept age-old moral principles after reflecting on them in the 
light of one's own knowledge and experience. 
'Thinking about moral principles seriously' involves what Bernard 
Williams (1985) calls critical reflection. That is, the skill of 
criticism and re-evaluation of one's ethical position, with special 
emphasis on examining and criticising the moral structures and 
institutions which are part of our cultures and societies and which 
we might otherwise be tempted to take for granted. This will not 
necessarily lead to harmony or peace, nor will it guarantee that 
individuals act justly, but it will at least help to ensure that I stand 
back and think seriously about the moral life I am now living or the 
moral course of action I propose to take. 
It is important that we teach young people to control their 
circumstances of life, whenever possible, instead of allowing 
themselves to be controlled by them. This can only be done if we 
teach them to reflect on their experiences and circumstances in the 
social, moral, political and sexual spheres of life. 
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Bernadette Tobin (J.P.E., 1989) outlines the Aristotelian distinction 
between a person who has sound practical judgement and knows how 
to act in particular circumstances of life, and someone who has a 
reflective understanding of the values embodied in her or his 
practical decisions. 
The former has 'the that' (knows that in these circumstances it 
would be good to do 'x'), the latter has, in addition, 'the why' (knows 
how to act in particular circumstances and can justify her or his 
decisions by reference to general goods which are achievable by 
human action). 'The that' and 'the why' constitute the two main 
elements in the knowledge which characterises the person of 
practical wisdom. 
The person of practical wisdom often has to weigh the value of 
competing goods (and the harm or evils) in each situation. Aristotle 
called this process deliberation. "He has to deliberate about how to 
bring about these goals and about the aptness, in each situation, of 
the goals he pursues." (Op. cit., p. 197). 
People of practical wisdom not only act well in particular 
circumstances, they also explicitly understand and accept the values 
they have accepted. They have the 'the why' or 'the because' in ethics. 
"He (the person of practical wisdom) appreciates that the goals he 
pursues, as embedded in the virtues he displays, are constituents of 
human flourishing; that part of his own flourishing which is up to 
him. He consciously endorses what he has become." (Ibid.). 
Morality, for Aristotle, is a matter of objective truths: some ways 
of acting are rich and fulfilling and others are frustrating and 
degrading. However, it is not enough to be trained to act in the 
former ways. "A man of practical wisdom has also been encouraged 
to reflect, carefully and sensitively, on what he has been taught, 
test it against his own experience in the circumstances of his life, 
and, in freely making it his own, to express his own dignity and 
integrity." (Ibid.) 
Autonomy requires that people reflect, if only from time to time, on 
the influences of their culture and society and attempt to see which 
are the expression of their unique character and which are not. 
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People are creatures with a will and therefore the capacity to 
deliberate. This gives them the chance of shaping their own lives and 
'developing a character'. 
The promotion of autonomy as an educational ideal does not 
necessarily undermine morality in any sense, therefore. Nor does it 
necessarily mean that we are bound to adopt any particular brand of 
morality, as Ward suggests. 
If socially responsible autonomy is valued as a major aim for 
education, young people will grow to maturity, trained to deliberate 
on their experience and to make independent judgements about the 
many complex moral and political issues which are part of our 
pluralist societies. Amongst other things, they will be taught 
critically to evaluate and, if necessary, to challenge and combat 
stereotypes, respecting other people's sexualities as an expression 
of diversity, and in some cases, free choice. 
As part of this process of critical evaluation and in the light of our 
earlier discussion, in the introduction, of 'the heterosexual 
presumption' (Epstein, 1994), it is vitally important that all 
citizens come to understand the many complex ways in which 
heterosexuality is often promoted to the detriment of lesbian and 
gay sexualities. 
On another level, citizens have the right to make their sexualities 
their own, in much the same way as we all strive to make moral 
principles our own. In order to facilitate this, it is essential that 
they are allowed critically to assess the attitudes and values 
society holds in relation to their sexualities. 
Within this context, heterosexual students should be encouraged to 
grow in knowledge and understanding of themselves and their 
prospective partners. It is particularly important for men critically 
to examine the ways in which they relate to women and .to 
appreciate some of the unequal power relations that exist within 
such relationships, often preventing women from exercising freedom 
of thought, choice and action. It is also important for both women 
and men to critically evaluate heterosexism as a power which harms 
heterosexuals, lesbians and gays alike. 
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Similarly, lesbian and gay students should be encouraged to grow in 
knowledge and understanding of heterosexualities. They should also 
acknowledge the realities of sexism and develop a deeper awareness 
of themselves and their sexualities. In addition, they should examine 
the ways they are perceived by society. They must develop a 
realistic and critical appraisal of the heterosexist and homophobic 
stereotypes and prejudices that abound in society so that they are 
well prepared to take their place as citizens within the wider 
democratic community. 
Of course, there is a danger that in helping young lesbians and gays 
to understand our homophobic society we may undermine their own 
self-respect and self-esteem, inculcating a reluctance to 
participate fraternally with their fellow citizens in the wider 
democratic community. This can be avoided if they are supported 
within the lesbian and gay communities. It is important for them to 
meet other lesbian and gay youth and to network with older lesbians 
and gays so that they can have role models to help and support them. 
In Britain, wide-ranging and radical law reform is necessary in 
order to make this possible. There must be an equal age of consent 
for heterosexuals and homosexuals so that the enormous pressures 
young lesbians and gays face in relation to their first sexual 
encounters are minimised. It is also vital that the law positively 
supports lesbian and gay teachers in revealing themselves within 
their educational institutions so that they can support and encourage 
the lesbian and gay students they work with. As I shall argue later in 
chapter four, this means the repeal of section 28 and the withdrawal 
of the government circulars which support it. 
Psychological conditions necessary for the exercise o f 
autonomy. 
Strike (1982, pt. I) outlines three components which make up the 
concept of autonomy. People who are not mentally ill or otherwise 
disordered have two important rights that must be safeguarded if 
personal autonomy is to be safeguarded and nurtured. 
38 
1. The right of self-determination in those areas of life that are 
properly left to the individual's discretion. 
2. The right to participate in collective choices (political 
participation). 
In order to protect these individual rights, a free society must 
provide, "...both for the right to participate in collective decisions 
and the right to protection from encroachment by the society." (p. 
67). 
Strike bases these rights on the Kantian view of the value of moral 
agency. Human beings are ends in themselves, moral agents who are 
responsible for choosing wisely on their own behalf and for acting 
justly with respect to others. They are morally responsible for what 
they choose and what they do. 
One can imagine an agent who lives within the perfect participatory 
community which fosters personal autonomy, but who lacks the 
psychological characteristics which enable her or him to function 
autonomously. Strike identifies one of the components of the 
concept of autonomy as 'Psychological freedom': the capacity for 
independent choice, rational judgement and self-control. One must 
be capable of exercising these faculties and not be impaired by brain 
damage, mental illness or other disorders. 
R. Dearden (S.C. Brown, 1975, Ch. 1) outlines the sort of 
psychological characteristics an autonomous person should have, and 
in doing so, complements and extends Strike's analysis of 
psychological freedom. These include: 
(1) Wondering and asking with a sense of the right to ask what the 
justification is for various things which it would be quite natural to 
take for granted. 
(2) Refusing agreement or compliance with what others put to one 
when this seems critically unacceptable. 
(3) Defining what one really wants or what is really in one's inter-
ests, as opposed to what may be conventionally so regarded. 
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(4) Conceiving of goals, policies and plans of one's own, and forming 
purposes and intentions of one's own independently of any pressure 
to do so from others. 
(5) Choosing among alternatives in ways which could exhibit that 
choice as the deliberate outcome of one's own ideas or purposes. 
(6) Forming one's own opinion on a variety of topics that interest 
one. 
(7) Governing one's actions and attitudes in the light of the previous 
sorts of activity. 
Dearden concludes, "At the centre of these activities, and common to 
them all, is the forming of one's own independent judgement...Advice 
may be sought, persuasion may be listened to, authoritative utter-
ance may be heard, yet there remains the person's own mind to be 
made up on whether s/he will agree or disagree or comply, or 
whether s/he will reject or resist." (Op. cit., p. 7). 
It is possible for someone to lack capacities or virtues such as 
courage, not because they are mentally damaged or ill, but because 
of the sort of person they are. They may have very low self-esteem 
or lack the courage of their convictions. Such people have been 
pejoratively labelled as having 'low moral fibre', a vague term which 
is meant to signify a kind of moral cowardice. Unless one has some 
degree of courage, it is hard to see how one could manage to act 
autonomously in very difficult circumstances. Take, for example, the 
citizen living within a dictatorship who feels strongly that she 
should speak out against some injustice, but who fails to act due to 
lack of courage. 
Justin Oakley (1992) points to other possible deficiencies of 
character which could seriously affect a person's ability to function 
as a moral agent. In the context of our present discussion, a person 
who lacks care, compassion, sympathy and concern, for example, 
will not only fail to be affected by others' plight, but will be likely 
to view personal autonomy in an entirely selfish manner, taking 
little account of the need for social responsibility. 
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This has important implications for education. The character traits I 
have briefly outlined are important necessary conditions for the 
exercise of socially responsible autonomy. I have already 
acknowledged that they are also necessary conditions for the 
flourishing of participatory democracy itself. They can be supported, 
reinforced and nurtured by an education which encourages the 
exercise of such virtues. I shall develop these claims in the next 
chapter. 
Socially responsible personal autonomy. 
The exercise of personal autonomy within a democratic context is of 
a totally different character to the exercise of personal autonomy 
per se. Within democratic communities, the right of individuals to 
exercise personal autonomy is not absolute or unqualified. In this 
context, autonomy must be exercised with a sense of social 
responsibility. Autonomy does not involve the right to do whatever 
we please. What we do affects others. People must be free to 
exercise personal choices and decisions, but the rights of all people 
to be treated equally and to be free to exercise such personal 
choices and decisions must also be protected. 
This protection of people's freedoms will inevitably, even 
paradoxically, mean that someone's freedom is going to be 
compromised or abandoned in favour of someone else's. It may well 
be that, on some occasions, the collective rights of others in the 
community will take precedence over the individual's right to 
exercise autonomy. There will be occasions when people freely 
choose to curtail or deny their personal autonomy for the good of 
society. The state has an important role to play in ensuring that 
everyone has the right to equality of treatment and to exercise their 
freedom of thought, expression, belief and action, provided they 
limit, as far as possible, harm to others and respect others' 
autonomy. 
Socially responsible personal autonomy requires a certain sort of 
society for its growth and development. Society should provide the 
kind of education needed to train and encourage students in the 
personal or psychological skills and virtues necessary in order for 
autonomy to flourish. 
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This can be achieved through studying the subjects on offer within 
the fairly broadly based school and college curricula and through the 
many other educational activities and experiences which take place 
within the informal curricula of such institutions. 
Good citizens are independent learners and thinkers, unlikely to 
succumb to undue state interference or control. This is also the 
hallmark of good students. Education systems should be designed in 
such a way as to recognise and develop people's personal autonomy. 
Cramming or rote learning do not succeed in doing this. Thus, the 
development of personal autonomy, exercised in a socially 
responsible manner, with due regard to one's fellow citizens and 
their rights, should be seen as a major aim for education within any 
democratic state. 
In addition to developing the content of and approaches to education, 
we must also maximise opportunities for the responsible exercise of 
autonomy by examining obstacles to its exercise within our 
educational institutions. We should start (using Lindley's model) by 
examining the ways in which people are or become heteronomous 
(Lindley, 1986). 
We can combat such heteronomy in two ways: (i) by ensuring that 
discriminatory processes, attitudes and structures in education 
which militate against the responsible use of personal autonomy are 
countered in the ways outlined in chapter seven, (ii) by educating 
children in those skills and virtues which will encourage critical 
enquiry as well as the growth and development of personal 
autonomy. 
If this kind of socially responsible personal autonomy is seen as a 
key aim for education, the scene is set for free, wide-ranging 
enquiry which should include, amongst a whole variety of other 
things, lesbian and gay issues. The ideal of education for autonomy 
is not simply a well established, popular liberal educational ideal, 
but an essential pre-requisite for radical political change. Creating 
a democratic society where lesbians and gays can make their 
sexualities their own and disclose themselves freely is the only 
effective means of ensuring that they achieve full participation as 
citizens. It is also an important means of ensuring that the 
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democratic state is based on genuinely participatory ideals. Thus, 
the promotion of autonomy for lesbians and gays and other oppressed 
peoples is a matter of fundamental importance for the democratic 
community as a whole. 
The wider social conditions necessary for the effective and 
responsible exercise of personal autonomy are the same as those 
required for the establishment of participatory democracy: a basic 
minimum of welfare provision, equality of educational 
opportunities, freedom of thought and expression, protection by the 
law, participation in the control of power at all levels. 
These social conditions are necessary in order to ensure at least 
some measure of equality among citizens within participatory 
democracies so that they can be enabled to participate as fully as 
possible and on relatively equal terms with others in the democratic 
community. 
The right kind of social conditions ensure that citizens are not 
prevented from exercising their individual freedom because of 
external restraints beyond their control such as extreme lack of 
resources (in terms of money, welfare provision, educational 
opportunity) or repressive laws, etc. In this way, society becomes 
the guarantor of personal autonomy. 
Joseph Raz (1990) argues that the provision of a sufficient range of 
options in life is necessary if personal autonomy is to be exercised, 
and Ross Poole (R.P., 1975) cites Hegel's belief that, "...it is a 
necessary condition of my being free that I live in a certain form of 
community." (Op. cit., p.11). It is clearly possible for a person to be 
autonomous, but lack the necessary freedom to exercise it because 
of imprisonment, military conscription or state control of various 
kinds. There is, then, an important relationship between the kind of 
community or society in which one lives and the extent to which one 
can exercise autonomy effectively. I shall argue that a community 
built on the principles of participatory democracy is the best means 
of supporting socially responsible personal autonomy. I begin by 
examining the kind of elite democracies which are prevalent 
throughout the world today in order to illustrate, by contrast, the 
kind of participatory democracy I wish to advocate. 
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Macpherson (1977) analyses the roots of our present elitist 
democracies. Liberal democrats of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries sought to fit a democratic structure onto the class divided 
society in which they lived. They devised their systems in such a 
way as to ensure that the principle of 'one person one vote' would 
not endanger property held privately or the continuance of class 
divided societies. Bentham and James Mill based their theories on 
two beliefs: 
Firstly, the belief (also shared by J.S. Mill) that all people want to 
maximise their own good and happiness and are interested in 
maintaining the sanctity of private property. "The institution of 
property, when limited to its essential elements, consists in the 
recognition, in each person, of a right to the exclusive disposal of 
what he or she has produced by their own exertions, or received 
either by gift or by fair agreement, without force or fraud, from 
those who produced it. The foundation of the whole is the right of 
producers to what they themselves have produced." (The Principles  
of Political Economy., bk. II, Ch. 2, sect. 1, p. 21 5). 
Secondly, their observations of the lower classes which led them to 
believe in the habitual deference of the lower to the higher classes. 
"Our opinion, therefore, is that the business of government is 
properly the business of the rich, and that they will always obtain 
it, either by bad means, or good. If they obtain it by bad means, the 
government is bad. If they obtain it by good means, the government 
is sure to be good..." (James Mill, 1830). 
The main tenet of Utilitarianism is 'The greatest happiness of the 
greatest number.' In counting happiness, each individual should count 
as one. It is also believed that each individual seeks to maximise 
their own pleasure as a matter of fact. Therefore, a rigid system of 
law and government is necessary in order to control this situation. 
The political requirement is a democratic franchise, secret ballots 
for leaders, frequent elections and freedom of the press. Bentham 
was not happy with the democratic franchise, but he was pushed to 
it by his utilitarian principle and his view of the intrinsic 
selfishness of human nature. The democratic process now becomes 
protective. It ensures that egoists act altruistically by ensuring 
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that political leaders put forward policies which have the interests 
of the community at heart. If such policies do not meet with the 
approval of the general populace, they (along with their proponents) 
can be rejected by them. This was the first modern model of 
democracy. 
J.S. Mill saw democracy as a means of self-development and 
expressed optimism that the working class would improve itself. He 
did not accept existing capitalist society unreservedly as Bentham 
and James Mill had done. Society need not be a collection of 
competing and conflicting self-interested consumers. The Greatest 
Happiness aggregate was obtained by permitting and encouraging 
individuals to develop themselves. This made them capable of higher 
pleasures and he believed this would increase the aggregate of 
pleasure in quantity and quality. 
J.S. Mill was not a full egalitarian. His political system allowed 
different numbers of votes to people of different occupations, 
arguing that some would be more competent to judge complex 
political issues than others. Further, Parliament itself would not 
initiate legislation. It would simply approve, reject or send back for 
reconsideration, legislative proposals from an expert, elected 
commission. 
In his book, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942), 
Schumpeter attacks democratic systems because they are concerned 
with ends. Democracy is rather a political method, a kind of political 
arrangement for arriving at political (legislative and 
administrative) decisions. 
Schumpeter used an economic model to illustrate how he thought 
democracy should operate. The competition for leadership is the 
main feature. Voters (like consumers) choose between the policies 
(products) offered by competing political entrepreneurs and parties. 
They regulate the competition, just as trade associations do in the 
economic sphere. Thus, parties act to maximise votes (profits) and 
voters act to maximise their own utility. The voter becomes a kind 
of consumer, paying for the policies of her or his choice with votes. 
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There are many problems associated with Schumpeter's use of the 
economic model of democracy: 
(1) Macpherson (1977) notes that not all markets are necessarily 
democratic. In the democratic as well as in the economic sphere, 
other forces come into play. 
(2) The analogy of votes (political purchasing power) to money 
highlights another flaw: in a society of inequality of wealth like 
ours, one voter's influence is not the same as another's. My influence 
is not the same as a multi-millionaire's, since she or he has vastly 
more political power than I. For example, it is well known that in 
Western democracies, the wealthy support political campaigns 
economically in return for political 'favours' if the party concerned 
comes to power. The wealthy also fund lobbying organisations to 
promote their interests with elected representatives. 
(3) Schumpeter's followers subsequently claimed that his theory 
was purely explanatory, not recommendatory or normative, but this 
is not the case, for central to his theory is a belief that the citizen 
must act rationally (in regard to voting patterns, etc.) and that self-
interest motivates human behaviour and is the goal of individual 
action. 
(4) The theory's basic assumption about the quality of the 
electorate's political knowledge tends to undercut its own 
effectiveness. If citizens are so unreliable in these areas, why 
suppose that they will be any better when it comes to electing 
leaders? 
It is impossible to separate competence in selecting leaders from 
competence in selecting policies. A precondition of judging leaders 
is that we judge their plans for achieving certain objectives. 
Leaders are not chosen in a moral, political and social vacuum. 
(5) Most importantly, there is little or no place, within this model, 
for the individual with an independent, autonomous set of demands, 
since the 'demand schedule' is dictated by the suppliers (ruling 
elites). 
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Schumpeter's theory is a fairly accurate empirical description of 
Western democracy and how it operates, but it does not allow for 
free and effective participation and is not, in this sense, truly 
democratic. Macpherson observes that, "...a system of competing 
elites with a low level of citizen participation is required in an 
unequal society." (Wringe, 1984). 
Berelson, in his book Voting, presents a functionalist view very 
different from Schumpeter's, but with the same aim. He lists the 
qualities and attitudes that democracies require of the average 
citizen (interest and participation in political affairs). He notes that 
the average citizen does not possess these. 
He sets out the conditions necessary for democracy to survive: (i) 
intensity of conflict must be limited, (ii) the rate of change 
restrained, (iii) social and economic stability maintained, (iv) a 
pluralist social organisation and basic consensus must exist. 
The heterogeneity found in people's attitudes and behaviour in our 
society are desirable. Citizens all have different qualities and 
attitudes, but to control this situation we need to cushion the shock 
of disagreement, adjustment and change which might result if all 
had an equal say in the democratic process. We do this by ensuring 
limited participation. 
In the end, Berelson is willing to sacrifice a system of free and 
effective participatory democracy for the sake of 'stability'. 
In an early work, R.A. Dahl in, A Preface to Democratic Theory  
(1956), puts forward an elitist model of democracy, which he later 
radically changed to something more akin to a participatory model 
(Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy, 1982, discussed later in this 
chapter). 
In his earlier work he concludes that the majority rarely rules. 
Democracy is characterised by the rule of minorities. A system of 
periodic elections and competition between parties may not result 
in majority rule, but it does vastly increase the size, number and 
variety of minorities whose preferences must be taken into 
consideration by leaders making policy decisions. Dahl thinks that 
47 
the main influence citizens should have within the democratic 
process is in the election of leaders. For Dahl, political equality is 
universal suffrage (one person one vote). Officials must listen to 
various groups and expect to suffer if they do not placate any 
particular group. 
There are two processes which lead to minorities having some 
influence in politics: (i) the electoral process. Elections cannot 
ensure that the preferences of the majority in terms of policy are 
successful. Competing parties may try to form a majority by 
adapting their policies in response to the wishes of some intense 
minorities. Where the majority are indifferent or apathetic, a vote-
winning strategy for policies will dictate preference to the wishes 
of the intense minority. (ii) The activities of pressure groups acting 
on governments and bureaucracies. All active and legitimate groups 
can make themselves known and heard at some stage in the process 
of decision making. 
Far from diminishing equality by allowing the minority to overrule 
the majority, Dahl claims that these processes really restore 
equality by allowing individuals to affect decisions which are 
important to them, even if they are a minority. 
Dahl is too Utopian in his view of society. He fails to take into 
account socio-economic and other inequalities which Marxist 
theorists like Macpherson point to. Only minorities who are highly 
motivated and highly skilled and educated or who are wealthy or 
have access to wealth succeed in making any impression on the 
leaders. Macpherson points out that once a group has gone to the 
immense effort of organising itself (in terms of finance, personnel, 
time and energy, etc.) it might well remain in existence for good or 
ill, perhaps influencing decisions which only marginally affect all 
its members. This is the case in Western societies where wealthy 
elites still have a massive impact on social policy and government 
because of their immense influence and power in the financial 
sector. 
On 19 October, 1994 in Britain, the Egyptian owner of Harrods, 
Mohamed al-Fayed, claimed he had given the Tories f250,000 and got 
nothing for his money, and had paid Tory ministers to put down 
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Parliamentary questions on his behalf when they were back-
benchers. He claimed he knew a lot more about widespread 
corruption and wanted the British people to know about it. A junior 
Minister (Tim Smith, M.P. for Beaconsfield) later resigned after 
admitting accepting L2000 to table a question. 
One should also take into account the existence of Parliamentary 
lobbying companies. For example, Ian Greer Associates promotes the 
interests of 60 corporate clients and has an estimated turnover of 
L3m a year, employing over 50 staff (The Sunday Times, 23 October, 
1994, p. 15). al-Fayed allegedly paid Greer a total of L130,000 over 
four years for "parliamentary services" (Ibid.). 
A further indication of the close links between powerful companies 
and the British Parliament can be gained by looking at the large 
number of consultancies held by Members of Parliament. For 
example, David Mellor (Putney) has 10 (income: f100,000), Patrick 
Nicholls (Teighbridge) 9 (income: L90,000), Sir Jerry Wiggin 
(Weston-super-mare) 6 (income: L60,000), Sir Donald Thompson 
(Calder Valley), 5 (income: L50,000). (Ibid.). Hundreds of other 
examples can be culled from the Register of Members' Interests. 
Within the context of a society where the rich have a powerful 
influence on government, there is also a problem of permanently 
excluded minorities such as the disabled, ethnic minorities, lesbians 
and gays. In such cases it is almost impossible to avoid majority 
tyranny. 
These are common features shared by all elitist theories: 
(1) They are empirical theories, grounded in present-day political 
attitudes and behaviour as revealed by sociological investigation. 
(2) The democratic element in the theories is the competition 
between leaders of elites for votes at periodic, free elections, 
through which some minorities have control over their leaders. 
(3) Participation is reduced to the choosing of decision-makers by 
means of voting for them. The function of participation is 
protective, it safeguards the individual from the arbitrary decisions 
of elected leaders. 
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(4) The conditions necessary for the stability of the democratic 
system are: (i) The level of participation by the majority should be 
kept to the minimum necessary to keep democracy working because 
non-democratic attitudes are common among the masses. (ii) Social 
training or socialisation in the democratic method. 
The case for participatory democracy. 
The word 'democracy' comes from the Greek words 'demos' (the 
people) and 'kratos' (power). This suggests that democracy is a form 
of government in which power resides with the people. The form that 
this exercise of power takes is diverse, as we have seen from our 
examination of elitist democracies. An important question is: to 
what extent should the people participate in democratic forms of 
government? 
It is important to say something in practical terms about the kind of 
participatory democracy I am arguing for. Anne Phillips (1991) notes 
that the only really effective way of guaranteeing a perfect 
reflection or representation of society would be if all citizens met 
in national assembly. Clearly, in very large societies such as ours, it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, to allow citizens full 
participation in every aspect of local and national life. 
There is also the problem of representation. For example, within the 
context of the British system, it would be ridiculous for women 
M.P.s to claim that they only represented women, black M.P.s only 
black people, etc. Further, the effort to gain more women 
representatives or representatives from ethnic minorities will not 
guarantee that women are represented as women or that ethnic 
minorities are represented as ethnic minorities. These groups are 
not homogenous, they are composed of many different individuals 
and groups of people, each with their own beliefs, cultures and 
political agendas, etc. It is therefore often very difficult to define 
these groups' shared interests. 
Phillips sees Iris M. Young's idea of a rainbow coalition as providing 
an answer to the seemingly intractable problem of representation. 
Young does not focus on the degree to which the sexual (or other) 
composition of a society is reflected in the legislature. She argues 
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that oppressed groups should have a guaranteed role in policy 
formation. 
"Such group representation implies institutional mechanisms and 
public resources supporting three activities: (1) self-organisation of 
group members so that they gain a sense of collective empowerment 
and a reflective understanding of their collective experience and 
interests in the context of their society; (2) voicing a group's 
analysis of how social policy proposals affect them, and generating 
policy proposals themselves in institutional contexts where 
decision makers are obliged to show that they have taken these 
perspectives into consideration; (3) having veto power regarding 
specific policies that affect a group directly, for example, 
reproductive rights for women, or the use of reservation lands for 
Native Americans." (I. Young, Ethics, 1989, pp. 261-262). 
It is difficult to envisage how such a power of veto would work in 
practice. However, Young's idea that oppressed groups should be 
encouraged by government support (in terms of resources and 
practical encouragement) to reflect collectively on the nature of 
their oppression and the strategies needed to oppose it and to 
formulate or criticise policy proposals is very attractive. 
In practical terms, I believe that Britain should retain its present 
representative structures of local and national government with the 
proviso that we examine them critically and open them up to a 
genuine cross-section of the pluralist democratic community. The 
British Parliament itself is not truly representative of all sections 
of the democratic community in terms of race, sexuality, disability 
and gender, for example. 
Like Iris Young, I would argue that citizens must be allowed to 
participate more fully and effectively in the formulation of policies 
at national and local levels. It is necessary to ensure that all forms 
of representative assembly (including parliamentary and government 
committees of various kinds) are required to consult and to listen to 
the views expressed by our diverse cultures and communities. It is 
also important that proposed government policies are communicated 
to the populace as a whole in terms that are easily understood by 
them. 
51 
This task can be made much easier by the mass media. However, 
before the mass media can be used constructively we must 
endeavour to counteract the damaging effects they sometimes have. 
It is unfortunate that television, radio and newspapers are often 
used to propagate views which militate against the kind of pluralist 
participatory democracy espoused by this thesis. 
If the mass media do not rid themselves of ignorance and prejudice, 
they cannot be trusted to convey important government policy in an 
unbiased and objective manner. In practical terms, it is therefore 
important to monitor and if necessary regulate the mass media to 
ensure that they do not encourage discrimination or oppression. The 
media must demonstrate their commitment to objectivity and to the 
ideals of participatory government. 
Finally, the more widespread use of referenda is important where 
matters of national interest are at stake. 
Within education, policy decisions should be formulated by 
representative assemblies which include a cross-section of groups 
within the democratic community: educational experts, teachers, 
parents, students, politicians and ordinary citizens. Important 
educational decisions should not be left in the hands of any one of 
these groups. 
I shall argue in detail in chapters four and five that there can be no 
place, within this democratic context, for according parents a 
privileged role when it comes to making important educational 
decisions. Of course, parents must be allowed to have their say, but 
their influence should not be allowed to exceed that of other 
citizens involved in the processes of consultation and discussion. In 
the light of this, the undue influence accorded to 'the family' by the 
present British government through its laws and pronouncements 
(discussed in chapter four) is unjustified. 
The combined knowledge, expertise and experience of a broad section 
of the democratic community should be utilised when important 
educational decisions are taken at national and local levels. This is 
the only effective way ensuring that such decisions are wise, just 
and meet the needs of the particular communities concerned. 
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The case for participatory democracy rests on two important claims: 
1. Democracy based on participatory principles is the best means of 
ensuring that socially responsible autonomy is supported and 
encouraged. 
Democracy is self-rule, rather than rule by others. Human beings are 
capable, in principle, of deciding how to live their own lives. They 
must be allowed to reflect on their experience and to make rational 
and moral choices and judgements under their own, not someone 
else's, control. Participatory democracy is the best means of 
generating the conditions which enable autonomous people to 
flourish. Such democracy depends upon the personal autonomy of its 
citizens for its survival. A system of government in which people 
are not truly free to deliberate, choose and act is not a democracy. 
The democratic state must therefore strive to maximise the 
opportunities available for the creative processes of reflection, 
decision-making and independent judgement. However, the 
maximisation of autonomy should not be promoted above all else. 
Autonomy is a qualified notion. In a system of participatory 
democracy, we do not have the freedom simply to do as we please. 
Keith Graham (1988) outlines an issue of major importance for any 
discussion of democracy. Decisions on laws, etc. are made if they 
attract the support of a majority of some sort. The problem then 
arises: if people agree to obey the state in all cases, they lose 
autonomy. However, if they decide autonomously whether or not to 
obey the state in each case, the state loses its authority. 
Graham's answer to this problem is that sometimes it is rational to 
forfeit autonomy. In the end, forfeiture of autonomy is to be 
minimised rather than avoided altogether and at all costs. At the 
conclusion of a debate, say, in a representative assembly, someone's 
autonomy will be thwarted, it is simply a question of whose. 
In general, majority voting in representative assemblies ensures 
that the exercise of autonomy is maximised. We may freely choose 
the democratic process, but this does not necessarily guarantee the 
individual's freedom of choice in every subsequent situation. 
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2. Participatory democracy is based on the principles of equality and 
respect for persons. 
Because participatory democracy recognises the equality of all 
citizens and is based on the principle of respect for persons, it is of 
crucial importance in supporting social and political change which 
will free groups such as heterosexual women, the disabled, ethnic 
minorities, lesbians and gays from discrimination and oppression. 
Within a participatory setting, all citizens should be treated equally 
unless there are good reasons for not doing so. Colin Wringe feels 
that the right to be governed democratically rather than in any other 
way rests on "...the absence of any convincing argument why any 
person should consider himself the natural subordinate of, or less 
important than, any other." (Wringe, 1984, p. 22). 
Because participatory democracies recognise the equality of 
citizens, they also recognise the necessity of according people 
significant roles in the decision-making process. They differ from 
other forms of government in that they seek the effective 
participation of all citizens in government at local and national 
levels. 
To have no active interest in or influence over important decisions 
that affect your life is to be alienated from yourself as a rational, 
autonomous agent. Keith Graham (1988) characterises participatory 
democracy as essentially a conception of democracy with no 
fundamental dichotomy between active leaders and a passive, inert 
mass. Consequently, participatory democracy tackles a major 
problem thrown up by the elitist model: the apathy, ignorance and 
powerlessness of ordinary citizens. 
The argument for participatory democracy is further strengthened by 
the following general considerations: (i) Karl Popper acknowledges 
that the modern world is a very complex place. We learn about the 
world by trial and error, by hypothesis and refutation. Feedback on 
our progress is essential if we are to succeed. Participatory 
democracy has the advantage of using the combined knowledge and 
judgement of most if not all the citizens involved. The dictator can 
encourage such feedback, but she or he can ultimately reject it if 
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necessary. (ii) Participatory forms of government encourage 
dissatisfied citizens to express their disquiet and also ensure that 
the government is sensitive to the views of the electorate. (iii) 
People feel more committed to decisions they have helped to make. 
(iv) A government based on participatory principles rules more 
justly because criticisms of policies and leaders are an integral 
part of its modus operandi. (v) Participatory democracy provides the 
best conditions for wide-ranging and informed debate, including 
lesbian and gay issues. 
The social conditions necessary for participatory 
democracy. 
What social conditions are necessary if this kind of participatory 
democracy is to flourish? J. Lively (1987) highlights the importance 
of political equality and notes that universal suffrage and the 
adoption of appropriate decision-making rules are not sufficient to 
attain this. A whole variety of psychological, social and economic 
considerations are also relevant. Political equality depends on other 
sorts of equality. 
R.A. Dahl in Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracies (1982) abandons his 
earlier elitist position and puts forward a participatory model. He 
claims here that an ideal democratic process would satisfy five 
criteria. Each of these criteria presuppose a set of enabling social 
conditions to ensure that citizens exercise real power: 
1. Equality in voting, "In making collective, binding decisions, the 
expressed preference of each citizen...ought to be taken into account 
in determining the final solution." (op. cit., p. 6). 
2. Effective participation: the citizen should have control of the 
process of decision making at all stages, especially in setting the 
agenda and in expressing preferences with regard to the final 
outcome. 
3. Enlightened understanding: each citizen should have "...adequate 
and equal opportunities for arriving at his or her considered 
judgement as to the most desirable outcome." (Ibid.). 
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4. Final control over the agenda: "The body of citizens (the demos) 
should have the exclusive authority to determine what matters are 
or are not to be decided by means of processes that satisfy the first 
three criteria (put in another way, provided the demos does not 
alienate its final control over the agenda it may delegate authority 
to others who may make decisions by non democratic processes.)." 
(Ibid.). 
5. Inclusion: the "The demos ought to include all adults subject to its 
laws, except transients." (Ibid.). 
Patricia White (1983) complements and extends Dahl's criteria by 
citing a list of basic rights which every citizen must possess if 
democracy is to flourish. These should be part of a constitutional 
framework. I have listed them differently, but they include: 
(a) Freedom of thought and expression. 
(b) Protection by the rule of law. 
(c) Participation in the control of power at all levels. 
(d) A basic minimum of welfare provision. 
(e) Opportunities: the right to education and the sampling of 
different ways of life. 
(f) White also includes in her list of rights, non-discrimination on 
grounds of sex. 
With regard to rights (e) and (f), I would add that the right to 
education and the sampling of different ways of life should also 
involve an appreciation of different views of life and that people 
should not be discriminated against on the grounds of sex or sexual 
orientation. 
The basic rights identified by White are intended to specify the 
general conditions required for a flourishing democratic polity, but 
they are equally important in ensuring effective democratic 
participation. 
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Freedom of thought and expression and protection by the rule of law 
are important. Without such basic guarantees, political participation 
will be severely restricted and perhaps prevented altogether. Only 
the right to control of power at all levels ensures that such 
participation will be comprehensive and effective. 
Basic welfare provision is important. We must recognise that a 
person's participation in democratic government at various levels 
may well be adversely affected by their economic circumstances. 
Many people are understandably pre-occupied with money matters, 
trying to ensure that they and their families are provided for. 
Compared to this central concern, political participation may take 
second place or may not be considered at all. 
We must also examine the ways in which wealthy minorities 
influence society in a way which is out of all proportion to their 
number. 
Safeguarding these basic rights ensures that participatory 
democracy is given the chance to grow and prosper, but such rights 
are inadequate, of themselves, to promote the continuation and 
survival of participatory democracy. 
The most important right which safeguards the conditions necessary 
for effective participatory democracy is the right to equality of 
opportunity. In this context, Marxist analyses alone are inadequate 
because there are inequalities in our society which cannot easily be 
reduced to a simple class divide. These include discrimination on the 
grounds of race, sex, disability and sexual orientation. Many people 
are excluded from full participation because they are oppressed by 
society and state. 
On one level, this does not seem to be the case, for they all have the 
vote and to this extent they are equal to other citizens, but on 
another more fundamental level, they do not have equal political 
rights. Many ethnic minorities are excluded from work due to racial 
prejudice. They are also often limited in educational opportunity and 
achievement. 
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Heterosexual women suffer discrimination in these areas too, as do 
lesbians, gays and the disabled. The really powerful and influential 
elites in our societies are composed, to a large extent, of men. The 
very machinery of 'democratic' government is riddled with 
inequality. For example, it is startling to appreciate how few women 
in Britain hold senior positions within local or national government 
as Counsellors, M.P.s, Cabinet Ministers, Civil Servants, etc. 
Anne Phillips (1991) notes that regardless of when women gained 
the right to vote and stand in elections (1902 in Australia, 1920 in 
the U.S.A., 1928 in the U.K. and 1971 in Switzerland), women's 
participation in national government in all these countries has 
remained between 2-10%. In the case of the U.S.A. and in Britain, 
this figure is approximately 5%. 
Figures are similar for local politics, "By 1983, women 
representatives had captured 18% of the seats in the West German 
councils; 14% on the French conseils; 14.4% on county councils in 
England and Wales; 11.1% on regional councils in Scotland; and 7.9% 
on district councils in Northern Ireland (Lovenduski 1986). By 1985, 
women made up 14% of the membership of municipal and township 
governing bodies in the United States, but had been elected Mayor in 
only four of the hundred largest cities (Randall 1987: 105)." (p. 60). 
In 1991 there were only 43 women out of 650 members of the 
British Parliament, only 28 women out of 435 members of the U.S. 
House of Representatives. 
The majority of lesbians and gays who hold such senior national and 
local government positions do so because they do not reveal their 
sexualities publicly. For this reason we cannot be certain what 
percentage of such senior positions are held by 'closeted' lesbians 
and gays. 
Oppressed people do not usually have the money or the resources 
with which to make their voices heard. If governments are serious 
about allowing the full participation of citizens, they must remedy 
this situation by improving people's socio-economic circumstances 
and providing equality of opportunity in education and employment. 
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The participation of the oppressed. 
An aspiring democracy built on participatory principles is concerned 
to hear the views of all its citizens, including the oppressed. This 
thesis is not simply a plea for the recognition of oppressed peoples, 
it provides a challenge to participatory democracy itself. The very 
existence, survival and growth of participatory democracy depends 
on the full recognition and participation of all people. Therefore, 
combating oppression of various kinds which limits or prevents such 
participation is the task of all citizens. 
In order to win social justice for excluded and oppressed minorities 
and encourage their greater participation, we must critically 
examine oppressive social and institutional structures and 
practices. I shall argue in chapter five that this process of 
examination and evaluation involves, in part, the scrutiny of our 
educational establishments, their curricula and the way they are 
structured in order to ensure equality of treatment and freedom 
from unjust discrimination for all citizens. 
How, then, are we effectively to bring about social justice for the 
oppressed and what precise form should their participation take? 
Iris M. Young (1990) provides us with a valuable response. Young's 
essential point is that social justice requires more than the 
"melting away" of the differences that oppressed groups exhibit. It 
requires that society promotes recognition of and respect for group 
differences without oppression. 
Young sees oppression as a complex concept which can be broken 
down into five categories: exploitation, marginalisation, 
powerlessness, cultural imperialism and violence. 
Oppression is defined as, "...the exercise of tyranny by a ruling 
group", but Young thinks that the many political movements of the 
1960s and 70s (centred on women, people of colour, lesbians and 
gays) helped to enlarge this meaning to include "...the disadvantage 
and injustice some people suffer not because a tyrannical power 
coerces them, but because of the everyday practices of a well-
intentioned liberal society." (Op. cit., p. 41). Using Foucauldian 
analyses, she sees oppression as structural: it is not simply the 
59 
result of certain individuals' behaviour. Rather, "...its causes are 
embedded in unquestioned norms, habits and symbols, in the 
assumptions underlying institutional rules and the collective 
consequences of following those rules." (p. 41). 
Oppression, in this structural sense, refers to the injustices 
inflicted on some groups because of the often unconscious 
assumptions and reactions of ordinary well-meaning people. These 
take place in the context of ordinary social interaction, but also 
within the media, cultural stereotypes and bureaucracies 
encountered in everyday life, what Foucault calls "the technologies 
of power" (discussed in the Introduction). 
Young shares Foucault's belief that the elimination of such 
structural oppression is not easy because it is systematically 
reproduced in economic, political and cultural institutions. We 
cannot rid ourselves of the powers of oppression simply by deposing 
rulers or changing laws. 
One aspect of oppression discussed by Young is marginalisation. 
"Marginals are people the system of labour cannot or will not use." 
(Op. cit., p. 53). She sees this as the most dangerous form of 
oppression. "A whole category of people is expelled from useful 
participation in social life and thus potentially subjected to severe 
material deprivation and even extermination." (Ibid.). Marginalisation 
can occur because of sex, age, disability, or presumably, in cases 
where it is made visible or explicit, sexual orientation. 
Young goes on to examine the category of powerlessness. "The 
powerless are those who lack authority or power...those over whom 
power is exercised without their exercising it; the powerless are 
situated so that they must take orders and rarely have the right to 
give them...the powerless lack the authority, status, and sense of 
self that professionals tend to have." (Op. cit., 56-57). 
Among the privileges enjoyed by professionals is 'respectability'. 
"To treat people with respect is to be prepared to listen to what 
they have to say or to do what they request because they have some 
authority, expertise or influence." (p. 57). In reality, oppressed 
people such as women and people of colour have to prove or 'work 
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for' their respectability. This also includes lesbians and gays who 
have 'come out', though Young does not include the latter in her 
analysis at this point. 
Young goes on to look at the concept of cultural imperialism. "To 
experience cultural imperialism means to experience how the 
dominant meanings of a society render the particular perspective of 
one's own group invisible at the same time as they stereotype one's 
group and mark it out as the Other." (Op. cit., pp. 58-59). Cultural 
imperialism takes place in societies where the dominant group's 
experience and culture is universalised as 'the norm'. "The dominant 
groups project their own experience as representative of humanity 
as such." (p. 59). As Foucauldian analysis points out: within 
contemporary societies, anything which does not approximate to the 
dominant culture or which differs markedly from it is deemed to be 
deviant, perverse, abnormal and, in some cases, dangerous. 
Epstein's (1994) concept of 'the heterosexual presumption' can be 
used to extend Young's analysis at this point. The heterosexual 
presumption is, in Young's terms, a kind of sexual imperialism: the 
assumption that heterosexuality is the only valid or 'normal' form of 
sexuality and that its existence is universal (except in rare cases of 
perversion or abnormality). 
Young completes her analysis with a discussion of violence. She 
sees violence as "...a phenomenon of social injustice" (p. 62) and not 
simply a moral wrong because it is systematised as a social 
practice. Members of some oppressed groups live with the fear of 
random, unprovoked attacks on their person or property, which have 
no motive other than to psychologically or physically hurt or harm. 
What makes violence systematic is the fact that it is directed 
against the individuals composing a given group simply because they 
are members of that group. Members of oppressed groups experience 
not only violence, but the threat of violence; they feel liable to 
violent attacks. 
Young's analysis is a sober reminder of the complexity and difficulty 
of the task of enabling oppressed minorities such as lesbians and 
gays fully to participate in society. Such participation requires a 
revolution in the way that many oppressed minorities are perceived, 
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valued and treated by the dominant culture. 
A central argument of this thesis is that the pre-requisite for this 
kind of social change is a democratic education system which will 
enable students fully to understand such oppressed minorities and, 
at the same time, come to terms with the many complex ways in 
which the dominant culture has asserted itself to their detriment. I 
shall argue in chapter four that such an education must also involve 
'consciousness raising' so that students can appreciate what is 
important and valuable in the lives of lesbians and gays. This 
process of consciousness raising involves either a shift in 
someone's values, or their perceptions of oppressed peoples, or 
perhaps the realisation that a value someone is committed to 
applies in an area they had not realised it did. 
A major psychological condition necessary for the establishment and 
development of participatory democracy is that citizens are taught 
and nurtured in certain desirable character traits. These include 
virtues like altruism, respect for persons, fraternity and toleration. 
Without such virtues, democracy is an ideal, a theory, or worse still, 
a fiction. It is of fundamental importance that citizens possess 
these character traits in order for democracy to become a way of 
life. The importance of these virtues and their place within 
democratic education systems will now be explored. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
THE DEMOCRATIC PERSONALITY. 
Introduction. 
F.W. Garforth (1985) provides us with a useful definition of value: 
"The word "value" is used to indicate that something is regarded as 
having worth, as attracting choice or preference. Value is thus the 
property of being choice worthy and it attaches to objects, like 
money, cars and books, to states of mind, like happiness or 
contentment, to modes of behaviour like courtesy, kindness and 
loyalty, to moral qualities like temperance and chastity, and to 
innumerable other items of human choice." (Op. cit., p. 55). 
I take "virtue" to mean desirable or choice worthy personal qualities 
or character traits. The concept of virtue is more limited in scope 
than value, referring to important aspects of the agent's personality. 
In the previous chapter, I made two claims about participatory 
democracy: it provides the best conditions for autonomous 
flourishing, and it is based on the principles of equality and respect 
for persons. This is why full and effective participation is valued 
and encouraged. 
This chapter will outline certain key virtues which are the 
indispensable pre-requisite for establishing and maintaining the 
existence of democratic communities based on participatory 
principles. Without such democratic virtues, participatory 
democracy as a way of life could not exist. 
R.S. Peters (1981) sees democracy as, "...a way of life in which high 
value is placed on the development of reason and principles such as 
freedom, truth-telling, impartiality and respect for persons, which 
the use of reason in social life presupposes." (p. 37). 
Peters sees these values as procedural, by which he means that they 
influence how social, political and personal life ought to be 
conducted. However, they do not provide a blue-print for an ideal 
society or indicate what sort of life is worth living. "Indeed, there 
is a certain sense in which democracy manifests a certain 
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scepticism about values in that no single conception of the good for 
man is acknowledged, and fallibility rather than certainty tends to 
be emphasised in the realm of truth." (p. 37). 
He believes that, "Encouragement for the individual to make 
something of himself is feasible only in a society in which respect 
for persons and its offshoot of toleration are widespread. These, 
together with impartiality and concern for others, are the 
fundamental principles of the democratic way of life, in which as 
much as possible is decided by discussion rather than by 
authoritative fiat." (p. 42). 
It is important to add that as well as educating and nurturing 
citizens in these virtues, we must also encourage the spirit of 
independent reflection and judgement, argued for in the previous 
chapter, so that people can critically evaluate situations in which 
the exercise of a given virtue might or might not be appropriate, 
however fundamental such a virtue might be taken to be. 
Education in the virtues. 
Is it possible to teach virtues in the first place? Gilbert Ryle (in 
Dearden, Hirst, Peters, 1975) acknowledges that the acquisition of 
virtues cannot be a wholly in-born phenomenon. People who are 
brought up well possess virtues such as frankness, loyalty, honesty, 
etc. They are evidently not born with such virtues, they have to learn 
them, though, as we shall see, the precise identification of who 
teaches them is far from easy. 
Protagoras tells Socrates that learning the virtues is rather like 
learning to speak in one's mother tongue. In both cases, one acquires 
knowledge, without formal instruction, from a variety of sources. 
There is another parallel between learning the virtues and learning 
one's mother tongue: nearly everyone knows about general standards 
of conduct. Sometimes, moral issues are complex and we may need 
the help of someone of experience and sound judgement to help us 
make our moral judgements, just as we may occasionally need to 
consult a dictionary or book of grammar to help us with aspects of 
language. 
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Ryle notes some fundamental differences between learning 
competences and skills and acquiring virtues: 
(1) Children may differ enormously in their ability to acquire 
language, depending on their aptitudes and up-bringing. 
(2) A child may be very proficient in her or his mother tongue, but 
may mis-use this proficiency to tell lies, spread gossip, etc. Ryle 
concludes that, "...a child can indeed pick up the main techniques of 
conversational English from the conversation of any English 
speakers with whom he associates; but this does not suffice for him 
to acquire standards of conversational conduct." (p. 50). 
A person may be taught how to play cards, but this will not teach her 
or him anything about the desirability or otherwise of cheating. This 
brings into focus Socrates' question: How, if at all, can virtue be 
taught? 
Ryle's important insight is that acquiring a virtue is not a matter of 
being well informed about anything or of coming to learn how to do 
anything. "Indeed conscientiousness does not very comfortably wear 
the label of 'knowledge' at all, since it is to be honourable, not only 
primarily to be knowledgeable about or efficient at anything..." (p. 
54). 
Ryle believes that Socrates made the mistake of assuming that the 
learning of virtue terminates in knowing. However, Ryle points out 
that, "...the knowing terminates in being so-and-so, and only 
derivatively from this in knowing so-and-so- in an improvement in 
one's heart and only derivatively from this in an improvement in 
one's head as well." (Ibid.). A person learns to be honest or not to 
cheat. Only derivatively does she or he know that honesty is a good 
thing or realise that cheating is wrong. 
Ryle's point is that I may learn something (e.g. another language) and 
gradually become 'rusty' through lack of practice and may eventually 
lose the capacity. However, a person who has learned to be 
considerate, though she may eventually become inconsiderate, will 
not usually be described as having forgotten how to be considerate 
or to have become rusty at being considerate. "It is not just 
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knowledge that he has lost, whether knowledge that or knowledge 
how. It is considerateness that he has lost; he has ceased to be 
considerate and not just ceased to know, say, some principles about 
considerateness. His heart has hardened, so it is not reminders or 
refresher courses that he needs." (p. 55). As we shall see, being 
virtuous or good has as much to do with being a certain sort of 
person as it has to do with knowing the principles of right and 
wrong. 
Young people learn virtues from diverse sources, including: (a) some 
of the elders who bring them up: parents, relatives, teachers, etc., 
(b) people they happen to meet or live among, (c) people they hear 
about or read about. Most of these people could not be classed as 
teachers because they are often unaware that anyone is trying to 
live up to them. They are often unintentional models. Indeed there 
would be something rather odd if this were not the case, "...in 
matters of morality, as distinct from techniques, good examples had 
better not be set with an edifying purpose. For such a would-be 
improving exhibition of, say, indignation would be an insincere 
exhibition; the vehemence of the denunciation would be a parent's, a 
pedagogue's, or a pastor's histrionics." (p. 56). 
He concludes by suggesting that we should not ask the question, 'Can 
virtue be taught?', but rather, 'Can virtue be learned?' Clearly, 
people can learn virtues, but the manner of their inculcation and 
learning is diverse and unspecifiable in any detail. 
This should not prevent us from recognising the place of the virtues 
in education. Indeed, it should encourage us to be aware of the many 
contexts (for example, formal and informal curricula) in which 
people, particularly the young, learn virtues from their surroundings 
and their communication with others. 
Factors such as the way a school is organised, its aims and ethos, 
the formal and informal relationships between young people and 
teachers are just as important, perhaps more important, than the 
subjects offered within the formal curricula of schools and colleges 
in contributing to the learning of young people in this area. 
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Living democracy: the democratic personality. 
Participatory democracy as a way of life is constituted by people 
who possess certain democratic virtues. 
There is a parallel between being a good democrat and leading a good 
life. Justin Oakley (1992) notes that performing good actions is only 
one aspect of 'living a good life', "...living well perhaps more 
importantly involves the development of a certain good character as 
an enduring way of being which underlies and informs it." (p. 39). 
Living a good life involves the whole person, emotions as well as 
intellect. He sees emotion as, "...a complex which involves 
dynamically related elements of cognition, desire and effectivity." 
(Op. cit., p. 6). 
Bernadette Tobin (J.P.E., 1986) points out that, "...morality is a 
matter of how one feels and the spirit in which one acts as well as 
what one thinks."(p. 204). If moral maturity is a matter of becoming 
a certain sort of person, the same is true as far as becoming a 
mature democrat is concerned. 
Is there, then, a suitable kind of personality for democracy? There 
are dangers in espousing this idea. I do not wish to advocate the 
brainwashing of citizens so that they conform to a particular kind of 
democratic norm. On the other hand, one can see that it is important 
to educate people in the democratic virtues so that they may choose 
to live fulfilling and happy lives as other-regarding citizens, 
strengthening and supporting the democratic community. 
This dual emphasis on the individual citizen and the community is 
important. Democratic virtues help the citizen to participate fully 
and effectively in the life of the community, but they also, at the 
same time, constitute the very nature of that community. Without 
the democratic virtues the democratic community would be a 
utopian fiction. If this point is grasped, the importance of education 
in these virtues becomes clear. 
As I shall argue in chapter six, the formal curriculum of an 
institution, together with its ethos and principles, strengthened, and 
to a large extent, defined by its policies and procedures, have a deep 
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influence on students' personalities. 
G. J. Direnzo (Ichilov, 1990) sees personality development as, "...the 
psychological formulation of the individual in terms of uniquely 
personal or individuating abilities. Personality may be defined as 
one's acquired, unique, dynamic, yet relatively enduring system of 
internal predispositions to behaviour." (p. 26). 
Key democratic virtues. 
I do not intend to list all the possible virtues which may be useful in 
supporting and strengthening democratic communities. Such a list 
would inevitably include virtues not necessarily related to 
democracies at all. For example, kindness, patience, generosity, 
courage, initiative and strength of will. 
I am highlighting the virtues of respect for persons, reciprocity, 
fraternity and toleration as the necessary conditions for 
establishing participatory democracy as a way of life. 
Some writers see autonomy itself as a virtue. John Benson is of the 
opinion that "To be autonomous is to trust one's own powers and to 
have a disposition to use them, to be able to resist the fear of 
failure, ridicule or disapproval that threatens to drive one into 
reliance on the guidance of others...autonomy, like courage- to which 
it is closely allied- is an essential virtue that everyone needs." 
(Doyle, 1973, Ch. 8.). 
It is unhelpful to see autonomy as a virtue. Certainly, autonomy is 
supported and helped in its development by desirable character 
traits or virtues, but if one classifies autonomy itself as a virtue, 
one is in danger of saying that only the virtuous are autonomous. 
There seems to be something amiss here because we all know that 
one can be acting autonomously in a way that harms others. This 
underlines the need, emphasised in the previous chapter, for 
education in the socially responsible exercise of autonomy, rather 
than simply 'education for autonomy' per se. Such education requires 
the inculcation of desirable character traits on which socially 
responsible autonomous action depends. 
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Direnzo (Ichilov, 1990) acknowledges the negative side of Western 
societies: "...dehumanisation and alienation are emerging as 
distinctive marks of people in Western societies. Such individuals 
are perceived to have become less individualistic, less autonomous, 
less inner-oriented, and less innovative. They are correspondingly 
more other-directed, conforming, sheepish, and essentially 
chameleon-like, changing appearances at will and taking on the 
colouring of a variety of social atmospheres as needed." (p. 35). 
In order to counteract these negative societal traits, democracies 
need a social character that is altruistic. If people have a sense of 
social responsibility, they will feel a genuine commitment to the 
democratic societies in which they live. This is a necessary 
condition for the establishment and development of such ways of 
life. John White (O.R.E., 1989) supports this position: "We should 
freely acknowledge that we are taking a life containing altruism as 
a baseline; and that as educators, or educators of educators, we 
want young people to be brought up so that they do too." (pp. 37-38). 
This kind of altruism entails the recognition that others are equally 
agents. It implies the need for respect for persons as individuals 
with purposes of their own and involves the acknowledgement that 
if human beings are to flourish, they must be allowed freely to 
choose the particular way of life they wish to live. Within a 
democratic setting, the fact that I want to live my own sort of life 
should be linked to an appreciation that others may wish to do 
likewise and should be allowed to live in peace, provided no harm is 
caused to others. 
Respect for persons is related to fairness and what Rawls calls the 
sense of justice. Rawls supports the widely held view that human 
beings are essentially social animals who have strong instincts for 
self-preservation and protection. They also have a deep need for 
security and this latter need is satisfied through their relationships 
with the members of the society in which they live. In terms of 
evolution within species which live in stable societal groups, the 
ability to comply with fair and co-operative arrangements and to 
develop the sentiments necessary to support them will be very 
advantageous. Rawls concludes that, "These conditions guarantee 
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innumerable occasions when mutual justice consistently adhered to 
is beneficial to all parties." (Rawls, 1990, p. 503). In this way, 
justice, "strikes a balance between altruism and the claims of the 
self and therefore involves a notion of reciprocity." (Op. cit., p. 502). 
This sense of justice must be based on the belief that everyone has 
equal liberty and we must be further assured that, "our claims will 
not be neglected or overridden for the sake of a larger sum of 
beliefs, even for the whole society..." (p. 499). Within such a society, 
individuals will build up real self-esteem and will be inclined more 
towards altruistic attitudes. 
The essential pre-requisite for developing a sense of justice, solid 
self-esteem and an interest in others' welfare is an equal society. 
"The improvement in political institutions removes that opposition 
of interests and the barriers and inequalities that encourage 
individuals and classes to disregard one another's claims." (p. 502). 
A sense of justice and the virtue of respect for persons helps to 
ensure the survival of democratic communities based on 
participatory principles. Without respect for persons and a sense of 
justice, there would be no reason why the needs of others should be 
taken into account or why their needs and wants should take 
precedence over mine, especially in situations where these conflict. 
It is especially important that citizens appreciate the need to 
respect oppressed people, including lesbians and gays, and to oppose 
discrimination and the mis-information that encourages it. Even 
people who believe homosexuality to be wrong, for moral or 
religious reasons, should still be interested in preventing the unjust 
treatment of lesbians and gays or countering inaccurate or 
misleading information about them. They should, for example, be 
concerned to correct the fallacy that all lesbians and gays are 
paedophiles. This kind of opposition to misinformation and 
discrimination is the necessary condition for genuine debate on 
these issues, though it is far from sufficient. 
Respect for persons involves having the sort of perspective on life 
which may be summed up crudely by the old adage, 'do unto others as 
you would have them do unto you'. This is what Carol Gould (1988) 
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calls reciprocity, which is "...the ability to understand the 
perspective of the other as equivalent to one's own, and a readiness 
to act with respect to the other in a way that is equivalent to the 
other's actions with respect to oneself, as well as to have an 
expectation that the other will understand and act similarly. Thus, 
epistemologically, the structure involves a shared understanding by 
the participants that their actions are reciprocal." (p. 290). 
A key feature of reciprocity is reciprocity of perspectives, going 
beyond the limits of one's own view and allowing the establishment 
of a shared point of view, as well as an explicit understanding of 
differences in points of view. She illustrates this by reference to 
the nuclear armaments debate. What is required here is that each 
side understands each other's need for security and the fear that 
people have of attack in order to establish common ground for a 
moratorium on testing and for de-escalation. 
Fraternity is also based on respect for persons. It supports and 
complements reciprocity. It involves feelings of comradeship and 
togetherness, co-operative attitudes, encouraging a bond between 
oneself and others; a view of others as equals. This does not imply 
that one has to be the friend of everyone or even like everyone. One 
should establish a feeling of co-operativeness, which is not an 
extension of mere toleration but positively encourages collaboration 
directed towards common democratic goals, thus creating the 
essential conditions in which democracy can be established and will 
flourish. 
Michael Fielding (Chitty, 1987) presents fraternity as a regulative 
principle within which this kind of equality and liberation can 
flourish in a way which is conducive to democratic communities. 
This is brought out in the following quotation from Halsey (1981), 
"Liberty and equality can operate as social principles only within the 
bounds set by fraternity...They offer the basis for a new fraternity 
without which both liberty and equality are impoverished..." (pp. 10-
12). 
Fielding emphasises the importance of liberty, equality and 
fraternity as fundamental principles of democracy. They are related 
to each other and "...it is this interconnectedness which gives them 
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emancipatory potential. Each on its own is only contingently related 
to democracy and the excesses of each uninformed by the significant 
presence of the others may lead, for example, to a freedom which 
favours only those with wealth and power, to an equality which 
mistakes uniformity for fulfilment, or to a fraternity whose 
boundaries are narrowly drawn around the disguised template of 
fascism." (Op. cit., p. 57). 
A key feature of fraternal relationships is that they are caring 
relationships, "...not just for some aspect or part of someone, but for 
them as a person. They are personal, not functional relationships. 
Secondly, they are characterised by liberty and equality. Fraternal 
relations cannot exist if these are absent; without liberty and 
equality, their growth is temporary or distorted." (Op. cit., p. 61). 
Finally, I would single out toleration as an important virtue which 
ensures at least the basic minimum of give-and-take within the 
pluralist democratic communities of today. At the same time, it 
implies a recognition that citizens have the right to live as they 
choose without interference. 
Toleration should not be limited to moral judgements or points of 
view. The tolerant person is someone who is willing and able to 
listen to any alternative point of view, in for example, moral, 
political, social, religious and aesthetic contexts. Those who 
cultivate a tolerant attitude will be less likely to dismiss other 
points of view or ways of life out of hand. A tolerant person is one 
who is not naive about the many irresolvable conflicts and 
disagreements in life, but is able, essentially, to live with them. 
Toleration, with all its intricacies and difficulties, is necessary in 
order to ensure that human beings flourish in harmony and peace 
together. 
Toleration is clearly not a universally good or desirable principle. 
One can think of examples where toleration might be disastrous: for 
example in cases of rape, paedophilia, racism, etc. We must be 
careful to impose certain limits on toleration, certain constraints 
of justice. 
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With regard to lesbian and gay sexualities, people may ask why they 
should be tolerant of ways of life they find morally or aesthetically 
distasteful. There are two aspects to my reply: (i) I will argue, in 
the next chapter, that there are no legitimate moral arguments to 
suggest that lesbians and gays are intrinsically bad or evil; they are 
no more or less evil than heterosexuals, (ii) feelings of disgust and 
distaste are widespread in this area, but the fact that I find 
something distasteful is not a sufficient reason for banning it or 
discriminating against it, especially if my disgust and distaste are 
based on irrational prejudice or misinformation. 
This latter point applies equally to feelings of disgust and distaste 
with regard to people of different ethnic groups, the disabled, and 
people who are despised for an infinite number of other seemingly 
trivial and illegitimate reasons: the short, the tall, the large, the 
freckled, etc. When people display these negative attitudes towards 
lesbians and gays, they must be challenged within this wider context 
of the irrational likes and dislikes some people display towards a 
variety of groups and individuals in society. 
I want to identify two aspects of toleration: the individual and the 
institutional. 
On an individual level, it is important that people are encouraged to 
be tolerant of individuals and groups, their societies, cultures, 
traditions, ways of life, or sexualities which may not necessarily 
appeal to them or of which they may disapprove for other reasons, 
providing that such people do not pose a threat to the democratic 
community. Toleration at this level, then, involves the inculcation of 
tolerant attitudes, values and behaviours. 
On an institutional level, toleration by the state (through its laws 
and institutions) provides protection for individuals or groups who 
might otherwise be interfered with, oppressed or discriminated 
against. Here, toleration ensures non-interference by the state and 
its citizens. This is what Isaiah Berlin called negative liberty. 
Institutional toleration must also encourage citizens to cope with 
and positively welcome the reality of the increasingly pluralist 
societies in which they must live and work. 
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Toleration, as the nurturing of a 'live-and-let-live' attitude to life, 
and the promotion of people's individual flourishing, is based on the 
virtue of respect for persons and their liberty discussed earlier. If 
we demand the right as individuals freely to choose our own way of 
life and develop our own perspectives on life, we must, in all justice 
and fairness, allow others the same right. 
If toleration is such a risky business, why bother with it? What are 
its advantages? Toleration is necessary as a pragmatic principle or 
device helping at least to ensure that pluralism (for example of 
culture, politics, religion or sexuality) can be accepted and lived 
with. 
Society is prone to conflict on many different levels. Anthony Black 
(J. Horton & P. Nicholson, 1992) characterises these conflicts in 
biological terms, "...human beings should enable themselves 
collectively to replicate in the social environment that degree of 
homeostasis that exists generally in plant and animal communities 
(in which many different species coexist and adaptively interact) or 
in populations within a single species." (p. 165). 
Whether one sees the need for peaceful co-existence or harmony in 
biological terms (as a means of encouraging the relatively trouble-
free propagation of the species) or in social or cultural terms (as 
helping to nurture the flourishing of individuals or groups within 
larger communities), toleration will always be an important 
pragmatic principle in any pluralistic society as a means of coping 
with various forms of tension or strife. 
Susan Mendus (1989) outlines three necessary conditions of 
toleration: 
(i) toleration occurs in circumstances of diversity. 
(ii) it occurs in circumstances where the nature of diversity gives 
rise to disapproval, dislike or disgust. It is important to appreciate, 
here, as Peter Gardner elsewhere (Horton & Nicholson, 1992) points 
out, that the reasons we have for disapproving of an action may be 
quite distinct from the grounds for toleration, "...someone might 
disapprove, say, of some form of sexual practice on religious 
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grounds, and yet hold that it should nevertheless not be prohibited, 
because this would violate equal respect." (p. 95). 
(iii) the tolerator must be in a position to influence (socially or 
legally) the behaviour of the tolerated. 
These conditions of toleration are what separates it from liberty, 
licence or indifference. "Simply to allow the different practices of 
others, whilst not objecting to them, disapproving of them, or 
finding them repugnant, is not to display tolerance, but only favour 
liberty." (Op. cit., p. 8). 
Mendus supports the Millian view that diversity is not a good in 
itself. It is a necessary precondition of human flourishing. This is 
why intolerance can be a real evil, especially if it leads to 
oppression and suppression. "We may think (though we need not) that 
the world would be a better place if there were no homosexuals in it. 
However, to suppress (by legal or social disapproval) the practice of 
homosexuality would be to stunt the very nature of those individuals 
themselves. It would be the moral equivalent of foot binding." (Op. 
cit., p. 51). 
It does not follow that we allow every kind of diversity 
indiscriminately (including, for example the habits of the 
pyromaniac or the rapist). Nevertheless, diversity is an important 
feature of human life which we cannot simply ignore, but must live 
with. 
Mill's commitment to liberty and diversity is based on two 
fundamental beliefs: "...the belief that human nature is diverse and 
can only flourish if allowed to express itself in all its diversity, and 
the belief in individual autonomy, which dictates that the life which 
is worth living is, supremely, the life which is self-chosen and self-
determined. Such a life cannot be obtained or sustained in the 
absence of an adequate range of options, and thus diversity is a 
precondition of autonomy." (Op. cit., p. 55). 
In order to affect the social and political changes necessary to 
encourage this kind of diversity and personal autonomy, Mendus puts 
forward a suggestion similar to Marion Young's idea of a coalition of 
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different cultures and interest groups, discussed in chapter one. 
Such a construction of what she terms socialist unity, from 
different solidarities, cultures and communities is, in itself, a 
demand for toleration. It is an articulation of the desire to be 
involved in the wider community, "..but on one's own terms. without 
taking on wholesale the values of the whole community." (Op. cit., p. 
157). 
Socialist unity can be seen as a complicated, often dangerous, 
construction of many different solidarities, some of which will 
inevitably be in conflict with each other. Toleration, within this 
context, helps to promote a very minimal sense of citizenship. Yet, 
as Mendus points out, socialists must want to go further than this: 
citizens also have to feel that they belong. To this extent, toleration 
can also have positive content in the sense of positively welcoming 
diversity. 
In the next chapter, I shall put forward a strong case for lesbian and 
gay equality with heterosexuals. In the light of this, is mere 
tolerance of lesbians and gays enough? On one level, the answer is 
no. As Peter Johnson puts it, "Those who are merely tolerated (my 
italics) know what it is like to be in receipt of good intentions, to 
be condescended and patronised. Equally, those who tolerate may 
allow only on condition of good behaviour or with the provision that 
the tolerated remain compliant. Bare permission can be close to 
indifference." (Horton & Nicholson, 1992, p. 148). 
Susan Mendus believes that we should tolerate "homosexuals" 
because they have no choice in their sexualities, "Whatever may be 
said about the moral repugnance of homosexuality, about the deep-
rooted belief that homosexuality is 'at best an inferior way of life 
and a worse a sickening perversion', it is also important to bear in 
mind that we have very little control or choice about our sexual 
preferences. To this extent, talk of 'preferences' is itself 
misleading." (Op. cit., p. 150). 
This is not an adequate defence of the grounds for tolerating 
lesbians and gays. Would Mendus change her position if it was found 
that some or all lesbians and gays freely chose their sexualities or 
that sexualities are a continuum in human lives (a possibility I 
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accept in the next chapter)? If lesbian and gay sexualities were 
chosen, what status would she give to the real "moral repugnance" 
that many in our society feel at lesbian and gay sexualities? Do 
these become grounds enough to justify intolerance? Mendus does 
not address these important questions. 
Mere toleration alone is inadequate to ensure that attitudes change. 
What is also required, if our present society is to grow towards 
genuine participatory democracy, is that citizens are educated to 
identify and challenge the negative aesthetic or moral judgements 
they make about oppressed minorities, including lesbians and gays. 
Education, within this participatory setting, is the means of 
ensuring that the need for mere toleration fades and gradually 
disappears as the fallacies and misinformation that surround lesbian 
and gay sexualities are exposed and countered. 
Conclusion. 
I have argued that in order for participatory democracy to be more 
than a set of principles or a worthy ideal, it should be grounded in 
certain essential virtues possessed by its citizens. 
A democratic community should be essentially other-regarding or 
altruistic. Such a society should promote a respect for persons as 
individuals with life-plans and purposes of their own. People should 
be allowed to live as they choose, providing they do not harm others. 
This belief is based on reciprocity, the ability to see another's 
situation in life as if it were one's own. 
The need for fair, co-operative arrangements requires a sense of 
justice, involving a belief that others should be treated with the 
same fairness I expect to receive. It also entails an 
acknowledgement that allowing others to flourish autonomously is 
beneficial to both myself and the democratic society as a whole. 
Encouraging people to establish fraternal relationships with one 
another provides a context in which lesbian and gay issues can 
fruitfully be addressed. Fraternity does not require that all citizens 
fully understand, approve of, or find lesbian and gay sexualities 
aesthetically pleasing, but it does provide a baseline from which 
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fruitful dialogue can grow. Citizens who want to promote the 
flourishing of participatory democracy must work together to ensure 
its continuance and survival. This necessarily involves tackling the 
problems of all those who are excluded from full participation. 
Individual toleration requires that people possess suitably tolerant 
attitudes, values and behaviour. Institutional toleration, expressed 
by society's laws and institutions, promotes, and if necessary 
enforces, a pragmatic principle of toleration, providing the minimum 
of protection so that oppressed peoples can achieve some measure of 
security, freedom and peace. It is important for all oppressed groups 
that the democratic community promotes both individual and 
institutional toleration primarily through its education systems, but 
also through its legal and other institutions. 
Pluralist societies such as ours require toleration if they are to 
function effectively and peacefully. Toleration has positive content, 
it is not a mere 'letting alone' or a 'live and let live' attitude to life, 
it is the welcoming of and respect for differences. Promoting this 
positive view of toleration, especially within education, would also 
have the beneficial effect of promoting equality of treatment and 
opportunity for many oppressed minorities. 
The key democratic virtues outlined here are important in providing 
a stimulus for consciousness-raising and an awareness of the need 
for lesbians and gays to be, at worst, tolerated and at best, 
liberated. Citizens who possess such virtues will be more likely to 
appreciate the realities, possibilities, challenges and dilemmas of 




THE EQUALITY OF LESBIANS AND GAYS WITH HETEROSEXUALS. 
Introduction. 
I have argued for socially responsible autonomy and participatory 
democracy as major social and educational aims. In the previous 
chapter, I examined the key virtues which citizens should possess in 
order to make participatory democracy a reality and experience it as 
a way of life. I shall now discuss the treatment of lesbian and gay 
citizens within that framework. 
We can draw parallels between the need for lesbian and gay equality 
and the kind of equality sought by other people within the spheres of 
sex, class, race or disability. In practice, our educational 
establishments do not promote effective equality of opportunity in 
any of these areas, often refusing to recognise the existence of 
lesbians and gays. 
One important reason for this is that people are not sure that they 
want to promote equality of opportunity for sexual dissidents. 
Lesbians and gays are often seen as transgressors against the norm 
of heterosexual behaviour. It is therefore important to examine 
claims that lesbians and gays are somehow abnormal, perverted, 
unequal or inferior. If these claims can be disproved, the way lies 
open for discussion and action which will bring about equality of 
treatment for lesbians and gays within our educational institutions 
and the wider democratic community. 
Lesbian and gay sexualities: given or chosen? 
On one level, the question of whether one is born with a definite 
form of sexuality or can choose it is an important issue. From 1852-
1863, Casper, writing in Germany, developed the distinction between 
innate and acquired characteristics that was to influence the debate 
for generations. Havelock Ellis, writing from 1897 to 1910 and 
Richard Von Krafft-Ebbing (1906-1935) followed Casper in 
accepting that some forms of homosexuality were congenital, whilst 
others could be acquired. 
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Havelock Ellis later distinguished between inversion, a purely 
congenital condition and perversion, an acquired condition. This 
invert/pervert distinction was used by moral reformers of the 
1950s and 1960s. 
'Inversion' is the theory that gay men assume reversed sex roles, 
seeing themselves as women trapped in men's bodies, and lesbians 
vice versa. The theory was probably influenced by the existence in 
Paris and London (beginning in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries) of meeting places for people of the same sex who wished 
to socialise and/or engage in same-sex sexual activity with one 
another. In London, these places were known as Molly Houses. Here 
men dressed as women and assumed women's names. 
Some of the early sexologists, believing that sexualities were 
largely congenital, campaigned for legal reform and more liberal 
attitudes towards homosexuality. Clearly, if it were possible to 
prove that lesbians and gays are 'born that way', it would follow that 
it is impossible to persuade people- particularly the young- to adopt 
this form of sexuality. 
Many writers in the field of sexual politics assume that we have two 
clear-cut positions. On the one hand, the essentialists who claim 
that sexual orientations are biologically 'given', on the other, the 
social constructivists who claim that we choose our sexual 
orientations in various ways. The situation is actually more complex 
than this because the social constructivist can also claim that 
sexual orientation is, to all intents and purposes, a 'given'. 
Freudians, for example, would claim that early parental influence is 
crucial in establishing our sexual orientations in later life. Thus, not 
all social constructivist positions necessarily allow for a 
significant element of choice in the formation of our sexual 
orientations, they can contain essentialist elements. 
The social constructivist, therefore, may adopt one of two positions: 
1. The essentialist view that societal and environmental influences 
determine the sexual orientation of an individual very early in life 
(e.g. a Freudian analysis of early parental influence). 
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2. The view (shared by writers such as Michel Foucault and Jeffrey 
Weeks) that sexual orientations are not fixed essences which we all 
acquire either at birth or soon after. On this model, everyone is 
capable of adopting a whole range of sexual orientations throughout 
their lifetimes. For example, some lesbian feminists claim that they 
have made a political choice to establish single sex relationships, 
largely as a reaction against various forms of patriarchy. 
Of course, social constructivists who maintain this second position 
admit that people do actually seem to be predominantly and 
permanently heterosexual, but this is not surprising because of the 
way things are organised by society and its institutions, which are 
based on heterosexism (the belief that heterosexuality is more 
important or valuable than any other sexual orientation) and on the 
assumption that sexual orientations are a 'given', a fixed way of 
behaving sexually. 
These two basic assumptions mean that we are all positively 
encouraged to become heterosexual at a very early age because of 
the prejudices and disadvantages that society creates for us if we 
consider the lesbian, gay or bi-sexual options. 
A more accurate description of the two protagonists in this debate 
is in terms of those who believe in a degree of freedom of choice in 
the formation of a sexual orientation and those who see sexual 
orientation as, in some sense, a 'given'. The essentialist begins with 
the presupposition that we are born with a particular sexual 
orientation or are strongly persuaded, soon after birth (e.g. by our 
parents or by wider social circumstances), to adopt a sexual 
orientation which is thereafter 'fixed' for life. This presupposition 
is then justified with reference to sociobiology, psychology, etc. 
J. Martin Stafford and Michael Ruse are examples of writers who 
adopt the essentialist position. Ruse believes that, "As far as sexual 
orientation is concerned, just about all of the causal theories 
suggest that this is something found rather than chosen. One is 
straight or gay by destiny and not by choice...it is something which 
comes about by the forces of nature." (Ruse, 1988, p. 172). Stafford 
believes that, "Homosexuality is no more alterable than 
heterosexuality- and for the same reasons." (Stafford, 1985, p. 5). 
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The earliest modern scientific formulations of lesbian and gay 
orientations were biological. The essence inhering in homosexuals 
was variously described in terms of sex drives, brain centres, germ 
plasm, genes and hormonal secretions. The sociobiologists, 
following this line of enquiry, are still interested in determining the 
genesis of sexuality, often with reference to hormonal theories (e.g. 
Lorraine et. al., 1971, Meyer-Bahlburg 1977, 1979, 1984; Sanders et. 
al., 1984). 
Hormones contribute to the male and female ability to function 
biologically as male and female. They also contribute to the male or 
female's inclinations so to function (e.g. a eunuch castrated before 
puberty has little or no sexual drive). 
One difficulty with scientific research in this area is that hormone 
levels fluctuate daily and even hourly, so their measurement is very 
difficult and often leads to inaccuracy. More importantly, the 
relationship between hormones and homosexuality is not a simple 
one of cause and effect. It is not true that gays have an excess of 
female hormones and lesbians an excess of male hormones. If this 
were the case, correcting the imbalance would be a relatively 
simple matter. However, it has been found that where correction of 
such a purported imbalance is attempted, lesbians and gays still 
retain their original sexual orientations. 
No one has proved that hormonal differences somehow cause 
homosexuality. Many of these studies suffer from grave deficiencies. 
For example, many hormone experiments are conducted on rats. Rats 
are not humans; they are not even primates. It is impossible to make 
valid generalisations from one species to another in such 
circumstances. Michael Ruse admits that "...for the time being we 
may have to make theoretical bricks with very little empirical 
straw." (Koertge, 1985, p. 15). 
Recent versions of the essentialist position have been formulated by 
sociobiologists who assume that lesbian and gay sexual orientations 
are a distinct reifiable trait. If lesbian and gay sexualities are an 
evolved trait, they must have a genetic basis. Sociobiologists, 
attempting to search for this basis, have posited the existence of 
homosexual and heterosexual genes transmitted through the 
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evolutionary process of natural selection and controlling a person's 
entire sexual behaviour. 
In 1991 Dr. Simon Le Vay, a scientist at the Salk Institute at San 
Diego, California, found slight structural differences in the 
hypothalamus of the brains of gay men. Other researchers identified 
further structural differences in different areas of the brain, but 
were unable to say whether this resulted from environmental or 
genetic influences. 
In July 1993, Dr. Gene Hamer, director of a research team based at 
the National Cancer Institute near Washington D.C., published an 
article in the journal Science, claiming that he had evidence to link 
a region of the X chromosome- which men inherit from their 
mothers- to the sexual orientation of some gay men. Hamer studied 
the X chromosome of forty pairs of gay brothers. Thirty three of the 
gay pairs had the same chromosome region, implying that 65 per 
cent of families studied were passing on a gene responsible for 
homosexual orientation. The gene has not been isolated and the 
mechanism by which it operates is unclear. It might act directly on a 
sex-specific area of the brain or indirectly through influencing a 
personality trait. 
He emphasised that this does not account for each and every case of 
homosexuality, "Given the intricacies of human behaviour, it is not 
surprising that a single genetic locus fails to account for all the 
variation seen in the study group." (The Independent, 18 July, 1993). 
He stressed that this does not mean that all those people who have 
the 'gay gene' would necessarily be homosexuals; environmental 
influences are also very important in the formation of sexualities. 
If a biological explanation is found for at least some instances of 
homosexuality, we are still left with some rather complex and 
difficult problems. David Halperin (1990) cites an anthropological 
case study of the tribesmen and warriors of New Guinea who, from 
between the ages of eight to fifteen are orally inseminated daily by 
older youths who, after years of orally inseminating juniors, will be 
apparently happily married to a woman and have children. 
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Identification of a 'gay gene' or some other biological basis of 
sexualities would not necessarily mean that scientists could tell us 
definitely whether a New Guinea tribesman was gay or not. There are 
in fact two possibilities here: (i) he just spends half his life having 
oral sex with other males, (ii) his primary erotic and sexual interest 
is in same sex relationships (i.e., he is homosexual). However, if this 
is the case, why does he show no erotic interest in males outside 
initiatory contexts and why does he not hesitate to marry? 
Other examples of this type of problem may be drawn from the 
armed forces and from prisons where same-sex relations are 
prevalent. Would we expect all of these people to have 'the gay gene', 
even those who only engage in same-sex relations during their 
periods of service or imprisonment and may be otherwise happily 
involved in heterosexual relationships? How would we explain the 
behaviour of those who engage in single-sex relations but do not 
have 'the gay gene'? 
It seems likely that environmental influences can never be 
completely divorced from biological considerations when it comes 
to deciding which factors influence our sexualities. 
Sociobiological research assumes that human nature is directed 
towards reproduction. For the Darwinian, what is significant is how 
well we manage to replicate our species. Yet lesbians and gays do 
not usually produce offspring. This supposedly curious state of 
affairs interests sociobiologists greatly. If heterosexuals reproduce 
more than homosexuals, genes for heterosexuality (if they exist) 
would eventually have replaced those for homosexuality during the 
course of evolution. Sociobiologists therefore posit the existence of 
a counteracting advantage of homosexuality which makes it 
desirable in an evolutionary sense. Various theories (such as kin 
selection) have been put forward to account for this advantage. Most 
of these theories centre on the belief that lesbians and gays can help 
the survival and reproduction of copies of genes carried by relatives 
by actively looking after their relatives' general welfare. Weinrich 
and Ruse (1988) argue that lesbians and gays may be better actors or 
more intelligent than heterosexuals, thus they are assisted in their 
helping roles, since they obtain important positions in society! 
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At present, neither the freedom of choice model nor the essentialist 
model can be proven conclusively. The fact that essentialism is 
often used by conservatives as a stick with which to beat 
progressives does not necessarily mean that essentialism blocks any 
progressive moves in the area of lesbian and gay rights. The crucial 
pre-requisite for real co-operation in this area is an appreciation 
that lesbians, gays and heterosexuals are all equally valuable and 
worthy of respect as autonomous human beings. As such, we are all 
entitled to live the lives we choose, as long as we do not harm 
others. Once this is accepted, the way is clear for joint 
participation in radical social and educational policies to promote 
lesbian and gay equality and liberation. 
Arguments characterising lesbian and gay sexualities as 
unnatural, perverse or inferior. 
Dialogue about whether or not sexual orientations are dynamic and 
changing, or somehow 'given' is useful to the extent that it helps us 
to focus on the crucial question of equality. In this context, 
essentialists might be asked to perform a kind of thought 
experiment: Imagine that it was possible, in principle, for everyone 
freely to choose lesbian or gay sexualities. Would such sexualities 
still be seen as equal in every way to heterosexualities? Is there 
anything in lesbian and gay sexual behaviour or ways of life that 
would count against this belief? 
It is important to outline the major arguments used in this debate by 
those who claim that lesbian and gay sexualities are illnesses or 
'perversions' or are inferior to heterosexualities in some other way. 
Lesbian and gay sexualities as sickness. 
In 1974, the American Psychiatric Association de-listed 
'homosexual orientation' as a mental disorder by a postal vote of 
5854 to 3810. Today, most mainstream psychologists and 
psychiatrists would accept that there is no evidence that lesbians or 
gays are generally more psychologically disturbed than 
heterosexuals. Nowadays, most people who object to lesbian and gay 
sexualities do so on the grounds that they are bad rather than mad. 
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The supposed centrality of reproduction. 
Sara Ruddick's writing (Baker and Elliston, 1975) is a good example 
of the view that the goal or end of all 'natural' sex is progenitive. 
She believes that males and females were specifically designed for 
the purpose of procreation and the continued survival of the species. 
Therefore, any kind of sex which deviates from this goal is unnatural 
or perverted because it deviates from the original design. She adds 
(p.11) that 'perverse' should carry no pejorative sense. 
This is a very common line of thought, especially amongst some 
religious people. However, Roger Scruton is doubtful about this kind 
of argument when he assesses Elizabeth Anscombe's attempt to 
offer a more refined version of it. She proposes that any sexual act 
which does not, in some sense, involve the intention to perform an 
'intrinsically generative act' is perverted. Scruton warns Anscombe 
that, "...the argument, if valid, would imply that the sexual act 
performed by people ignorant of the facts of human reproduction is 
intrinsically deviant, while homosexual acts performed in the 
mistaken hope of inducing pregnancy in a male are perhaps not." 
(Scruton, 1986, p. 287). 
Michael Levin believes that homosexuality is a perversion because it 
involves "A misuse of bodily parts." (The Monist, 1984). This position 
is by no means original: Plato holds that homosexuality is wrong 
because: (i) it is 'unnatural', in the sense that it is not something 
engaged in by animals, (ii) our bodies are designed for the purposes 
of procreation. 
Plato is wrong about homosexuality in the animal world. It occurs 
throughout the animal species. Weinrich (1976), among others has 
reviewed the evidence. 
The fifth century African writer, Caelius Aurelianus, cited by David 
Halperin (1990), shares Plato's view of homosexuality as unnatural. 
He translated (into Latin) a work on chronic disease by the Greek 
physician Soranus (ninth chapter of the fourth book of De Morbis 
Chronicis ). Here he puts forward the view that men who adopt the 
'passive' role in same sex sexual activity suffer from excessive 
desire which, in an attempt to satisfy itself- drives out their sense 
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of shame and forces them to convert parts of their bodies to sexual 
uses not intended by nature (P. 22). 
Levin is clear that genitalia are "for something" (The Monist, 1984, 
p. 251) and that "...penis and vagina seem made for each other." 
(Ibid.). He also believes that misuse of bodily parts, in most cases, 
results in unhappiness because, "...it leaves unfulfilled an innate and 
innately rewarding desire." (Ibid.). He cites a study by Weinberg and 
Williams in Denmark (supposedly a very liberal and tolerant country) 
and the U.S.A. (supposedly a very intolerant and conservative 
country) which found that homosexuals from both countries were 
equally unhappy. 
It seems more likely that the unhappiness of the people involved in 
this study was due, in large measure, to society's reactions to their 
homosexuality, rather than their homosexuality itself. The fact that 
one of the studies was conducted in a supposedly 'tolerant and 
liberal' country does not affect this point. Lesbians and gays are 
discriminated against legally and socially even in so-called tolerant 
countries. 
The difficulties involved in positions such as Levin's become clear 
when they are applied to other areas of sexuality. Are masturbation 
and oral-genital sex a misuse of bodily parts and, if so, do these 
activities make the participants unhappy? 
Ruse notes the sociobiological claim that because humans need so 
much parental care, they have evolved sexual habits different from 
the rest of the animal world. In particular, unlike most mammals, 
the male human gets involved in child-rearing. One way in which the 
female keeps the male in attendance is by being continuously 
sexually receptive. This means that much human heterosexual 
intercourse does not have the biological end of reproduction in the 
sense of insemination. Hence, arguments that sex not potentially 
leading to conception is unnatural is based on defective biology as 
far as some sociobiologists are concerned. 
Arguments relying on the 'use', 'function' or 'purpose' of bodily parts 
often rely on fact/value ambiguities. It is a fact that genitalia can 
be used for reproductive purposes, but it is also a fact that they are 
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not always used exclusively in this way, either by heterosexuals or 
homosexuals. It requires a specifically moral argument to go further 
and assert that this is how the genitalia ought to be used; such 
arguments will always be open to question. 
Moral disapproval of sex acts which do not lead directly to 
procreation must extend to oral-genital sex, but it must also, on the 
same criteria, include kissing and holding hands, since these two 
activities are not directly related to procreation any more than 
oral-genital sex is. 
People have sex for all sorts of reasons, but the primary aim is 
usually pleasure. This intention to engage in a pleasurable activity 
is often quite distinct from the intention to procreate. In Western 
societies, very few people see reproduction as the primary aim of 
sex. Recent scientific advances in contraception and artificial 
insemination have made the choice about whether to have sex purely 
for pleasure or in order to procreate much easier. 
Ruse (1988) notes that this disparity between certain sorts of 
intention can be seen in other areas of life, for example, eating and 
exercise. The pleasures of these two activities are, to a large 
extent, distinct from their roles in nourishment or health. For many 
people, the primary attraction of exercise is the 'natural high' one 
gets from it. The primary attraction of food is often its taste, with 
little or no thought of nourishment. 
Lesbian and gay sexualities as cowardly, narcissistic or 
promiscuous. 
Roger Scruton (1986) tries another tack. He does not want to 
categorise homosexuality as a perversion, since many lesbian and 
gay relationships clearly involve a degree of human responsiveness, 
which he sees (following Nagel, 1988) as the hallmark of a 'normal' 
sexual relationship. However, he does think that heterosexuality is 
more courageous and morally valuable than lesbian and gay 
sexualities. Homosexuality is cowardly and borders on narcissism. 
This is based on his belief that heterosexuals are moving 
adventurously, even courageously, 'beyond themselves' when they 
establish a relationship with a person qualitatively different from 
88 
themselves. Lesbians and gays can never achieve this kind of 
relationship, their sexualities are thus flawed to some extent. 
Martha Nussbaum (New York Review of Books, 18 Dec., 1986) 
criticises this view, using an example drawn from another 
significant qualitative difference: race. If Scruton's line of argument 
is applied here, it will be morally superior to have sex with someone 
of a different race. Sex with a member of one's own race could be 
construed as moral cowardice or narcissism! She concludes that, 
"...it is individual people who have homosexual relationships, men 
and women as different from each other as any heterosexuals are, 
living each one a unique life." (Op. cit., p. 52). 
Eve Sedgwick believes that, "...far from its being the essence of 
desire to cross boundaries of gender, it is instead the most natural 
thing in the world that people of the same gender, people grouped 
together under the single most determinative dialectical mark of 
social organisation, people whose economic, institutional, 
emotional, physical needs and knowledges may have so much in 
common, should bond together also on the axis of sexual desire." 
(Extract from Eve Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet in Abelove 
et. al., p. 58). 
Elsewhere, Scruton, writing in The Sunday Telegraph (24 September, 
1989) and in an essay collection entitled The Philosopher on Dover 
Beach. (1990) puts forward the belief that since homosexuals have 
no children, they can have no real interest in society or its future. 
Homosexuals therefore tend to be careless and promiscuous in their 
sexual relationships. For this reason, he advocates that, "we should 
instil in our children feelings of revulsion" (Stafford, 1991, p.187) 
towards homosexuality. 
J. Martin Stafford (1991, pp. 197-193) replies that many 
heterosexuals abstain from having children, often for very selfish 
reasons. Further, many of those who do decide to become parents are 
so careless in discharging their duties that it would have been 
better had they not done so. At the very least, if Scruton's argument 
is correct, it should be applied to all childless people, not just 
homosexuals. 
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Stafford sees Scruton's argument as defective on three counts: (1) 
not all homosexuals are promiscuous, (2) it is not true that all 
homosexuals are childless and even those who are often take a 
beneficent interest in the children of their friends and relatives. (3) 
Consequently, "...having children is neither a necessary nor sufficient 
condition of a sense of social responsibility...there are...prolific and 
irresponsible breeders who have little or no social responsibility." 
(Op. cit., p. 188). 
There is, Stafford notes, "...a striking incongruity between the sober 
reflections of Scruton the philosopher and the demotic ravings of 
Scruton the man." (Op. cit., p. 190). Scruton's position in his Sunday 
Telegraph piece and his Dover Beach essays contradict his earlier 
position in Sexual Desire (1986), highlighting his deep prejudices. 
One of the major themes of Scruton's Sexual Desire is that in a 
proper sexual relationship we fully encounter the other as a person. 
This is what constitutes a loving relationship. Scruton admits that 
both homosexuals and heterosexuals are capable of this kind of love. 
Scruton has to admit, therefore, that homosexuality is not a 
perversion. 
The inadequacy of the terms 'unnatural' and 'perverted' 
when applied to lesbians and gays. 
The most important philosophical objection to the use of the term 
'natural' in moral reasoning is that it commits what G.E. Moore 
(1903) described as 'the naturalistic fallacy', inferring an 'ought' 
from an 'is'. 
Paul Hirst (1974) notes that "What all forms of naturalism do is 
simply to take some particular state of affairs or human quality, or 
social rule, and without any justification, assert that the pursuit of 
it is what is good or right." (p. 29). The naturalistic fallacy fails to 
distinguish the description of actual or possible states of affairs 
from their evaluation. 
"...what is wrong with naturalism is not merely that it mistakenly 
sees moral questions as scientific questions when they are 
essentially no such thing. Rather it is that it sees moral questions 
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as being in the end answerable by an accurate description of how 
things are when description alone is quite inadequate for the 
business of evaluation." (Op. cit., p. 30). 
Fact and value are logically different in kind. "The ultimate 
weakness of naturalistic theories is that they fail to keep the 
distinction between descriptions and evaluation, and thus in the end 
fail to provide any real justification for the evaluations they are 
seeking to establish." (Op. cit., p. 34). 
Of course, lesbian and gay sexualities can be morally evaluated, but 
this evaluation should not be based on unsubstantiated claims 
relating to the supposed goals or ends of sexual activities. The fact 
that human reproduction is not the prime goal of many forms of 
sexual activities (whether heterosexual, bi-sexual, lesbian or gay) 
does not make them immoral, bad, sick or perverted. Lesbian and gay 
sexualities should be evaluated in exactly the same way as other 
forms of sexuality, using the same criteria (e.g. the extent to which 
they promote the welfare of oneself or others, or cause harm). 
This is an important point because it counts against the possibility 
of a 'heterosexual morality' of the kind implied in the British 
government's recent pronouncements, legislation and educational 
circulars, as I shall argue in the next chapter. 
Thomas Nagel published an article in The Journal of Philosophy (66), 
no. 1 in January, 1969 which was widely re-published and sparked 
off a great deal of interest in the concept of sexual perversion. He 
supports the view that the term 'perverted' is inappropriate when 
applied to lesbian and gay sexualities. For Nagel, the following 
conditions would have to be met for 'perversion' to be a viable 
concept: 
(i) Sexual perversions would have to be sexual desires or practices 
that are in some way unnatural. He recognises that this 
natural/unnatural distinction is the crux of the problem, but fails to 
analyse these concepts further. 
(ii) Certain practices will be perversions (he lists as examples: shoe 
fetishes, bestiality and sadism). 
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(iii) Perversions are unnatural sexual inclinations, rather than just 
unnatural practices. For example, contraception cannot realistically 
be described as a sexual perversion. "A sexual perversion must 
reveal itself in conduct that expresses an unnatural sexual 
preference." (Nagel, 1981, p. 39) 
Nagel sees the concept of perversion as primarily psychological, not 
physiological. For example, we do not apply it to the lower animals 
or plants, all of which have reproductive functions that go astray in 
various ways (e.g. seedless oranges). He does not regard as 
perversions every deviation from the reproductive function of sex in 
humans (such as contraception and abortion). 
Sex, for Nagel, is a complex form of interpersonal awareness in 
which desire itself is consciously communicated on several 
different levels. His central idea is that, in sex, two people are 
aroused by each other, aware of the other's arousal, and further 
aroused by this awareness. This, for Nagel, is the norm of a sexual 
relation. 
He believes that to see some practice or inclination as perverted is 
to make an evaluation of it, but not necessarily a moral evaluation. 
"...if humans tend to develop some version of reciprocal 
interpersonal sexual awareness unless prevented, then cases of 
blockage can be called unnatural or perverted." (Op. cit., p. 49). To 
say that some sexual inclination or practice is perverse is merely to 
indicate that better forms of sexual activity are possible, though he 
believes that perverted sex is better than no sex at all. 
Nagel appears to see 'normal' and 'natural' as corollaries of each 
other. For Nagel, it is in some sense 'natural' for human beings to 
want some form of complex interpersonal relationship and this 
becomes the 'norm' or standard of a good relationship. Nagel's 
position suggests that both the capacity and the desire for complex 
interpersonal relationships are somehow intrinsic. This intrinsic 
capacity becomes the norm by which we measure good human sexual 
relationships in a non-moral sense. Nagel believes that, "Nothing 
rules out the full range of interpersonal perceptions between 
persons of the same sex." (p. 50). 
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Michael Ruse puts forward the view that, "...naturalness ought to be 
redefined in terms of culture and not simple biology. What is 
unnatural and what is consequently in some important sense 
perverse, is what goes against or breaks with our culture. It is what 
violates the ends or aims that human beings think are important or 
worth striving for." (Ruse, 1988, p. 199). 
He follows Nagel's attempt to remove perversion from the moral 
realm by defining perversion as the, "...breaking not of a moral rule, 
but of an aesthetic rule." (Ibid.). On this view, questions about 
whether lesbian and gay sexualities are perverse are questions as to 
how we feel about such sexualities (given our culture, beliefs, etc.) 
and the extent to which we can relate to or empathise with them. 
Some people can so relate and some cannot. He concludes that 
"...neither side is absolutely right and neither side is absolutely 
wrong." (Op. cit., p. 201). 
He feels that we must educate people not to confuse 'perversion' 
with moral indignation and that we should work towards reducing 
the number of people who hate homosexuals, since homosexuality is 
not in itself immoral. 
The terms 'unnatural' and 'perverted' are inadequate when applied to 
lesbian and gay sexualities. It is important, especially for lesbians 
and gays who have felt the full force of such potent rhetorical 
devices, to abandon them altogether. Ruse is naive if he thinks he 
can persuade people to use them in a dispassionate and non-moral 
sense. These terms are deeply offensive, steeped as they are in a 
history of bigotry and hate. It is difficult to see how they can be 
'lifted out' of their historical and cultural contexts and given a new 
currency as aesthetic opinion. 
The terms 'unnatural' and 'perverted' depend upon the converse 
concept of 'natural', thus providing a standard against which the 
'unnatural' can be measured. Yet, 'natural' is a highly ambiguous term. 
It has at least three principal meanings: (1) that which is believed 
to be part of human 'nature', but is in fact the result solely of social 
influence and conditioning, (2) that which is fixed or 'given' by 
nature at birth, (3) that which has its basis in nature (in this latter 
sense), but can develop and change throughout a person's lifetime. 
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Jeffrey Weeks warns us that "...the meaning of 'Nature' is not 
transparent. Its truth has been used to justify our innate violence 
and aggression and our fundamental sociability. It has been employed 
to legitimise our basic evil, and to celebrate our fundamental 
goodness. There are, it often seems, as many natures as there are 
conflicting values." (Weeks, 1985, p. 62). 
Recent political organisations within the lesbian and gay 
communities such as Queer Nation in the United States and OutRage 
here in the larger cities of England have adopted the term "Queer", 
rather indiscriminately, to refer to any form of sexuality which 
deviates from the perceived 'norm' of conventional heterosexuality. 
"The insistence on "queer"- a term defined against "normal" and 
generated precisely in the context of terror- has the effect of 
pointing out a wide field of normalisation, rather than simple 
tolerance, as the site of violence." (Michael Warner, 'Fear of a Queer 
Planet.'). Whatever one makes of this particular term, it can be seen, 
in part, as an attempt to state unambiguously the belief that it 
really does not matter whether a sexuality is judged unnatural or 
abnormal because these are empty categories. 
In any case, how useful is the term 'unnatural' in other, perhaps less 
controversial, contexts? Using a typewriter or word-processor, 
cooking in a microwave oven, using a telephone, travelling by train 
or in an aeroplane. Could these activities be considered unnatural in 
some sense? One can imagine irate individuals exclaiming, "If god 
(or nature) had intended us to fly, we would have developed wings!" 
David Halperin (1990) cites W.C. Rivers ('A New Male Trait (?)' in 
Alienist and Neurologist, 41, 1920, pp. 22-7), writing in the 1920s, 
who believed that women with political aspirations and men who 
liked cats were examples of deviant object choice, one of a number 
of pathological symptoms exhibited by those who reversed or 
'inverted' their sex roles by adopting a masculine or feminine style 
at variance with what was deemed to be natural and appropriate to 
their anatomical sex. 
'Nature' should not be used as the basis for arguing that something or 
someone is either eccentric, distasteful, disordered, ill or wrong. 
The term is inadequate when it comes to making these sorts of 
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judgement. 
My point is not simply that lesbian and gay sexualities are as 
'normal' as other forms of sexuality. Even if it could be proved that 
lesbian and gay sexualities are somehow abnormal or unnatural, we 
would still be left with the question as to whether they are 
consequently immoral. 
Abandoning such terms as 'unnatural' or perverted' does not mean 
that we cannot make moral appraisals of sexual activity; that one 
form of sexuality is much the same as another in this respect 
(including paedophilia, for example). I believe the opposite holds 
true, for once we have recognised the inadequacy of such terms, we 
are free to consider sexual activities in all their complexity and to 
make sound moral judgements about them, whenever appropriate and 
necessary. 
The enculturisation of the unnatural. 
Culture, not 'nature', powerfully shapes our views of what is 
'natural' or 'unnatural'. The kinds of sexual behaviour condoned or 
condemned by various cultures is diverse. What is acceptable in one 
culture or era is sometimes taboo in another. David Halperin (1990) 
cites K.J. Dover's book, Greek Homosexuality. (1978), which gives us 
a thumbnail sketch of ancient Greek society and underlines the 
radical differences between its views of sexual activities and ours. 
Dover makes the following points with regard to ancient Greek 
culture: 
(1) Homosexual behaviour among Greek males took the form, mostly, 
of pederastic relations between a man and a youth. 
(2) Classical Greeks considered the desire of adult males for sexual 
pleasure through contact with handsome youths to be normal and 
natural. 
(3) Neither Athenian law nor Athenian custom forbade or penalised 
the sexual expression of such desire, so long as the lovers observed 
certain conventional decencies. 
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(4) Pederastic love-affairs which conformed, at least outwardly, to 
those conventions were regarded by Athenian society as decent, 
honourable, and- under certain circumstances- even praiseworthy. 
In Athenian society, sexual partners were of two different kinds, not 
male and female, but active and passive, dominant and submissive. 
The homosexual/heterosexual distinction would have had no meaning 
for the classical Athenians. They did not think in terms of two 
different 'sexualities'. 
Active and passive modes of sexuality separated classes and were 
hierarchical. Therefore, an adult male citizen of Athens could have 
legitimate sexual relations only with statutory minors (his 
inferiors, not in age, but in social and political status). The proper 
outlets for his sexual desires were women, boys, foreigners and 
slaves, all of whom did not enjoy the same legal and political rights 
as he did. 
In this scheme of things, the 'active' partner has his pleasure 
promoted, the 'passive' partner is penetrated and is 'at the service' 
of another's pleasure. 
"...the 'sexuality' of the classical Athenians, far from being 
independent and detached from 'politics' (as we conceive sexuality 
to be), was constituted by the very principles on which Athenian 
public life was organised." (Halperin, 1990, p. 31). 
In Athenian society, sex between members of the subordinate groups 
was almost inconceivable. Whereas sex between a member of the 
superordinate and a member of a subordinate group was seen as a 
manifestation of personal status, not a 'private act'. 
Whatever reservations we might have about the hierarchical and 
class divided nature of ancient Athenian society reflected in these 
same-sex relationships, we must also acknowledge this as an 
example of a society where same-sex relationships were positively 
valued, albeit within strict and unacceptably discriminatory 
boundaries. 
This analysis of ancient Athenian society should inspire us with 
hope. There is no reason to believe that people in our society must 
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necessarily continue to hold bigoted and prejudiced views with 
regard to lesbian and gay sexualities for all time. 
Conclusion. 
I began by examining two very influential models of sexuality: the 
'given' and the chosen. This issue is a red-herring in the sense that 
we do not have to postpone the promotion of lesbian and gay issues 
and the adoption of radical policies until we weigh the available 
evidence or wait for more evidence about the genesis of sexualities. 
What is of central importance in these discussions is the argument 
that lesbians, gays and heterosexuals are all equally valuable and 
worthy of respect as autonomous human beings with life-plans of 
their own which they must be allowed to pursue in order to flourish. 
If we accept this basic argument, it follows that, on the 
essentialist model: lesbian and gay minorities deserve the same 
legal and political rights as others, and that positive images of 
lesbians and gays should be promoted. One would also have to argue 
for the promotion of the self-realisation of the individual in this 
area of their lives. It would be important to be as fair as possible to 
lesbians or gays and help them to achieve the good life on equal 
terms with everyone else. The heterosexual majority would also 
have to be educated to cope with, understand and respect minorities, 
just as one does in anti-racist education, for example. 
The same things apply on the freedom of choice model, but in 
addition, one would anticipate and welcome possible gradual 
increases in the numbers of lesbian and gay citizens as lesbian and 
gay sexualities became more accepted by society, thus making this 
sexual choice more attractive. 
Producing strong arguments for the equality of lesbians and gays 
with heterosexuals is one thing, tackling the reality of homophobic 
bigotry, violence and oppression is quite another. It is very 
important that heterosexism is exposed in all its complex forms and 
that connections are made between this and other forms of 
oppression. 
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Heterosexism is a powerful and dangerous force which threatens 
democracy itself. Opposition to it must be seen as the task of 
everyone in the democratic community. The next chapter examines 
the reality of institutionalised heterosexism and the threat it poses 
to all citizens, whatever their sexualities. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
SEX EDUCATION: A CHALLENGE TO INSTITUTIONALISED 
HETEROSEXISM? 
Introduction. 
The previous chapter presented a strong argument in support of the 
view that lesbians, gays and heterosexuals are all equally valuable 
and worthy of respect as autonomous human beings with life plans 
of their own. 
The opposite view is held by our society and its institutions, but it 
is important to understand that the situation is far more complex 
and dangerous than this. Society does not simply disagree with 
lesbian and gay equality and liberation, it constructs cultures in 
which heterosexualities are promoted to the detriment of lesbian 
and gay sexualities, actively encouraging citizens to disparage or 
reject lesbian and gay sexualities as ways of life. 
This chapter examines British government legislation and circulars 
of the 1980s and 1990s relating to sex education. These 
demonstrate clearly the British government's heterosexist 
ideologies. Section 28 of the Local Government Act of 1988 
encapsulates the government's central worry that lesbian and gay 
sexualities might be 'promoted'. The government reports and 
circulars discussed contain three principle heterosexist 
assumptions: (i) that sex education should take place within the 
context of heterosexual family life, (ii) that the views of 
(heterosexual) parents should be given prominence and that they 
should be allowed to withdraw their children from sex education 
lessons, whatever their reasons (which might, for example, include 
racist, sexist or heterosexist beliefs), (iii) that lesbian and gay 
sexualities are inferior to heterosexualities. 
The importance of government pronouncements, legislation and 
advice is next discussed. The section 28 legislation grew out of the 
homophobia and heterosexism which is deeply imbedded in society 
and its institutions. Faucauldian analysis demonstrates that for 
centuries sex was seen as a secretive affair which was not to be 
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spoken of openly. Paradoxically, this led to a proliferation of 
discourses related to 'sins of the flesh' and sexuality in general. 
The A.I.D.S. epidemic has led to an explosion of information and 
discourses centring on sexuality by means of the press, publishing 
and the media. This has had the positive effect of bringing sex into 
the open and making it accessible to public scrutiny, examination 
and debate. Paradoxically, heterosexist government legislation, 
circulars and pronouncements have provided us with the opportunity 
of questioning and perhaps reappraising our reactions to and beliefs 
about sexualities. 
The need for consciousness raising is then highlighted. It is not 
enough to present solid arguments for lesbian and gay equality and 
liberation. What is also needed is a shift in moral perspective, a 
change in or reappraisal of attitudes and values with regard to 
sexuality. 
Finally, it is also important that positive images of lesbians and 
gays are promoted so that negative stereotypes can be effectively 
countered. The most effective way of countering prejudice and 
misinformation in this area is by working towards radical social and 
political change which will facilitate lesbians and gays in the task 
of coming out, of revealing their sexualities to the rest of the 
democratic community so that people can work and live with 
lesbians and gays and come to see them as equals. 
Heterosexism is the beliefs, attitudes and institutional 
arrangements which reinforce the view that heterosexualities are 
superior to any other sexuality, whether lesbian, gay, or bi-sexual. 
Chris Gaine (Cole, 1989) sees institutional racism as a subtle form 
of domination. "It happens when procedures and practices perhaps 
date from a time when most of the population were white and Anglo-
Saxon, so they operate in such a way as to exclude minorities." (p. 
32). Institutional racism is not necessarily intentional, it is, 
"...simply the continuation of routine procedures originally devised in 
different circumstances. Nevertheless, their effect is to 
disadvantage a particular group." (Ibid.). 
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Similarly, institutionalised heterosexism is a subtle mode of 
domination, taking on many complex forms and occurring within a 
variety of different contexts. Institutional heterosexism is 
manifested principally in two ways: firstly, its most pervasive form 
can be seen in what Debbie Epstein (1994) calls 'the heterosexual 
presumption'. It is assumed that everyone in society is heterosexual 
and consequently other forms of sexuality are systematically (or as 
a matter of course) ignored or marginalised. 
Secondly, it is evident in the widespread negative views people have 
about lesbians and gays. These views are encouraged and fed by the 
many mythologies and cultures that exist in society with regard to 
sexualities which are not heterosexual. These mythologies and 
cultures are encouraged by institutions such as the mass media, the 
law and the education system, all of which, to some extent, either 
ignore the existence of lesbians and gays or positively encourage 
their oppression. 
Section 28 of the Local Government Act, 1988. 
The British government of the 1990s is supporting institutionalised 
heterosexism, prejudice and discrimination. It does so by its unjust 
laws relating to the age of consent (16 for heterosexuals, 18 for 
gays), its failure to acknowledge lesbians in the law, its denial of 
the rights of lesbians and of gays to marry if they wish and its 
attempted prohibition of the 'promotion' of lesbian and gay 
sexualities in section 28 of the Local Government Act, 1988. 
Similar discriminatory legislation can be found in the United States 
of America. Greenberg (1988) cites The Family Protection Act, 
introduced in Congress during the first Reagan administration: "It 
denies Legal Aid Societies the right to "promote, defend or protect 
homosexuality." An Arkansas statute permits schoolteachers to be 
fined for "advocating, soliciting, imposing, encouraging or promoting 
public or private homosexual activity in a manner that creates a 
substantial risk that such conduct will come to the attention of 
school children or school employees." 
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Section 28 is inserted awkwardly, almost as an afterthought, into 
what is, in any case, a mish-mash of diverse regulations affecting 
local authorities. This is well illustrated by the following list of 
contents which appears at the beginning of the Act. 
"An Act to secure that local and other public authorities undertake 
certain activities only if they can do so competitively, to register 
certain functions of local and other public authorities in connection 
with public supply or works contracts; to authorise and register the 
provision of financial assistance by local authorities for certain 
housing purposes; to prohibit the promotion of homosexuality by 
local authorities; to make provision about local authorities' 
publicity, local government administration, the powers of auditors, 
land held by public bodies, direct labour organisations, arrangements 
under the Employment and Training Act 1973, the Commission for 
Local Authority Accounts in Scotland and dog registration; dog 
licences, and stray dogs; and for connected purposes." (24 March, 
1988). 
The government claimed that there was growing concern throughout 
Britain about the use of ratepayers' money by some local authorities 
intentionally to promote homosexuality. They had in mind left-wing 
local authorities of the time, whose radical attitudes in this area 
had been widely publicised. 
A number of the allegations about the supposed 'promotion' of 
homosexuality were made in the Conservative Party's advertising 
campaign in the 1987 General Election. Madeleine Colvin (1989) 
notes the use of large billboards featuring books (bound with red 
covers) bearing the titles Young, Gay and Proud and Black Lesbian in 
White America. It was implied that there was something shocking 
about these books. In fact, one was a collection of writings by gay 
teenagers about their experiences, the other a collection of 
academic essays. The implication was that these books were part of 
a campaign to encourage young people to become homosexual. 
The National Council for Civil Liberties sees section 28 as, "...an 
extraordinary badly-drafted piece of legislation...some have argued 
that it is unlikely ever to be used to any effect because of its 
narrow scope and the difficulties of its implementation. But it is 
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also a very dangerous piece of legislation, because as long as these 
difficulties of interpretation remain, there is the very real 
likelihood that, without cases ever coming to court, section 28 will 
be both misunderstood and misinterpreted, and used to justify acts 
and decisions which result in censorship and discrimination." (M. 
Colvin, 1989). 
There is also the problem of self-censorship. Teachers may well be 
tempted to avoid tackling lesbian and gay issues within the 
curriculum or as they arise informally from discussions with 
students in case they may somehow prove to be in breach of the law. 
A brief history of Section 28. 
Sketching some of the background to section 28 helps to 
demonstrate how legislation can both reflect and reinforce the kind 
of bigotry and prejudice just acknowledged. It is very likely that the 
moral, political and social climate relating to lesbians and gays 
shifted in response to the A.I.D.S. hysteria of the time. Lesbians and 
gays were seen as the major cause of H.I.V. and A.I.D.S. because of 
their 'promiscuous' sexual behaviour. The clause acknowledges that 
"Nothing in subsection (1) shall be taken to prohibit the doing of 
anything for the purpose of treating or preventing the spread of 
disease." Thus, lesbian and gay sexualities may be spoken of and 
discussed, but ideally, only within the context of disease. 
In 1986, Lord Halsbury introduced a Private Members Bill entitled 
'An Act to restrain local authorities from promoting homosexuality' 
as an amendment to the Local Government Bill. This received an 
unopposed second reading in the House of Lords on 8 December, 1986. 
Dame Gill Knight (M.P. for Birmingham, Edgbaston) adopted the Bill in 
the House of Commons. It received its third reading on 8 May, 1987. 
It was accepted by 20 votes to 0, but the Bill fell because it needed 
a minimum of 40 votes in order to become law. The general election 
was called the next week. 
In December 1986 the Government's attitude, as presented by Lord 
Skelmersdale was one of 'neutrality'. That is, whilst sympathising 
with the aims of the Bill, it was deemed unnecessary and was seen 
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as undermining other legislation, in particular the 1986 Education 
Act no. 2. 
This attitude had shifted by May 1987 to one of full support and 
encouragement for the Bill. Margaret Thatcher, then Prime Minister, 
made this clear in her reply to an oral question from Dame Gill 
Knight in the House of Commons on 14 May, 1987 and again in her 
remarks at the Conservative Conference in October of that year when 
she dismissed "the inalienable right to be gay". 
Tory backbenchers had been campaigning on this Bill throughout 
1987. Several were members of the Conservative Family Campaign 
whose aim, as described by Geoffrey Dickens, M.P. on I.T.V.'s London 
Programme in April 1987, was to re-criminalise homosexuality. He 
saw support for this clause as the first step along this path. 
When the Local Government Bill was being debated at the committee 
stage in the House of Commons, David Wiltshire, a Conservative M.P. 
on that committee, proposed an amendment to the Bill broadly 
following the Halsbury lines. The amendment was debated on 8 
December 1987 in Committee, and this time it was formally adopted 
by the Government. 
Section 28 states that: 
2A 	 (1) The local authority shall not 
(a) intentionally promote homosexuality or publish 
material with the intention of promoting homosexuality 
(b) promote the teaching in any maintained school of the 
acceptability of homosexuality as a pretended family 
relationship 
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) above shall be taken to 
prohibit the doing of anything for the purpose of treating 
or preventing the spread of disease. 
(3) In any proceedings in connection with the application of 
this section a court shall draw such inferences as to the 
intention of the local authority as it sees fit. 
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There is an attempt to ban the "promotion" of lesbian and gay issues 
by Local Education Authorities, yet nowhere is 'promotion' defined. 
One can only assume that a dictionary definition was intended. In 
this case, 'promotion' means to, "Advance, prefer...help forward, 
encourage, support actively...publicise and sell." (The Concise Oxford 
English Dictionary, 1970). 
This definition encapsulates the Government's heterosexist fears. 
These are three-fold: (i) promotion in general. The idea that 
teachers, in particular, might positively commend lesbian and gay 
sexualities as a morally and socially acceptable lifestyle, (ii) the 
publication of materials which promote homosexuality. It seems 
likely that the government was especially concerned about a 
children's story book called Jenny Lives With Eric and Martin, about a 
young girl, her gay father and his lover (Gay Men's Press, 1983), (iii) 
the promotion of homosexuality as "a pretended family relationship". 
This rather vague phrase encapsulates the government's concern that 
homosexuality somehow undermines the traditional heterosexual 
nuclear family (defined as a heterosexual mother and father and 
their children). Therefore the notion of homosexuality and the notion 
of family are to be very sharply distinguished. There is no place for 
homosexuality within the kind of 'traditional family values' 
espoused by the Conservative government of the day. 
In the previous chapter, I noted that the sexologists of the 
nineteenth century advocated law reform in order to legalise lesbian 
and gay sexualities. They did so on the assumption that sexualities 
are determined at birth or very soon afterwards and that it is 
therefore not appropriate to punish or condemn people for their 
sexual orientation. This position implies that it is not possible to 
'catch' lesbian and gay sexualities. The idea of 'promotion', in this 
sense, is ruled out. 
Interestingly, section 28, on the other hand, accepts that it is 
possible to persuade people, especially the young, to adopt a sexual 
orientation. This position has unexpected parallels with the lesbian 
feminist idea that many people-predominantly women-can and do 
choose their own sexual orientation. Many women have chosen to be 
lesbians as a reaction to patriarchal society. They have made a 
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conscious decision to abandon relationships with men and establish 
social and sexual relationships exclusively with women. 
I claimed, in the previous chapter, to be agnostic as to the genesis 
of sexualities because there is no conclusive scientific evidence to 
support either the 'given' or 'chosen' claims at present. It is 
nevertheless interesting to consider the idea, implied in section 28, 
that sexualities may well be open to development and change and 
that it may be possible to influence someone with regard to their 
sexual orientation. If this is the case, we may well ask what is so 
wrong with the idea of 'promoting' lesbian and gay sexualities? In 
asking this question, we are faced with the single most important 
assertion in the area of lesbian and gay rights: that lesbian, gay and 
heterosexualities are equally valuable and worthy of respect as 
autonomous human beings who have the right to live the lives they 
choose, providing they do not harm others. I argued in the previous 
chapter that there are no substantive arguments against this 
fundamental assertion and that therefore the way is open for radical 
legal and social reform leading to lesbian and gay liberation. 
Section 28 encapsulates a worry felt by many people: namely, that it 
is possible to persuade the young to become lesbian or gay. It is 
highly significant that people do not have the same worries when it 
comes to heterosexuality. 
With regard to the issue of teachers encouraging young people to 
become lesbian or gay: it is no more appropriate for teachers to 
persuade young people to indulge in any particular form of sexual 
activity than it is to persuade them to adopt a particular religious 
or political viewpoint. On the other hand, teachers do have a clear 
duty to ensure that young people are aware of the range of 
sexualities that exist within our democratic society so that they 
can develop their sexualities and, just as importantly, formulate 
independent and critical views of sexualities which may differ from 
their own. This is important for all students, whatever their 
sexualities may be. 
It must be acknowledged that Section 28 could well have an adverse 
effect on the employment rights of lesbians and gays in education, 
especially since the introduction of Local Management of Schools. 
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From now on, it is the governors of a school who decide who should 
be employed and who not. Some governing bodies may well use 
Section 28 to support the disciplining or sacking of lesbian and gay 
teachers who are deemed to be 'promoting' lesbian and gay 
sexualities. 
It is interesting that the government's response to lesbian and gay 
issues has been concerned almost exclusively with curriculum 
matters (pastoral and wider school curricula), whereas the response 
of progressive local authorities and teaching unions has also been 
based on equal opportunities initiatives, in terms of support for 
lesbian and gay students, teachers, and parents. They have seen this 
as an issue for the institution as a whole. 
In fact, Section 28 does not relate directly to school at all; it 
restricts only the type of advice and material a local education 
authority can give to its schools, as Circular 5/94 makes clear 
(under the heading 'Other Provisions', p.19). It is the schools' 
governors, parents and staff who control their own sex education 
policies. 
Section 28 and Government Guidance on Sex Education. 
The central belief that lesbian and gay sexualities are inferior to 
heterosexualities and the fear that homosexuality might be 
'promoted', expressed in Section 28, forms the basis of all the 
government circulars that followed. 
The Education (no. 2) Act 1988 states that the governors of a school 
must decide whether or not sex education is to be taught in that 
school. If governors decide to offer sex education, it must be taught 
with "...due regard to moral considerations and the value of family 
life." (sect. 46, p. 48). The Education Act does not define what 
'family life' is, though we may assume that they mean to define the 
family as a heterosexual married couple and their children. However, 
the fact that the concept of the family is not closely defined makes 
it possible to interpret 'family' in its broadest sense, including 
single parents, lesbians, gays and, in some cases, their children. 
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A report published by the D.E.S. in 1986 called Health Education from  
5 to 16  (D.E.S. Curriculum matters 6) sets out a framework to help 
schools develop a health education programme which is appropriate 
for their pupils. This was a discussion document, not a directive, and 
comments were invited when it was first published. It focuses on 
the aims and objectives of health education between the ages of five 
and sixteen and considers the implications for choice of content, 
teaching strategies and the assessment of pupils' progress. 
This report is important because it contains, in embryo, many of the 
themes of the later 11/87 circular. These include: (i) the idea that 
sex education should take place within the context of family life, 
loving relationships and respect for others, (ii) emphasis on the 
importance of parents' views, (iii) the presumption that lesbian and 
gay sexualities are inferior to heterosexualities. 
The report states that schools have a statutory duty (under section 8 
(5) of the Education Act 1980) to inform parents of the manner and 
content of sex education. Primary school heads should involve 
parents as well as staff if they decide to have structured sex 
education within their school. Further, sex education should always 
be presented, "...in the context of family life, of loving relationships 
and of respect for others: in short, in a moral framework." (S. 15). 
I will argue in chapter seven that sex education should not be 
confined to a discussion of the 'mechanics' of sex or to sex acts. Sex 
must be contextualised within the spheres of feeling, emotions, and 
morality. To this extent, the D.E.S.'s definition of moral frameworks 
as including, "...loving relationships and of respect for others...", 
though inadequate and sketchy, is uncontentious because it covers 
lesbian and gay sexualities as well as heterosexualities. 
Section 41 of the report stresses that schools should always be open 
to parents' views and keep their sex education policies under 
continual scrutiny and review in the light of such views 
(presumably, however negative or harmful these views may be). 
Section 42 acknowledges that problems may arise when pupils have 
had access to parental advice and information and have already 
formed strong moral or religious views on this basis. Teachers are 
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advised not to seek to undermine the views of pupils (which may 
well stem from their parents) but to aim to help all pupils to gain an 
understanding and respect for the views of others. 
Whilst we should, in general, respect the views of others, this 
cannot be an absolute principle because there are some views that 
are intolerable. For example, the kind of racist or sexist ideas to 
which some children may be exposed within their family 
environment. Consequently this piece of advice is inadequate and 
misleading. 
The fact that certain views emanate from the family does not make 
them immune from questioning and, where necessary, refutation. 
This piece of advice ducks this issue. If children hold racist or other 
distorted views which they have learnt from their parents, they 
must be challenged. Of course, one must challenge young people 
sensitively and avoid alienating them, but not to challenge them at 
all in such circumstances is to collude with them. 
As I shall argue more fully in the next chapter, a democratic 
education broadens young people's horizons by exposing them to 
educational experiences which the family alone cannot provide. The 
family cannot be allowed to completely mould the child politically, 
morally or socially, since the child is part of the wider democratic 
community and must be taught as a future citizen of that community. 
Paragraph 48 deals specifically with homosexuality: 
"Information about and discussions of homosexuality, whether it 
involves a whole class or an individual, needs to acknowledge that 
experiencing strong feelings of attraction to members of the same 
sex is a phase passed through by many young people, but that for a 
significant number of people these feelings persist into adult life. 
Therefore it needs to be dealt with objectively and seriously, 
bearing in mind that, while there has been a marked shift away from 
the general condemnation of homosexuality, many individuals and 
groups within society hold sincerely to the view that it is morally 
objectionable. This is difficult territory for teachers to traverse 
and for some schools to accept that homosexuality may be a normal 
feature of human relationships would be a breach of the religious 
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faith upon which they are founded. Consequently, L.E.A.s, Voluntary 
bodies, governors, heads and senior staff in schools have important 
responsibilities in devising guidance and supporting teachers dealing 
with this sensitive issue." 
Once again we have evidence of the view that lesbian and gay 
sexualities are essentially inferior to heterosexualities, even when 
we are being advised to deal with the issue "objectively". Why do 
lesbian and gay sexualities have to be singled out as being a phase 
that young people go through? Surely, the same is true of 
heterosexuality for some people. 
This paragraph is extremely negative and cautious in tone. The 
messages it conveys are that: (i) homosexuality needs to be dealt 
with "objectively", (ii) but at the same time, many in society hold 
that it is "morally objectionable", (iii) "...this is difficult territory 
to traverse", (iv) "for some schools, to accept that homosexuality 
may be a normal feature of relationships would be a breach of the 
religious faith on which they were founded.", (v) Governors and 
senior managers have important responsibilities in devising 
guidance and supporting teachers in dealing with this "sensitive 
issue". 
Although the propositions of this paragraph are all factually correct, 
no attempt is made to put forward the alternative and equally valid 
moral viewpoint that lesbian and gay sexualities are not abnormal or 
unnatural and that lesbian and gay sexualities are equal to 
heterosexualities. To teach about sexualities within a moral 
framework is important, but it does not necessarily follow that such 
a framework must be built on reactionary or conservative principles. 
What should have been stressed is that the requirement to deal with 
homosexuality objectively is paramount. Clearly, some parents will 
believe lesbian and gay sexualities to be "morally objectionable" for 
religious or other reasons, but this state of affairs should not 
prevent schools from dealing with such issues. Indeed, failure to do 
so would mean that pupils are deprived of a proper, broadly based 
education which seeks to develop their personal autonomy by 
encouraging them to reflect, to make independent and well informed 
judgements, decisions and choices. 
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This paragraph effectively discourages teaching and discussion 
centring on lesbian and gay issues in the classroom. It ends by 
placing the responsibility (and perhaps any potential blame) for 
tackling such issues firmly with the governors and senior managers 
of schools. At the same time, no practical advice or support is 
offered. 
A major aim of this thesis is to provide such support. Beginning with 
the argument that lesbians, gays and heterosexuals are all equally 
worthy of respect as autonomous human beings who have the right to 
live their own lives and that lesbian and gay sexualities are in no 
way inferior to heterosexuals (developed in the previous chapter), 
chapter six provides a framework within which policies can be 
formulated, developed, implemented and monitored so that teachers 
can feel confident and secure in dealing with these issues. Chapter 
seven indicates the areas of the curriculum where lesbian and gay 
issues can be effectively identified and explored. 
This report illustrates well the chaos that is caused when a 
government refuses to acknowledge in any way the equality of 
lesbians and gays with heterosexuals. In practical terms, until this 
government brings the age of consent for lesbians and gays into line 
with that for heterosexuals, objective and fair treatment of these 
issues is impossible. Lowering the age of consent for lesbians and 
gays would signify some acknowledgement of equality among 
lesbians, gays and heterosexuals and would encourage and support 
teachers to acknowledge lesbians and gays as the equals of 
heterosexuals in their teaching, advice to and counselling of 
students. 
Circular 1 1 /87. 
A D.E.S. circular (11/87) issued in 1987 called Sex education in  
schools (later replaced by circular 5/94) gives guidance to education 
authorities on the implementation of the 1980 and the 1986 
Education Acts insofar as they relate to sex education in schools. Its 
recommendations are purely advisory and the statutes it quotes are 
the only directives which must legally be complied with by an 
education authority or school. 
1 1 1 
The purpose of this circular is to advise on the educational 
implications of these two important pieces of legislation. It does 
not seek to provide a framework within which Personal and Social 
Education or Sex Education Programmes can be developed, as did the 
previous D.E.S. report. 
This circular takes up and develops the major themes dealt with in 
the D.E.S. report of 1986. Greater stress is placed on the centrality 
of the family and on 'parent power'. Lesbian and gay sexualities are 
now explicitly acknowledged to be inferior to heterosexualities 
(para. 22). 
The circular re-emphasises that governors have complete control 
over whether there shall be a sex education programme and, if so, 
what form it will take. It strongly advises governing bodies to adopt 
some sort of sex education programme. 
Although the document acknowledges (in paragraph 16) that, 
"...opportunities for considering the broader emotional and ethical 
dimensions of sexual attitudes and mores may arise in other subject 
areas", the only context within which 'sex education' is to be taught 
is that of, "...moral considerations and the value of family life." 
(paragraph 6). Once again, the term 'moral' is not defined. I can only 
assume that by linking "moral considerations" to "the value of family 
life", the document means to convey the idea that sex should be 
taught within the context of a kind of 'heterosexual morality'. 
This raises the fundamental question of whether such a 
'heterosexual morality' can exist and, if so, what it would consist of. 
Perhaps an attempt might be made to base such a morality on the 
belief that only heterosexual relationships are normal because they 
are open to procreation. I demonstrated the weakness of this 
argument in the previous chapter. However, even if such a belief 
could be supported, a further argument would be required to 
establish that lesbian and gay sexualities are immoral because they 
are abnormal. 
In any case, lesbians and gays do have children, either by sexual 
intercourse or by artificial insemination, and it is difficult to see 
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how this can be argued as immoral or wrong in itself, without 
recourse to unsubstantiated religious pronouncements or beliefs. 
The circular states that schools have a duty to: (i) present facts in 
an objective, balanced manner, (ii) help students to appreciate a 
range of sexual attitudes and behaviour in present day society 
(paragraph 19), (iii) to know what is and what is not legal, (iv) to 
encourage students to make their own informed and responsible 
decisions about their own future sexual behaviour in adulthood, (v) 
to warn students of the physical, moral and emotional risks of 
promiscuity, (vi) to help students to "...recognise the benefits of 
stable married and family life and the responsibilities of 
parenthood." (paragraph 19). 
The acknowledgement, in paragraph 19, that we must, "...enable 
pupils to comprehend the range of sexual attitudes and behaviour in 
present day society..." is the only positive acceptance of discussions 
centring on sexualities other than heterosexualities. 
Paragraph 21 acknowledges that, "Schools cannot, in general, avoid 
tackling controversial sexual matters, such as contraception and 
abortion, by reason of their sensitivity. Pupils may well ask 
questions about them and the schools should be prepared to offer 
balanced and factual information and to acknowledge the major 
ethical issues involved. Where schools are founded on specific 
religious principles this will have a direct bearing on the manner in 
which such subjects are pursued." 
Paragraph 21 is unclear as to whether lesbian and gay issues could 
be included under the term "controversial sexual matters", but a 
case can clearly be made for this reading of paragraph 21, especially 
in the light of what is said in paragraph 19. Consequently, we have 
at least some vague reassurance that schools cannot avoid such 
issues and that we should, "offer balanced and factual information 
and...acknowledge the major ethical issues involved." We are not told 
what these major ethical issues might be or how they should be 
tackled. 
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Paragraph 22 states. "There is no place in any school in any 
circumstances for teaching which advocates homosexual behaviour, 
which presents it as 'the norm', or which encourages homosexual 
experimentation by pupils. Indeed, encouraging or procuring 
homosexual acts by pupils who are under the age of consent is a 
criminal offence. It must also be recognised that for many people, 
including members of various religious faiths, homosexual practice 
is not morally acceptable, and deep offence may be caused to them if 
the subject is not handled with sensitivity by teachers if discussed 
in the classroom." 
The question now arises as to the meaning of the term "norm' in this 
paragraph. There are three possibilities: (i) a statistical norm. In 
this context, lesbian and gay sexualities would appear not to be 
statistically normal and to present them as otherwise would be 
factually incorrect, (ii) a moral norm, in which case lesbian and gay 
sexualities are seen as abnormal, perhaps because of the mistaken 
belief that only heterosexual sex leading to procreation is morally 
justified, (iii) the pejorative use of the term 'normal' to connote 
society's general moral or aesthetic disapprobation of lesbian and 
gay sexualities. 
There is evidence that the use of the term 'norm' is intended 
primarily within a moral context because paragraph 22, which 
includes this term, occurs under the heading of 'A moral framework 
for sex education.' This further supports my earlier argument that 
the circular makes the illegitimate inference that lesbians and gays 
are immoral because abnormal. The authors of circular 11/87 appear 
to be conflating the terms 'norm' and 'moral' without appreciating 
that there is no necessary link between what is normal and what is 
moral and without attempting to put forward the grounds on which 
such an assertion is based. 
The draft circular (6.12.1993). 
On 6 December 1993, the Secretary of State for Education issued a 
draft circular intended to replace advice about the provision of sex 
education in schools contained in Circular 11/87. The purpose of this 
circular is the same as that of 11/87, to advise on a new piece of 
legislation, in this case, the Education Act 1993, the main effect of 
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which is to allow parents to withdraw their children, "...from any or 
all parts of a school's programme of sex education, other than those 
elements which are required by the National Curriculum Science 
order." 
Again, the three major themes of the family, 'parent power' and the 
inferiority of lesbian and gay sexualities are re-emphasised. 
The structure of the proposed revision of circular 11/87 differs 
from that of the original circular in one important respect, the 
situation of the heading 'A Moral Framework for Sex Education'. This 
has been moved from its original place at the end of paragraph 17 to 
the beginning of the document, immediately after the introduction. 
Presumably, this was intended to highlight the importance of such a 
moral framework, though, once again, this framework is not spelt 
out in detail anywhere in the document. 
The revised section on 'a moral framework for sex education' begins 
with the central proposition that, "The purpose of sex education is 
to provide knowledge about the processes of human reproduction and 
the nature of sexuality and relationships." 
As in circular 11/87, we are advised that sex education should, 
"...present facts in an objective, balanced and sensitive manner, set 
within a clear moral framework." Although this "clear moral 
framework" is not closely defined, it is acknowledged that it has 
something to do with encouraging pupils to, "...consider the 
importance of self-restraint, dignity, respect for themselves and 
others and sensitivity towards the needs and views of others. They 
should be enabled to recognise the physical, emotional and moral 
implications and risks of certain types of behaviour, and to accept 
that both sexes should have responsibility in sexual matters. Last 
but not least, pupils should be helped to appreciate the value of 
stable family life, marriage and the responsibilities of parenthood. 
Teachers should, however, remember that many children come from 
backgrounds which do not correspond to this ideal: sensitivity is 
therefore needed to avoid causing personal hurt and giving unwitting 
offence." 
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This emphasis on a 'moral framework', or a "framework of values" 
demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the relationship 
between morality and education in sexuality. Such a relationship is 
not contingent: it is impossible for morality not to be linked to 
education in sexuality. Stevi Jackson (1984) makes the point that, 
"Even if sex is reduced to its biological facts, the selection and 
presentation of those facts implies moral messages. For example, a 
description of the sexual organs could emphasise either the 
reproductive or the sensual functions, thus conveying quite different 
images of sex. Moreover, all debates on sex education revolve around 
its supposed effects on the young, revealing that we are not simply 
seeking to offer them information, but are interested in influencing 
their behaviour." (pp. 135-6). 
If one appreciates that one cannot avoid teaching sex education 
within some sort of moral framework, the purpose of circular 5/94 
becomes clear: the kind of morality hinted at (rather than explicitly 
acknowledged) here is one which sees heterosexuality as the only 
legitimate and normal form of sexuality, and reproduction as the 
biological function which gives heterosexuality its legitimacy. 
This passage gives great prominence to the assertion that the 
purpose of sex education is to study the processes of human 
reproduction. However, the sentence ends by also allowing for the 
study of "...the nature of sexuality and relationships". Thus the door 
is open, if narrowly, for tackling lesbian and gay issues. 
The study of "the nature of sexuality and relationships" is a tall 
order indeed. However, the covering letter states that, "It (the final 
draft of the circular replacing 11/87) will include further annexes 
offering examples and models of school sex education policies and 
programmes, which the Department has commissioned and are 
currently in preparation." 
It is important to note that there has been a change of emphasis 
with respect to the aims of sex education. In the 11/87 circular, we 
are told that the aims of sex education should be to, "...present facts 
in an objective and balanced manner so as to enable pupils to 
comprehend the range of sexual attitudes and behaviour in present 
day society..." In the new circular, the emphasis on the presentation 
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of objective and balanced facts remains, but the aim of sex 
education is now the study of, "...the nature of sexuality and 
relationships." Thus, there is a definite shift from the empirical, 
practical recognition and study of sexual attitudes and behaviour to 
a more theoretical approach, not necessarily linked to what is going 
on in society at all. 
We are not enlightened as to 'the nature of sexuality', despite the 
prominence given to the notion. Of course, it could be argued that 
this emphasis on the nature of sexuality is broadening the 
discussion at this point, but it is likely that 'the nature of sexuality' 
is thought to be defined by reproduction. This would explain why the 
concepts of human reproduction, the nature of sexuality and 
relationships appear in the same sentence (in para. 7). Thus, it is 
implied that reproduction is what gives sexuality its legitimacy and 
moral acceptability. This is supported by John Patten's comments at 
the launch of the circular. He claimed that values such as "...respect 
for authority, personal responsibility, loyalty and fidelity as well as 
the teaching of the mechanics of reproduction (my italics)" should be 
taught. (Donald MacLeod in The Guardian, Tuesday 7 December, p. 4). 
In paragraph 11 we are told that, "In secondary schools, sex 
education should encompass, in addition to facts about human 
reproductive processes and behaviour, consideration of the broader 
emotional and ethical dimensions of sexual attitudes." 
The prohibition, in paragraph 22, of the 11/87 circular against 
presenting homosexuality as 'the norm' has been deleted, but John 
Patten made it clear, at the launch of the draft circular, on 6 
December 1993, that, "Teachers should tell pupils that marriage is 
better than single parenthood and heterosexuality better than 
homosexuality when it comes to giving sex education." (Donald 
MacLeod in The Guardian, Tuesday 7 December, p. 4). 
Paragraph 8 of the draft circular re-emphasises the importance of 
'parent power'. We are advised that, "The teaching offered by schools 
should be complementary and supportive to the role of parents. The 
more successful schools are in achieving this, the less the 
likelihood that parents will wish to exercise their right of 
withdrawal." 
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Whilst teaching should aim to be complementary and supportive to 
the role of parents whenever possible, this cannot be an absolute 
principle. As I shall argue in the next chapter, it is also important 
that teaching sometimes provides a challenge and a contrast to the 
values offered within the family, not all of which may be morally 
justifiable. It must also be recognised that children need to make 
independent judgements about the things they learn within their 
families. Only in this way will they make morality their own and 
build their individual moral character. 
The right of parents to withdraw their children from sex education 
is being used here as a threat in order to ensure that teachers 'toe 
the line' as far as teaching 'what is acceptable to parents' is 
concerned. 
It could be argued that parents have a special responsibility for 
their children deriving from their intimate knowledge of their 
personalities, levels of understanding, etc. and that this is the basis 
of their right of withdrawal. However, one has to balance the right 
of parents to have some say in the education of their children with 
the right of the wider democratic community to provide young 
citizens with a broad and well-balanced education that will prepare 
them for life in the wider democratic community. As I shall argue in 
the next chapter, the state has a duty to educate children fully and 
freely to participate in this wider democratic community. Sex 
education is very much a part of this kind of democratic education. 
It is far from clear why sex education should be a special case for 
withdrawal, apart from the unfounded fear that children may 
somehow be 'corrupted' by a sexual knowledge which they are not yet 
ready for. The fact is that children experience sexual feelings and 
are able to articulate these feelings, discuss them and ask questions 
about them in the right setting. It is true that some children are 
reluctant to discuss sexual matters and there is a sense in which 
they are perhaps not mature enough to cope with such information. In 
this case, children should not be forced to participate actively in 
discussion, though allowing them to 'take a back seat' in sex 
education lessons might positively encourage them to come to terms 
with questions of sexuality in their own way and in their own time. 
1 1 8 
Children who are diffident about discussing sexual matters are not 
going to be ruined for life because they do not feel able fully to 
participate in sex education lessons. 
The fact that education in sexuality can be controversial, that there 
can be real disagreement between students, teachers and parents on 
the issues raised is not a sufficient reason for not fully discussing 
and studying these issues in schools. 
Circular 5/94. 
The final circular on the Education Act 1993: Sex Education in  
Schools (5/94) issued on 6 May, 1994 is substantially the same as 
the draft circular which preceded it. Its tone is less dictatorial with 
phrases like "The Secretary of State considers..." (para. 10), or "In 
the Secretary of State's view..." (para. 11) replacing the more 
definitive pronouncements and assertions concerning sex education 
in the draft circular. 
The draft circular promised us, "...annexes offering examples and 
models of school sex education policies and programmes." (my 
italics), but the final circular offers us only, "Guidance on Good 
Practice in developing a school Sex Education Policy" (pp. 22-29). No 
sex education programmes are forthcoming. 
In Annex A (p. 17) the only the definition of sex education we are 
presented with is that provided by the Education Act 1993, "...a 
definition of sex education which includes education about HIV and 
AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases." It goes on to state 
that, "The law does not however define what else is included in sex 
education; and the Secretary of State has no statutory power to 
prescribe, by subordinate legislation, the content of sex education." 
Although this broad definition of sex education provides a loophole 
for lesbian and gay issues to be dealt with, it is also indicative of 
the Secretary of State's reluctance to offer a comprehensive 
definition of sex education, other than to indicate what he considers 
to be some of its essential content. 
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Paragraph 8 of the draft circular has now been moved to the 
beginning of circular 5/94 (p. 5), with the heading, 'The Role of 
Parents', thus giving 'parent power' more emphasis. 
This is followed by 'A Moral Framework for Sex Education' which is 
substantially the same as the corresponding section in the draft 
circular. There are two minor changes of emphasis: firstly, this 
section now begins, fairly negatively, with the statement that the 
Secretary of State recognises that sex education is a "difficult 
issue", secondly, the moral framework being proposed is now clearly 
recognised as the Secretary of State's own view: 
"In his view, the purpose of sex education should be to provide 
knowledge about loving relationships, the nature of sexuality and the 
processes of human reproduction." (5/94, p. 6). 
Compare this to the draft circular which states, "The purpose of sex 
education is to provide knowledge about the processes of human 
reproduction and the nature of sexuality and relationships." 
On p. 6 of circular 5/94, human reproduction is not given so much 
prominence (it appears last on the list) and there is a new and 
welcome emphasis on "loving relationships". 
The new circular contains a paragraph (31), not included in the draft 
circular of December 1993: 
"There will be occasions when teachers and other professionals 
giving sex education have to exercise their discretion and judgement 
about how to deal with particularly explicit issues raised by an 
individual pupil. It is unlikely to be appropriate to deal with such 
issues with the whole class. Teachers should normally discuss the 
child's concerns first with the parents, to see how they would like 
the matter to be handled. ...In exceptional circumstances, where the 
teacher has reason to believe that a child may be distressed or in 
danger, it may be appropriate for the teacher to speak individually to 
the child, before consulting the parents, to clarify the basis for the 
concerns..." (p. 11). 
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This is going to make it very difficult to talk about sexual matters 
on a one-to-one basis. Instead of respecting teachers' professional 
judgement, the Secretary of State has here reinforced the climate of 
apprehension, generated by Section 28, encouraging a reluctance to 
discuss any personal issues with individual students. This is a 
tragedy because students often wish to discuss personal matters 
arising from sex education lessons on an individual basis. A 
significant proportion of these students find it either difficult or 
impossible to discuss intimate details with their parents. Yet we 
are now being advised to contact parents first before speaking to 
their children. 
For lesbian and gay students who disclose their sexualities to 
teachers within the context of a private discussion, it is very often 
highly inadvisable for the teacher to communicate what was 
discussed with parents. Many parents share the prejudices of society 
with regard to lesbian and gay sexualities. It is not uncommon for 
young people to be thrown out of their homes because they identify 
or are identified as lesbian or gay. 
The implication of the draft circular and the final version (5/94) is 
that sexualities are "difficult" or even dangerous, to be ignored or at 
least 'handled very carefully'. This attitude is a danger to 
participatory democracy itself because it discourages and limits 
human beings' essential freedom to make socially responsible, 
independent, well informed judgements and choices of their own in 
every area of their lives. 
The draft circular of December 1993 nowhere mentions lesbians and 
gays explicitly, though their existence might be implied in the 
phrases, "...sexuality and relationships" (par. 7) and "...the broader 
emotional, and ethical dimensions of sexual attitudes." (para. 11). 
The fact is that any form of sexuality other than heterosexuality is 
simply ignored. 
In circular 5/94, homosexuality is mentioned under the heading of 
'Other Provisions'. Here we have a quotation from Section 28's 
prohibition of Local Authorities from "...intentionally promoting 
homosexuality or publishing material with that intention, and from 
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promoting the teaching in any maintained school of the acceptability 
of homosexuality as a pretended family relationship." (p.19). 
Sexual discourses. 
Section 28 and recent D.F.E. circulars relating to sex education can 
be seen, in part, as a response to A.I.D.S. hysteria and the moral 
panic that accompanied it. However, despite the adverse effects of 
government policy and advice, it is also the case that they have 
generated important discourses about sex and sexualities. 
Wayne Dynes, in the preface to The Encyclopaedia of Homosexuality  
(St. James Press, 1990) observes that, "The love that dare not speak 
its name is now, in spite of or because of AIDS, shouting it from the 
rooftops, and in many voices. Almost as much scholarship on 
homosexuality has appeared since 1969 as in the previous hundred 
years, even in the wake of Freud and Hirschfeld, and with each 
passing year the volume increases." (p. ix). 
Michel Foucault recognises the importance of such sexual 
discourses. Sex had been prohibited, barred and masked since the 
classical age, a time when sex was identified as "the secret". He 
sees the seventeenth century as the age of repression (Foucault, The 
History of Sexuality. An introduction.). This period of the Church's 
history was the origin of many important sexual discourses, 
beginning with pronouncements and advice relating to sex. 
With the deliberations and pronouncements of the Council of Trent 
(in the mid sixteenth century) came an elaboration of how 'sins of 
the flesh' should be confessed. Spiritual manuals and confessionals 
would later direct the penitent to mention sins of the flesh in as 
much detail as possible. "...not only consummated acts, but sensual 
touchings, all impure gazes, all obscene remarks,...all consenting 
thoughts." (Alfonso de Liguori, Preceptes sur le sixieme  
commandement, 1835). By the end of the eighteenth century, Sade 
takes up the challenge. He uses words which seem to be borrowed 
from the treatises of spiritual direction: "Your narrations must be 
decorated with the most numerous and searching details; the precise 
way and extent to which we may judge how the passion you describe 
relates to human manners and man's character is determined by your 
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willingness to disguise no circumstance; and what is more, the least 
circumstance is apt to have an immense influence upon the procuring 
of that kind of sensory irritation we expect from your stories." 
(Foucault, 1984, p. 21). 
At the end of the nineteenth century, the author of My Secret Life  
takes the confessor's advice to 'tell all' in intimate detail! This is an 
account of all the sexual episodes experienced by the anonymous 
author throughout his lifetime. There were eleven volumes and only a 
few copies were printed. 
Foucault concludes that, "...in an epoch dominated by (highly prolix) 
directives enjoining discretion and modesty, he was the most direct 
and in a way the most naive representative of a purisecular 
injunction to talk about sex. " (Op. cit., p. 22). 
At the beginning of the eighteenth century, population was 
acknowledged as a major economic and political problem. This 
occasioned detailed studies of the effectiveness of contraceptives, 
fertility, health, illness, diet, etc. "Between the state and the 
individual, sex became an issue, and a public issue no less; a whole 
web of discourses, special knowledge, analyses, and injunctions 
settled upon it." (Op. cit., p. 26). Of course, at times, discourse was 
limited and even silenced, but sex was very much on the agenda. 
Foucault sees the 'Christian Pastoral' (i.e. confessional manuals and 
practices) and the need to expose sex as absolutely crucial to the 
burgeoning of sexual discourses. Sex had to be confessed, brought 
into the open. "What is peculiar to modern societies, in fact, is not 
that they consigned sex to a shadow existence, but that they 
dedicated themselves to speaking of it ad infinitum, while 
exploiting it as the secret." (Op. cit., p. 35). 
He notes that the repression of all forms of pleasure whose object 
was not procreation continued throughout the nineteenth century. Up 
to the end of the eighteenth century, three major codes governed 
sexual practices: canonical law, the Christian Pastoral and the civic 
law. These were all centred on matrimonial relations. The 'stable 
married couple' became ' the norm', a concept the inadequacy of which 
I exposed in chapter three. This was no longer questioned or 
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scientifically investigated. At the same time, the sexualities of 
children, those who were not attracted to the opposite sex, and 
various manias, obsessions, etc. came under scrutiny. This process 
led to, "...the setting apart of the 'unnatural' as a specific dimension 
in the field of sexuality." (Op. cit. p. 39). 
In our day, discourse centred on the A.I.D.S. epidemic has led to the 
kind of positive and negative effects broadly described by Foucault. 
Positively, A.I.D.S. has been highly effective in putting sex firmly on 
the political agenda. Sexual behaviours are now more freely 
discussed than ever, especially within the context of safer sex. 
Lesbian and gay sexualities are also widely discussed. This has had 
an impact on every area of our lives. The media have begun to 
discuss lesbian and gay issues. Television companies in this country 
have screened lesbian and gay seasons (such as Channel Four's 'Out 
on Tuesday') as well as films such as Brideshead Revisited, E.M. 
Foster's Maurice, Prick Up Your Ears, Torch Song Trilogy, Longtime 
Companion, etc., plays, documentaries, arts programmes and soap 
operas (such as East Enders and Brookside) dealing with lesbian and 
gay issues. 
Discourse centred on A.I.D.S. has also had negative effects. It is 
important to realise that since the identification of A.I.D.S. in the 
U.S.A. in 1981 it has been strongly associated with marginalised, 
oppressed or feared groups. Jeffrey Weeks (Aggleton & Homans, 
1988) notes that at first it was associated with Haitians, and 
subsequently with blacks (a disproportionate number of American 
sufferers are black); with injecting drug users; with prostitutes and 
with gays. A.I.D.S. has fed into much deeper anxieties and fears that 
find a focus in society's racism and homophobia. The result has been 
fairly predictable: a moral panic rooted in fear of the disease, and 
fuelled by the search for scapegoats. 
Patrick J. Buchanan wrote in New York Post (May 24, 1983) that, 
"...homosexuals have declared war upon nature, and now nature is 
exacting an awful retribution." (Quoted in Weeks, 1985, p. 48). James 
Anderton, the then Chief Constable of Greater Manchester, attributed 
the spread of A.I.D.S. to "degenerate conduct" in the form of 
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"obnoxious sexual practices" and described gays as "swirling around 
in a human cesspit of their own making." (Greenberg, 1988, p. 478). 
Weeks sees one of the major changes in the organisation of moral 
behaviour in Britain over the past century as the detachment of 
sexual from religious norms. By the 1960s, many of the Christian 
churches (ranging from the liberal Quakers to the traditional Church 
of England) abandoned attempts to impose their morals on the whole 
of society. The Quakers began to support a less moralistic legal code 
(see Hall, Reformism and the legislation of consent and C. Davies, 
'Moralists, Causalists, Sex Law and Morality' in Armytage, et. al, 
Changing Patterns of Sexual Behaviour.). A distinction was made 
between individual morality and the social order. The role of the 
state was now seen as guarantor of the social order, it was not 
considered appropriate for the state to interfere with individual 
morality. This was the position broadly endorsed in the law reforms 
of the 1960s relating to a whole cluster of sexual matters, including 
homosexuality, abortion, censorship and divorce. 
These changes were never accepted by moral conservatives or by 
many of the churches in Britain. Since the 1960s, minorities 
advocating 'moral absolutism' and 'social purity' have developed. 
Mary Whitehouse (of the Viewers and Listeners Association) with 
her media campaigns and Victoria Gillick with her campaigns 
centred on sexuality and contraception, were backed by more 
sinister people inside and outside Parliament, including members of 
the Conservative Family Campaign. 
A.I.D.S. has allowed these "moral entrepreneurs" (Weeks borrows this 
phrase from Becker, 1963, p. 147) to increase their influence. In 
recent years, growing anxiety has been expressed with regard to the 
spread of sexually transmitted diseases such as herpes and hepatitis 
B. From the moral right's point of view, if A.I.D.S. is also a sexually 
transmitted disease, then it must be the case that 'promiscuity' is 
not only wrong, but it kills. Thus gay men, traditionally thought of 
and described as 'promiscuous', the main sufferers of the disease in 
the West, became symbolic of this moral decline. "The wages of sin 
is death." (Romans 6: 23). 
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These beliefs are a feature of the homosexual as well as 
heterosexual moral right. J. Martin Stafford (1988), for example, 
links the spread of A.I.D.S. to promiscuity per se, regardless of the 
sexualities of those who engage in it. However he also acknowledges 
a link between his stereotyped ideas about 'lesbian and gay 
promiscuity' and the spread of H.I.V. and A.I.D.S.: 
"In the 1980's much harm has been inflicted by the publicity 
surrounding A.I.D.S.- a sexually transmitted disease which is rightly 
associated with promiscuity and loose-living of the kind which many 
homosexual 'spokespersons' were once only too happy to condone, 
although not all those who have contracted this disease are guilty of 
such faults...Accordingly, the unsavoury images of homosexuality 
which A.I.D.S. has helped to promote have militated against its 
acceptance as potentially a responsible and legitimate way of 
living." (Op. cit., p. 28). 
Stafford defines promiscuity in terms of "...'less durable liaisons in 
which there is the intention to keep deep emotional involvement and 
personal commitment to a minimum'. By this definition, which I find 
attractive, the criterion is related more to intention than to 
conduct." Op. cit., p. 59, note 1 3) . Stafford is assuming that he can 
judge the intentions of people with A.I.D.S. when they chose to have 
sexual encounters. He is implying that the majority of people with 
A.I.D.S. sought to have as many sexual partners as possible and to 
have sex for its own sake with the explicit intention of limiting 
deep emotional involvement and personal commitment. What grounds 
has Stafford for assuming that people's intentions are so readily 
available for scrutiny or judgement? 
Stafford and other members of the moral right seem unaware that 
the cause of A.I.D.S. is not "loose-living", but H.I.V. This virus has 
attacked all sorts of people: those who have had only one sexual 
encounter, those who have had few and those who have had many. His 
remarks about A.I.D.S. do not fall far short of the tabloids who 
announced the onslaught of a "Gay Plague". There is a need for clarity 
of thought here: what is dangerous is not the number of partners one 
has, but the kind of sexual behaviour one engages in. We must all be 
wary of engaging in unsafe sex regardless of our sexual orientation. 
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Unfortunately, many moralists of the right have used the A.I.D.S. 
epidemic as a stick with which to beat those who live what they see 
as 'promiscuous' lifestyles, employing such distinctions as 'innocent' 
and 'guilty' victims, as if it were possible for a virus to act as judge 
and jury in a case of life and death. 
Colin McGinn (1992) emphasises that micro-organisms don't have 
any moral views about sexual morality, "...they are just using the 
most convenient way to invade another organism. If sex didn't 
involve any kind of contact, of the kind that micro-organisms can 
exploit- say, you did it over the phone- there would be no sexually 
transmitted diseases, no matter how promiscuous and irresponsible 
this telephone sex was. " (p. 58). 
These remarks are important because the way we view lesbian and 
gay sexualities in this age of A.I.D.S. will have a profound impact on 
the way we present such sexualities, lifestyles and issues in the 
curriculum. It is proper that we discuss promiscuous sexual 
behaviour in any course of study dealing with human sexuality. 
However, issues about whether promiscuity is or is not morally 
right are separate from beliefs about the cause of A.I.D.S. It is 
improper to claim that promiscuous behaviour is the actual cause of 
diseases like A.I.D.S. This is a confusion of the metaphors of moral 
'disease' and 'decay' with the physical effects of disease. 
Jeffrey Weeks acknowledges the, "...'unfinished revolution' in 
attitudes to sexuality in general and to homosexuality in particular. 
There have been many fundamental changes in the past thirty years, 
but their impact has been uneven and fragmented, producing 
frustration as well as social progress, new tensions as well as the 
alleviation of old injustices. Secularisation, liberalisation, changes 
in the pattern of relationships have all taken place. But they have 
left deep residues of anxiety and fear, which A.I.D.S. as a social 
phenomenon has fed on and reaffirmed." (Aggleton & Homans, 1988, p. 
15) 
These "deep residues of anxiety and fear" are what led to the 
enactment of section 28. The echoes of something Mary Whitehouse 
once said can be detected in section 28 and the circulars that 
followed it, "Over recent years homosexuality has been represented 
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as being perfectly normal...But now the laughing is over." (The 
Guardian, 22 February, 1985, Aggleton & Homans, 1988, p. 13). 
As I argue in chapter seven, lesbian and gay issues cannot be ignored. 
They exist within our educational institutions, like it or not. They 
are explored within playgrounds, classrooms and common rooms, 
bars and seminar rooms throughout the country and around the world. 
It is not our task, nor is it possible, simply to 'introduce' such 
issues into our educational institutions, since these issues are 
already there. On the contrary, it is our task to acknowledge such 
issues and find ways of engaging with the whole range of discourses 
on sexualities that emanate from our educational communities, their 
life and work. 
The most urgent task for educationalists is to work towards the 
abolition of laws such as section 28 of the Local Government Act of 
1988 and circulars such as 5/94 which encourage heterosexism, 
replacing them with advice and guidance which promotes education 
about lesbian, gay and heterosexualities in a spirit of freedom, 
honesty and integrity. 
The Promotion of Positive Images of Lesbian and Gay 
Sexualities. 
This thesis is a direct refutation of the requirement of section 28 
that lesbian and gay sexualities should not be 'promoted'. 
It has long been accepted within educational circles that racist and 
sexist stereotypes need to be countered with positive images. It is 
necessary to promote positive images of lesbian gay sexualities in 
order to counterbalance the negative and misleading stereotypes 
that abound in our society. This would have three desirable effects: 
(i) opportunities for consciousness-raising in this area would be 
more abundant, (ii) young people, particularly young lesbians and 
gays, could be provided with positive role models to live up to, (iii) 
people's negative attitudes towards lesbians and gays could be 
effectively challenged. 
Heterosexist attitudes and beliefs are not effectively countered 
solely by rational argument, since they often spring from irrational 
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and illogical feelings and prejudices. What is needed, in addition to 
rational argument, is a 'change of heart', a shift in moral 
perspective. This is affected by what is often described as 
'consciousness-raising', meaning either that a person has come to 
feel differently or hold more positive views about lesbians and gays, 
or that they realise that a value they are committed to (say, respect 
for persons) applies in an area in which they had not realised it did. 
Consciousness-raising in this area may be brought about by 
encouraging people to share their views about sexualities with 
others in a supportive atmosphere and by giving them the time and 
space to do so. It may also be brought about by challenging 
prejudiced and stereotyped views, but in my experience, the most 
effective form of consciousness-raising comes from talking to, 
living with and working alongside lesbian and gay people and 
understanding first-hand that they are as worthy of respect as 
anyone else. 
It is of fundamental importance that we positively challenge 
negative stereotypes and attitudes relating to lesbian and gay 
sexualities. Failure to do this undermines the rights of lesbians and 
gays to participate within the wider democratic community, it also 
undermines democracy itself, as I argued in chapter one. 
Effective participation involves a positive and radical movement 
towards social change. It is not sufficient to formulate policies or 
espouse worthy ideals. The democratic community has to examine 
the prejudice, discrimination and oppression that lead to many 
citizens' disempowerment through lack of material and educational 
resources and political power. It must strive to overcome these 
obstacles to full participation. This is the task of everyone within 
the democratic community, it is not limited to educational 
institutions or to lesbians and gays themselves. 
More fundamentally, building on my identification, in chapter one, of 
personal autonomy as a key value of democracy: it is necessary for 
young people to engage with lesbian and gay issues in an unbiased 
manner so that they can examine a wide range of morally acceptable 
sexualities and ways of life. This kind of study is part of a broad 
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democratic education which encourages students to exercise their 
personal autonomy by making independent, informed judgements. 
Irrational bigotry and prejudice shown towards lesbians and gays 
can be partly challenged and combated by broad well-planned 
curricula coupled with pedagogical skill and ingenuity, but we must 
also consider the hidden curriculum and the way such issues are 
responded to in the lives and cultures of school and college 
communities. 
Only when we re-examine, challenge and reform educational 
institutions' responses to sexualities will we be able to create 
communities of learning where lesbian and gay students and 
teachers will feel sufficiently safe and encouraged to reveal their 
sexualities and act as effective role models for students and staff. 
It is within this context that the radically political nature of 
education in sexuality can be seen. Consciousness-raising, rational 
argument, curriculum development, sound policy planing and 
implementation, and radical social change are the pre-conditions for 
any truly effective education in this area. 
The following three chapters will examine the control, form and 
content of democratic education systems that are necessary to 
support and promote the basic ideals of participatory democracy, 
ensuring that the sexualities of lesbian and gay citizens are 
acknowledged and discussed. 
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CHAPTER 5. 
THE CONTROL OF EDUCATION WITHIN THE DEMOCRATIC STATE. 
Introduction. 
An education system based on participatory principles must ensure 
that students learn about the many forms of oppression that exist in 
society. This is important because the degree to which citizens are 
able to participate will depend, to a large extent, on their position 
within society. Oppressed people very often have their societal 
influence and power limited or eliminated altogether. The state 
should consequently ensure two things: (i) that oppression and 
discrimination are combated within the education system itself, (ii) 
that all students have the opportunity to learn about the diverse 
forms of oppression that threaten participatory democracy. 
In chapter one, I claimed that it is not sufficient to put forward a 
theoretical case for lesbian and gay equality and liberation, it is 
also necessary to examine the actual society one is addressing and 
to seek ways of preparing people for free, informed and open debate 
on this important issue. 
This chapter will explore, in practical terms, the manner in which 
education within a participatory democracy should be controlled, 
balancing its role in encouraging the autonomous and effective 
participation of all citizens with safeguarding the continuation of 
democracy. I begin with a general examination of the role the state 
should play in protecting and promoting the essential elements of a 
democratic education system. I go on to consider the extent to which 
parents and children should participate within such a system. 
I will raise three questions: (i) Who, within the democratic 
community, should determine what sort of education is best and the 
basic structure and content of education? (ii) To what extent should 
the democratic state promote what it considers to be the right kind 
of education for its citizens? (iii) How should the democratic 
education system be controlled and managed in practical terms 
within local and national government? 
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The participation of parents in a democratic education 
system. 
T.H. McLaughlin (Halstead, 1994) provides us with a useful account 
of the two sides in the debate about the nature and scope of the 
moral rights parents have over their children. 
The 'Parents as determiner' view sees parental rights in education 
as, "fundamental, overriding and extensive. On this view...there is a 
suspicion of the priority of 'professional' or 'political' judgement in 
educational matters and of a common form of education provided by 
the state. The child's educational experience is seen as properly 
determined to the greatest possible extent by the child's own 
parents and family." (Op. cit., p. 94). 
The other side of the argument is characterised by what McLaughlin 
calls the 'Parents as trustee' view. "On this view, it is denied that 
parents qua parents have any rights over their children's upbringing 
and education independent of the duties they have in relation to 
these activities. One of the most basic of these duties is to enable 
their children to become rationally autonomous persons and 
democratic citizens. The fundamental rights on this view are those 
of the children, which are merely 'held in trust' on their behalf by 
parents. This view is suspicious of parental choice of school as 
straightforwardly conducive to the satisfaction of these parental 
duties, and favours children being educated together within common 
schools." (Ibid.). 
Coons & Sugarman (1978) illustrate well the Parents as Determiner 
view, putting forward a case in support of the rights of 'the family' 
and its place within the education system. Since Victorian times, 
the concept of the family has been used in a distinctly moral 
context. It is often said that the child must learn about the moral 
life (and things pertaining to the moral life) within the 'privacy' of 
the family where the parents' influence can be brought to bear. 
Public institutions such as the education system have no right to 
interfere in these family matters. 
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A good contemporary example of this kind of 'family centred 
morality' is circular 5/94, examined in detail in the previous 
chapter. Here, the British government stresses that, "The prime 
responsibility for bringing up children rests with parents. Schools 
should therefore recognise that parents are key figures in helping 
their children to cope with the emotional and physical aspects of 
growing up and in preparing them for the challenges and 
responsibilities which sexual maturity brings. The teaching offered 
by schools should be complementary to and supportive to the role of 
parents, and should have regard to parents' views about its content 
and presentation..." (paragraph 8). 
When 'the family' and its rights are spoken of, what is often meant 
is that the rights of parents over children should be established. The 
concept of the family is unhelpful in this context because it 
disguises some of the real issues in question. The fact is that both 
parents and children have rights. 
Education within a democratic society requires that we expose our 
children to as wide a variety of experiences, and what Gutmannn 
(1987) describes as, "forms of the good life", as possible. This 
breadth of experience is not possible if we confine the whole of a 
child's general or moral education to the family. The British 
government, typically, does not offer us any arguments in support of 
its brand of family centred morality, but we can gain some insight 
into their moral viewpoint by examining two arguments put forward 
by those who defend the parents as determiner view. 
Firstly, the argument from progenitorship. This involves the view 
that parents have rights over their children because their children 
are their off-spring. This argument fails to emphasise sufficiently 
that children are essentially separate human beings with separate 
rights in virtue of their being separate persons with individual 
consciousness. It follows that children's interests and needs are not 
necessarily connected with those of their parents. They may either 
coincide or diverge from time to time. Therefore, when we consider 
how children are to be educated within a democratic society, we 
must look beyond the family for the provision of a good, broad 
education. 
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A second argument used to defend parents' rights is the principle of 
subsidiarity. Coons and Sugarman (1978) define this principle in the 
following way, "...responsibility for dependent individuals should 
belong to the smaller and more intimate rather than the larger and 
more anonymous community to which the individual belongs." (p. 49). 
Coons and Sugarman believe that the family should consult widely on 
matters concerning their child's education, but that in the end, such 
decisions must be left with the families concerned. 
Amy Gutmann notes that in many cases, the family itself cannot 
provide a sufficiently broad education, though it can, of course, 
contribute to it significantly. "...they (parents) still have a duty to 
permit, if not to prepare, their children to choose among a range of 
conceptions of the good life that differ substantially from those 
held by the family." (P.P.A., 1980, Vol. 9, no. 4, p. 342). She believes 
that, "We can justify limitations on parents' rights because our 
valuation of liberal freedom to pursue differing conceptions of the 
good life is dependent upon that freedom being exercised by beings 
who have been raised under conditions conducive to choice." (Op. cit., 
pp. 350-1). 
The family already has considerable influence on the child for the 
majority of the time. We must see the role of the school as adding a 
new dimension to students' education, going far beyond the 
necessarily limited confines and perspectives of the family. 
Joel Feinberg points to the "closed circle" of influence that parents 
seem to have over their children. "...the parents help create some of 
the interests whose fulfilment will constitute the child's own good. 
They cannot aim at an independent conception of the child's own good 
in deciding how to do this, because to some extent, the child's own 
good (self-fulfilment) depends on which interests the parents decide 
to create. The circle is thus closed." (Aiken & Lafollette, 1980, p. 
148). 
A democratic education system provides opportunities outside the 
family for the child to grow and develop. It is the task of the family 
to encourage, not stunt, this growth. This argument is based on the 
empirical fact that children are not just members of a family, they 
are also members of the wider democratic community. 
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Does this mean that parents have no rights at all? P.A. White (1983, 
ch. 5) says that, strictly speaking, parents do not have 'rights'. She 
prefers to characterise parents' responsibilities in terms of duties. 
Parents have three principal duties: (i) those covering educational 
matters and involving an intimate knowledge of the student based on 
a personal relationship with her or him, (ii) that of an intermediary 
between formal educational agencies and the individual child, (iii) to 
introduce the child to aspects of the good life beyond formal 
education in school. 
White emphasises that parents have no right to impose any 
particular conception of the good life on their children, especially by 
way of imposing indoctrinatory forms of education on them (e.g. in a 
Catholic or Public school). This is based on the argument that there 
can be no moral experts as to what constitutes the good life for 
individuals. 
The state's role is to facilitate students freely to choose the kind of 
life they wish to live. The state has the right to specify what 
general forms of education will best facilitate this kind of choice. 
White concludes by defining two sorts of parental enabling rights: (i) 
rights to help them carry out duties connected with providing 
intimate knowledge of the student and a personal relationship with 
her or him, (ii) The right to interest others in their hobbies, 
pastimes, concerns, etc. 
What about parents who object to lesbian and gay issues being dealt 
with in schools? The right of parents to withdraw their children 
from any or all aspects of sex education other than those which are 
statutory requirements of the National Curriculum Science Order are 
enshrined in section 241 of the Education Act 1993. 
Parents now have the right to withdraw their children from sex 
education without giving a reason. This means that parents can 
withdraw their children from sex education even if their reasons for 
doing so are reprehensible or ill-considered. This legislation 
fundamentally misunderstands the purpose and aims of democratic 
education. 
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I have already argued that parents do not have the right to override 
what the democratic state considers, after proper consultation and 
reflection, to be the best form of education for its young citizens. In 
cases where education in sexuality is confined to the family because 
the child has been withdrawn from school sex education, the 
education of the child concerned will be limited. She or he will be 
exposed to a restricted range of moral, cultural and social attitudes 
and values. This is unacceptable in a plural democratic society in 
which citizens should be encouraged at least to understand and 
tolerate religions, moralities, sexualities and other aspects of life 
which differ from their own. 
Since the focus of democratic education in schools is children and 
young people, this kind of parental power is unjustifiable on 
democratic grounds. The freedom of parents to remove their children 
from this important aspect of education is also the freedom to deny 
their children the liberty to learn about fundamental features of 
their growth and development as people and as citizens. 
Parents who do not wish their children to attend education in 
sexuality courses, for whatever moral or religious reason, should 
not have the right to withdraw their children for two reasons: 
(i) They are at liberty to teach their children what they consider to 
be morally acceptable within the family setting, but children have 
the right to expect to encounter attitudes and values which may 
differ from those held by their families. In this way, democratic 
education provides a positive challenge. The child is able to test 
what she or he has learned against what she or he encounters within 
the wider democratic school community. 
(ii) The right of withdrawal from education in sexuality courses 
undermines equality of opportunity for lesbians and gays. In very 
many cases, the real reason why parents withdraw their children 
from education in sexuality is because they do not want their 
children to learn about contraception, abortion, or lesbian and gay 
sexualities, which they object to on moral or religious grounds. 
Children should be allowed to make up their own minds on these 
issues. Failure to allow them to do so may be likened to a situation 
where parents are permitted to withdraw their children from 
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aspects of anti-sexist or anti-racist education because they believe 
that women or people of colour are inferior. 
Parents who hold strong moral or religious beliefs must, in the end, 
accept the state's right to decide on the right kind of education for 
its citizens. Religious and moral education are important aspects of 
young people's education, but parents must accept that these 
subjects are taught from a secularist point of view. This is 
necessary because some people in our society are agnostic or atheist 
and many belong to a diversity of religions with contradictory 
beliefs, generating irresolvable moral and religious conflicts. These 
irresolvable conflicts must be openly acknowledged as part of life 
within a pluralist democratic community. 
The essential requirement is that religious parents agree to their 
children learning about a variety of other religions, cultures, 
moralities, beliefs and ways of life, many of which differ greatly 
from their own. This is fundamental to living harmoniously in a 
pluralistic democratic community. 
The right of the state to paternalistic intervention in the 
lives of children. 
In chapter one, I argued that personal autonomy is an important 
educational aim. In what circumstances, then, can the state justify 
the limitation of children's personal autonomy for the purpose of 
securing what it considers to be the right sort of democratic 
education? 
Amy Gutmann (P.P.A., 1980, p. 38) defines the concept of paternalism 
as, "...a standard justifying interference with a child's freedom of 
action by reference to the child's present or future interests." There 
are times when a child's freedom is restricted for its immediate 
good (e.g. physically preventing a child from touching a flame or 
crossing a busy road), but there are other occasions when a child's 
freedom is restricted for his or her long term good (e.g., by the 
state's insistence that children must attend school until they are 
sixteen, or by a parent's decision that their child comes home at a 
certain time). 
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The right to exercise paternalism is based upon the empirical fact of 
the child's emotional, intellectual and physical immaturity and 
dependence. Children depend on adults for guidance, protection and 
material needs. Gutmann justifies paternalistic intervention using 
Rawls' Primary Good Standard (Rawls, 1990). If there are certain 
primary goods that adults would choose to have had provided for 
themselves as children, then one might justify paternalistic 
intervention that supplies these goods. Examples of such goods are 
adequate nutrition, health care, housing, familial affection, 
education as a democrat. Gutmann does not see primary goods as 
timeless or universal. They reflect a common understanding within a 
particular society of what goods rational individuals want provided 
for them in their society. 
Feinberg (Aiken and Lafollette, 1980) also bases his argument for 
the exercise of paternalism in certain cases on the child's 
immaturity. He focuses on the child's immaturity in the sphere of 
freedom and identifies two senses of autonomy: (i) the capacity to 
govern oneself (this is a matter of degree), (ii) the sovereign 
authority to govern oneself (this is absolute within one's own moral 
boundaries). Children's capacity to govern themselves is limited by 
their immaturity, but they still have the sovereign right to exercise 
freedom within certain limitations imposed by their particular 
stage of development. "...recognition and enforcement of the right of 
self-determination (autonomy) is a causally necessary condition for 
the achievement of self-fulfilment (the individual's own good)." (p. 
144). It is vital that the child is allowed to exercise autonomy 
within the self-imposed limitations of her or his emotional, moral 
and intellectual development. 
A democratic education system based on the ideal of education for 
autonomy, should never sanction paternalistic intervention in the 
case of adults, with the exception of the mentally ill or retarded 
whose social, moral and intellectual capacities have been 
temporarily or permanently impaired. The ideal of personal autonomy 
should make us wary of interfering with the goals or life plans of 
mature adults, even if we disagree with them. We should also avoid 
cultural paternalism based on the idea of 'the noble savage', or the 
sort of colonialism exhibited by some Western countries. It is 
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largely for these reasons that we need to fix a rough barrier 
between childhood and adulthood, beyond which we want to restrict 
the use of paternalistic intervention by the state. 
It is true that many children will be uninterested in or even hostile 
to some aspects of education which adults may consider to be 
fundamental. These aspects may include the formal subject areas of 
the curriculum or certain other subject areas and processes of 
teaching to be outlined in chapter seven. The state has the right to 
insist that children explore these aspects of education, despite their 
lack of enthusiasm or even hostility. It is important that young 
people learn perseverance, the ability to engage in and pursue 
activities which they may not initially see as important, interesting 
or worthwhile. They should be enabled to realise that activities 
which may initially seem boring or irrelevant often turn out to be 
important and worthwhile on closer scrutiny. This promotes open-
mindedness. 
The participation of children within a democratic 
education system. 
When is a child not a child? Some would answer, 'When she or he is 
an adolescent', thus invoking that mid-way stage between childhood 
and adulthood. 'Coming of age' is a process, it does not happen 
instantaneously. The question as to when someone is no longer to be 
treated as a child is complex. Definitions of childhood can be divided 
into two basic types: Normative (concerning the needs, interests and 
capacities of people, their maturity of thought and action, etc.) and 
Institutional (the way the law determines who is and who is not to 
be treated as a child). 
The law discriminates arbitrarily between adults and children, 
apportioning various rights at different stages of chronological 
development. The question as to when people are ready to assume 
certain responsibilities and hold certain rights depends on individual 
development, as any experienced teacher knows. The law can only 
roughly define the ages at which certain rights are applicable and it 
is clear that improvements could be made in the way it does this. 
The central problem concerning the adult/child distinction is well 
put by John Harris (K. Graham, 1982), "There are numerous children 
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whom it would be implausible to regard as incompetent and 
numerous adults whom it would be implausible to regard as anything 
else." (p. 37). 
Despite the state's right to paternalistic intervention in the lives of 
children under certain circumstances, we must also recognise that 
children should learn to make autonomous choices and decisions on 
matters which concern them. It is necessary to balance the need for 
paternalistic intervention with the need for education in autonomy. 
The overall aim should be to maximise, whenever possible, the young 
person's socially responsible exercise of autonomy. The extent to 
which this is possible will depend on the intellectual and emotional 
maturity of the child concerned, but it will also depend on the 
sensitivity of the educational institution in providing real 
opportunities for the exercise of these freedoms. It is by 
participating as fully as possible within their educational 
communities that children are enabled to learn first-hand the real 
benefits of participatory democracy. 
How the state should control curricula. 
In what ways should the democratic community determine the form 
and content of education? David Bridges (J.P.E., 1979) believes that 
it is important for all sections of the democratic community 
(experts, teachers, students, parents and other citizens) to have 
some influence over what is taught and, I would add, the manner in 
which it is taught. I would also emphasise this as the only effective 
way that people will see the importance of democratic education, 
establishing ownership of and commitment to it. 
The rationale Bridges gives for this form of decision-making is: 
(a) A variety of ideas, hypotheses and policies are generated. 
(b) False or bad ideas are subjected to criticism. 
(c) The virtues of good ideas or opinions can be properly appreciated. 
(d) All relevant interests and opinions can be represented. 
(e) This system provides for the best accommodation of as many 
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opinions and talents as possible. 
Yael Tamir (J.P.E., vol. 24, no. 2) supports the view that a wide 
variety of different sections of the democratic community should 
decide on the kind of education required in such a community. She 
claims that, strictly speaking, educators do not have a right to 
educate. The problem with establishing a right to educate is that 
this would allow the educator to supply any assumed deficiencies in 
someone's education according to a subjective and individual 
conception of what these deficiencies might be. Education can never 
be truly impartial because it reflects the cultural, moral and 
educational viewpoint of the educator. This is essentially why 
important educational decisions should not be left to a small number 
of individuals or certain sections of society but should be the 
responsibility of the democratic community as a whole. 
Tamir's argument is based on the liberal belief (shared by Gutmann) 
that no-one has the right to determine the type of life others will 
live and that the only worthy type of education is one that promotes 
and protects the person's personal autonomy. In the case of children, 
Tamir feels that the justification for the type of education chosen 
should not be grounded in the preferences of parents, but in an 
independent argument about the nature of 'right education.' 
"While the duties of educators towards children force them to make 
educational choices- regarding the cultural and moral horizons, and 
the kind of knowledge children should acquire- no educator has the 
right to make these choices. I suggest that such a right is not 
needed. In fact, to give the educator a right to educate can only 
injure the child." (Op. cit., p. 168). She concludes that children should 
be exposed to different ways of life from their parents and that 
education should express preferences, views and knowledge of a 
wide variety of different educators. Parents, state representatives 
and educators should all determine the child's education, but no 
single group has an exclusive or absolute right to educate. 
It is consequently important that the general framework of the 
curriculum should be determined by the wider democratic community 
and controlled by the state in its name. Syllabus details should then 
be worked out by local education authorities. 
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As to the way in which these representatives should control the 
curriculum, John White (Sockett, 1980, pp. 25-41) makes an 
important distinction between: (a) the control of syllabus details 
and (b) the control of the general framework of the curriculum. 
White's argument is that teachers should have control over syllabus 
details. However, because the general framework of the curriculum 
has important implications for the whole of society, decisions 
relating it should be made by a more representative body of people. 
Amy Gutmann (1987), speaking within the context of the American 
education system, poses a problem with regard to the control of the 
curriculum: "At one extreme, delegating to local school boards full 
control over public schooling would reduce the U.S. to a collection of 
democratic city-states, totally neglecting our collective interest in 
a common education. At the other extreme, centralising all control 
at the national level would eliminate any effective democratic 
control over schools, leaving bureaucrats, administrators and 
teachers in de facto control." (p. 73). 
Gutmann proposes a solution to this problem by advocating a Federal 
system of government. The central government should set down the 
absolute minimum structure of school and college curricula in order 
to promote autonomy and participation within the democratic 
community. It is then for the education authorities to decide how to 
implement these government policies within their areas. Within J. 
White's framework, the national government would control the 
general framework of the curriculum while local government would 
control the syllabus details, tailoring them to the cultural and 
social needs of each school community. 
The limits of state control. 
Isaiah Berlin is wary of too much state intervention or control. He 
believes that the liberal state's exercise of control should be used 
only to defend people's negative liberties. Negative liberty involves 
the idea that the state should not interfere with people's personal 
freedom of activity or thought. "...a frontier must be drawn between 
the area of private life and that of public authority." (Berlin, 1969, 
p. 124). His worry is that positive liberty may well involve the 
coercion of people by the state in the name of their own liberation. 
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The main rationale for promoting a large sphere of negative liberty 
is that it is essential for the promotion of positive liberty. Thus, 
negative liberty is freedom from coercion and interference by the 
state; positive liberty is freedom to exercise one's positive liberty 
(or personal autonomy). 
Berlin's worries about the state interfering too much in people's 
positive liberty are to some extent justified. Roger Scruton, for 
example, argues that 'contentious issues' should be banned from 
schools. The intervention of government in this wholly undesirable 
way is now a reality in Britain with the appearance of section 28 of 
the Local Government Act, discussed at length in the previous 
chapter. Here it was acknowledged that a major consequence of this 
Act and the D.F.E. circulars that followed it, is that many teachers 
are very wary of tackling lesbian and gay issues. This is an attempt 
by the British government to restrict the democratic education of 
students to an intolerable degree by limiting their field of enquiry 
and exploration. 
I argue for the view that there is a principled limitation on state 
control: the state should not determine what constitutes the good 
life or the right path for individuals. The state must remain agnostic 
in this area. However, J. White argues that the state should 
encourage people to co-operate with one another, thus engendering a 
sense of mature social responsibility and the kind of democratic 
virtues discussed in chapter two. The state should also guarantee 
people's freedom to pursue their own concerns privately (except 
where these are anti-social concerns) and without interference as 
far as possible because this goes some way towards safeguarding 
their positive liberty. 
Amy Gutmann (1987) highlights an important dichotomy faced by 
state education: "Either we must educate children so that they are 
free to choose among the widest range of lives (given the 
constraints of cultural coherence) because freedom of choice is the 
paramount good, or we must educate children so that they will 
choose the life that we believe is best because leading a good life is 
the paramount good." (p. 36). 
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She concludes that "Neither alternative is acceptable: we 
legitimately value education not just for the liberty but also for the 
virtue that it bestows on children; and the virtue that we value 
includes the ability to deliberate among competing conceptions of 
the good." (Ibid.). Her point is that neither choice- freedom or virtue-
is neutral. In any society (especially one that encourages democratic 
participation), many general aims in education are controversial 
because there will always be sections of society that disagree with 
them. 
State educators do not have the right to indoctrinate students into 
believing that 'our way is best', states can be wrong about what 
constitutes the good life. Even if they were right, there is no 
guarantee that everyone will agree that this conception of the good 
life is for them. "...the objectively good fife, defined as the life that 
is best for people who are rightly educated from birth, need not be 
the good life, or even the closest approximation of the good life, for 
people who have been wrongly educated." (Op. cit., p. 26). Gutmann 
believes that our good is always relative to our education and the 
choices we are capable of making for ourselves, our children and our 
communities. Therefore the state's role should never be the 
realisation of the good life for individuals through education. 
The function of education within a democratic state is rather to 
enable and empower students freely to choose for themselves the 
lives they wish to pursue and the views of life they wish to hold, 
whilst respecting the well-being and life-plans of others. 
Although we can never hope to have a consensus agreement on what 
constitutes the good life for a particular individual, John White 
feels that we can make certain generalisations and agree on what a 
good education is. We can state uncontroversially that everyone has 
the right to an education of some sort. Whilst we may not all agree 
on the rights and wrongs of a particular moral dilemma such as 
abortion, for example, we can agree that moral education should take 
place, even if we have different moral and political viewpoints as to 
what moral education should consist of. 
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John White outlines two important features of a good society: (a) its 
members are not egoists, they should have a genuine regard for the 
well-being of others as well as themselves. Society is not simply a 
collection of atomic individuals. Wittgenstein's private language 
argument dispenses with the notion of a pre-social individual. 
Members of a society should co-operate in order to function within 
that society. This co-operation is, in the broadest sense, political. 
There are two important implications of this for education: (i) we 
should encourage people to be other-regarding, to consider the needs 
and desires of others as well as their own because this is what 
builds and sustains the democratic community, (ii) in order to 
nurture this basic attitude, subjects like personal and social 
education, moral and political education must be included within 
school and college curricula and the state must ensure this 
inclusion. 
(b) The good society must allow freedom to pursue one's own 
concerns in privacy and without interference. This is an argument 
for a broad curriculum in which people can decide which aspects of 
education will contribute to their well-being. "Since a good society 
will aim at promoting the well-being of individuals and since, as I 
should want to argue in a fuller account, the individual is to a 
certain extent the final authority on that in which his well-being 
consists, he must be left as free as possible to develop his own 
preferred way of life within the framework of his moral, including 
political, commitments."(J. White, P.P.E.S.G.B., 1976). 
Amy Gutmann's notion of personal autonomy goes some way towards 
developing a clear notion of the limits of state control. She 
articulates personal autonomy in terms of what she calls the 
principles of "non-repression" and "non-discrimination". The 
principle of non-repression involves the idea of not preventing 
rational deliberation about different ways of life. It also involves 
inculcating character traits of the kind discussed in chapter two 
(e.g., respect for persons, toleration, etc.) which are the foundation 
of rational deliberation of various ways of life. 
Gutmann (1987) claims that non-repression is not just freedom from 
repression, it is also the freedom to deliberate rationally among 
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different ways of life (a feature of autonomy discussed earlier in 
chapter one). "Rational deliberation remains the form of freedom 
most suitable to democratic society in which adults must be free to 
deliberate and disagree but constrained to secure the intellectual 
grounds for deliberation and disagreement among children." (p. 45). 
Importantly, whilst non-repression is a limitation on democratic 
authority, its foundation is, at the same time, democratic education 
itself. "Because conscious social reproduction is the primary aim of 
democratic education, communities must be prevented from using 
education to stifle rational deliberation of competing concepts of 
the good life and the good society." (Ibid.) 
The principle of non-discrimination extends the logic of non-
repression. It acknowledges that education is open to all educable 
people. The effect of discrimination is to repress the capacity or 
desire of groups or individuals to participate in the processes that 
structure choice among good lives. The state must ensure that its 
educational establishments adhere to these two principles in order 
to safeguard personal autonomy. 
Conclusions. 
In summary: 
1. The state should control education in the name of the democratic 
community. A representative assembly of citizens should determine 
the general form and content of education best suited to promote 
participatory democracy. Syllabus details should be worked out by 
local authorities, with regard to the cultural, educational and 
material needs of local educational institutions. 
The rationale for this kind of state control is based on the argument 
that democratic education should seek to provide students with a 
wide variety of experiences and "forms of the good life." This cannot 
be provided by the family alone. Children are not only members of a 
family, they are also members of a much wider democratic 
community. 
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2. Therefore, there is no place, within the democratic community, 
for 'family centred morality', although families do have an important 
role to play in nurturing and supporting the aims of state education 
and in looking after the educational and social welfare of their 
children. 
3. An important limitation on state control is that it should not 
specify what is constitutive of the good life, since there can be no 
'moral experts' as to what will lead to an individual's happiness. The 
state's role is to facilitate students to live the lives they wish to 
live, while, at the same time, encouraging a sense of social 
responsibility. 
It has sometimes been objected that encouraging co-operation, 
honesty, toleration, mutual respect for persons, etc. is the same as 
encouraging or promoting a particular conception of the good life. 
This is not the case: although these desirable character traits or 
virtues support democratic society and help to ensure that it 
functions along participatory lines, they do not specify in any detail 
what the good life consists in for that society or for any given 
individual within it. 
4. The democratic state's right to specify the form and content of 
education best suited to its young citizens is a kind of state 
paternalism. The right to exercise such paternalism is based on the 
fact of the emotional and intellectual immaturity of children. 
5. We must balance the need for paternalistic intervention by the 
state in certain circumstances with the need for children to learn 
how to become more autonomous. The overall aim should be, 
whenever possible, to maximise opportunities for the young person's 
exercise of socially responsible autonomy. Students must learn to 
participate freely and effectively within their educational 
institutions in order to see that participatory democracy works. 
Finally, I would argue for Gutmann's position: ft is not sufficient for 
the state to defend what Berlin calls negative liberty. Students must 
also be allowed to deliberate about different ways of life. However, 
the provision of opportunities for students to exercise their 
personal autonomy is inadequate of itself to ensure the proper 
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education of future citizens. A democratic education should also 
develop the kind of democratic personality discussed in chapter two. 
In practical terms, I shall argue that the kind of education outlined 
in chapter seven is the best means of fostering the exercise of 
socially responsible autonomy and developing such a personality. 
Such an education will also provide a context in which various forms 




POLICY FORMATION, DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION 
WITHIN A DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION SYSTEM. 
The acknowledgement of lesbian and gay issues within the lives and 
work of educational communities is not a simple one-way process of 
staff enabling students to appreciate the importance of such issues. 
This process of acknowledgement requires that both staff and 
students are made aware of the importance of the struggle for 
lesbian and gay equality and liberation. Therefore, the need for staff 
to explore such issues should be seen within the wider context of 
their continuing in-service training and development. 
Focusing on the current needs and practices of educational 
institutions, this chapter examines the life and work of educational 
institutions, highlighting the importance of educational policies and 
exploring the significance of the way educational institutions are 
organised. 
Simon Harris (1990) emphasises the practical importance of 
institution wide (in this case, whole school) policies. Individuals 
and even departments who take on lesbian and gay sexualities as an 
issue face the risk of homophobic behaviour and abuse from parents 
and/or children. It is therefore necessary to situate the work of 
individuals and departments within a supportive institution wide 
framework that recognises the value of the work being done and 
supports such work by offering a solid rationale for it, linking it to 
the institution's fundamental principles, policies and ethos. 
"First it (a whole school policy) would depersonalise the issue, 
bringing it within the ambit of issues which concern the entire 
school. Second, it would set up agreed procedures, ensuring a unity 
of response and a coherence of objectives. It would remove 
accountability from an individual teacher or department and result 
in the headteacher's having to take clear responsibility for both its 
representation to parents, governors and the local education 
authority and its implementation within school." (Op. cit., p. 97). 
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Policies serve a dual purpose: they reflect the ethos of an 
institution and, at the same time, they help to define that ethos. Of 
course, the ethos of an institution cannot be reduced to a set of 
policies. However, such policies can offer a valuable insight into an 
educational institution's ethos. 
Because policies are a reflection of a living institution, they must 
be open to continual evaluation and development. In this way, they 
can be used as a valuable tool for assessing the life and work of an 
institution and its development. 
The institutional development plan, introduced with the enactment 
of the Education Reform Act 1988 is an excellent way of integrating 
the major aims and objectives of an educational institution, its 
fundamental principles and ethos. It is a very useful tool for 
planning and evaluation and is of relevance to educational 
institutions at all levels. 
Such a plan will reflect, inter alia, all important institutional 
policies. Short, medium and long term aims for their effective 
implementation can then be established. It should include an element 
of resource planning so that a realistic appraisal of necessary 
resources (in terms of people, time, materials, etc.) is undertaken. 
A certain type of ethos is necessary in order for lesbian and gay 
issues to be recognised and for lesbian and gay liberation to come 
about within our educational institutions. Without a supportive 
ethos, policies will not be effective. Central to such an ethos are the 
ideals of respect for persons and their differences in terms of race, 
sex, culture, class, ability and sexuality and equality of opportunity 
for all students and staff. Policies on equal opportunities, 
discipline, pastoral care and education in sexuality will help to 
establish, develop and support such an ethos and clearly articulate 
the institution's fundamental principles. 
Equal opportunities. 
Students should understand the need for equality of opportunity for 
lesbians and gays by becoming aware of the wider context of 
discrimination, the many ways in which their fellow citizens are 
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oppressed for a variety of reasons. This awareness often emanates 
from the 'hidden curriculum', the countless informal ways in which 
an institution expresses its ethos. 
Educational institutions all too often mirror the bigotry and 
prejudices of society. It is therefore necessary to develop, promote 
and effectively implement an equal opportunities policy which will 
reflect the fundamental principles and aims of the institution in 
this important area and seek positively to combat heterosexism and 
all other forms of oppression. 
It is important to examine the meaning of equality of opportunity in 
order to ensure that policies in this area are effective in expressing 
and achieving what they intend. 
Alan H. Goldman (E.F. Paul, 1987) provides us with a useful 
definition: "An opportunity is a chance to attain some goal or obtain 
some benefit. More precisely, it is the lack of some obstacle or 
obstacles to the attainment of some goal(s) or benefit(s). 
Opportunities are equal in some specified or understood sense when 
persons face roughly the same obstacle or obstacles of roughly the 
same difficulty of some specified or understood sort. In different 
contexts we might have different sorts of benefits or obstacles in 
mind...we generally divide obstacles into two broad classes: those 
imposed by the social system or by other persons in the society, for 
example the hardships of life in the lower economic classes or 
barriers from prejudices based on race, sex or ethnic background; 
and those imposed by natural disabilities, for example, low 
intelligence or lack of talents." (Op. cit., p. 88). 
James W. Nickel (Op. cit.) describes opportunities as, "...states of 
affairs that combine the absence of insuperable obstacles with the 
presence of means-internal or external-that give one a good chance 
of overcoming the obstacles that remain. A means that provides only 
a remote chance of reaching a goal will not be thought of as an 
opportunity. On the other hand, a means does not have to be a 
guarantee (my italics) of reaching a goal in order to present a 
genuine and valuable opportunity." (p. 110). In simple terms, equality 
of opportunity is about 'evening up the score' for those who are 
unjustly discriminated against or disadvantaged. Nickel sees equal 
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opportunity as a norm or goal, a principle identifying which 
opportunities ought to be equalised to some degree. 
John White, in a paper entitled The dishwasher's child: education and  
the end of egalitarianism (1994) challenges the idea that a society 
equal in terms of wealth, income, personal well-being or power, is 
desirable in itself. 
Contemporary writers such as Nagel and Nielsen believe that 
egalitarianism is a good in itself, but they give no reason for valuing 
such equality. Nielsen can only point to his 'pre-theoretical sense of 
unfairness' at, "...the existence of very different life prospects of 
equally talented, equally energetic children from very different 
social backgrounds: say, the children of a successful businessman 
and a dishwasher." (Nielsen, 1985, p. 8). 
White believes that whilst we may well share Nielsen's sense of 
unfairness at the poorer life-prospects of the dishwasher's child, 
we do not necessarily have to accept that this also involves 
advocating a society in which all life prospects are equal. What is 
undesirable is that the dishwasher's child's life prospects are so 
poor. We can improve this situation by supporting the child's well-
being. We do not necessarily have to wish that the dishwasher's 
child's prospects are equal to those of the businessman's child. The 
fundamental ethical consideration is that "...all human beings' 
interests are equally worthy of consideration." (White, p.141). This 
ethical consideration does not necessarily imply equality in the 
distribution of goods or burdens, in life prospects, or economically. 
"Even when both the dishwasher's child and the businessman's child 
have what they need to lead a flourishing life, one may be much 
richer than the other." (Ibid.). 
Following Frankfurt (1988), White rejects the claim that, "...equality 
in the distribution of goods, including economic goods, is an 
intrinsically desirable social goal." (Ibid.). What is morally 
important is not that everyone should have the same, but that 
everyone should have enough. 
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A.H. Goldman (E.F. Paul, 1987), arguing for a principle of distribution 
of goods rejected by White, acknowledges that there are sometimes 
good reasons for overriding such a principle. One such reason is 
incentive. "If society is to influence the behaviour of its members 
in socially desirable directions, then it must utilise positive 
rewards and negative sanctions. The former will include the 
prospect of higher than average income and wealth, and the latter 
may include losses of liberty. Such inequalities are necessary for 
maintaining social values." (p. 90). 
White goes on to support Nagel's concept of a "high social minimum". 
This involves the notion that in order to enable everyone to lead a 
flourishing life, certain conditions are necessary. The political task 
is to provide everyone with these conditions, which include adequate 
food, shelter clothing, good health, etc. White adds to this list: a 
decent education, a reasonable income, enjoyable work, friends and 
lovers, social recognition and sustaining virtues such as confidence 
and practical wisdom. 
White believes that, "The central value is that everyone lead a 
flourishing life." (Ibid.). Within the political sphere, policies would 
have to be formulated in order to limit impediments to universal 
autonomy, not in order to ensure total equality, as egalitarians 
would argue. 
The egalitarian argument for equality of power is then tackled, 
"..foremen are typically more powerful than operatives, managers 
than other staff, prime ministers than civil servants, teachers or 
parents than children. If power is to be equalised, these differences 
are at risk." (pp. 142-143). One reason for diminishing these power 
gaps might be to increase a sense of commitment at lower levels on 
the hierarchy. If so, the underlying value is commitment, not 
equality of power. 
White concludes by acknowledging that in some cases equal 
opportunities policies in schools and colleges are concerned with 
enlarging opportunities for women or blacks, etc. in order to obtain 
more senior posts within these institutions. However, they are also 
applied to prevent abuse or disrespect. Abuse and disrespect can 
affect opportunities available, for example, by diminishing self- 
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confidence, but even when this does not happen, this kind of 
behaviour is still reprehensible. "Abuse and disrespect are bad not 
because they offend against egalitarian values but because they 
make things more difficult for individuals: they are impediments to 
their autonomous flourishing and need to be cleared out of their 
way." (p. 144). 
'Equal opportunities issues' in schools and colleges are not always 
what they seem, equalising opportunities is not always what people 
really intend. For example, the proportion of working class people 
going into higher education is much lower than in the middle class. 
The central aim cannot be to even up the proportions, for this could 
be achieved by eliminating higher education for everyone and they 
are not interested in that. 
A.H. Goldman (Paul, 1987) points out, in support of this position, 
that chances cannot be literally equal unless certain jobs are 
awarded by lotteries, a clearly undesirable state of affairs. In the 
light of this, "Equality of opportunity is normally interpreted in 
terms of opportunity to compete for such places and to earn them 
through productive effort. Interpreting it in this way, we could still 
seek to equalise as far as possible chances to succeed in the 
competitions." (Op. cit., p. 91). 
White agrees that data on differential opportunities is useful 
because it singles out deficiencies- e.g. the obstacles facing 
working class people-which need to be put right. The use of 'equality 
of opportunity' in such cases is, as Raz (1986, p. 228) suggests, 
largely rhetorical. It is simply pointing to a need not met. "Once 
again, the real value which directs us is not the essentially 
comparative notion of equality but a non-comparative concern for 
certain individuals' well-being." (White, p. 144). 
In chapter two, I supported the idea of a democracy which 
acknowledges the pluralist nature of our communities in terms of 
race, sex, sexuality, ability, etc. Tolerance of and, more 
fundamentally, respect for differences among people is just as 
important as respecting those features they have in common. 
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The focus of equal opportunities policies should not be the naive 
'equalisation' of all human beings. Such a goal is unattainable and 
even undesirable in some circumstances. People do not possess equal 
intellectual aptitudes, talents, skills and capacities. As Goldman 
points out, "The demand upon a moral social system for equal 
respect for all its members would be violated if its educational 
institution failed to contribute to the development of gifted 
individuals until all others had caught up, or if it so contributed only 
to the extent that doing so benefited others, otherwise 
concentrating exclusively upon the less gifted." (E.F. Paul, 1987, p. 
92). No-one should be held back from personal development, whether 
they are intellectually talented or not. 
Equal opportunities policies should concentrate on combating 
oppression and unjust obstacles to people's well-being and life 
plans. 
In summary, an equal opportunities policy should have four principal 
features: 
(1) The focus of equal opportunities policies should be an 
acknowledgement of and respect for people's individuality and their 
many differences, with regard to, among other things, race, gender, 
sexuality and ability. 
(2) It must be acknowledged that people should have sufficient 
resources to achieve their goals or aims in life. Here, John White's 
list of minimal social conditions is important: adequate food, 
shelter clothing, good health, a decent education, a reasonable 
income, enjoyable work, friends and lovers, social recognition and 
sustaining virtues such as confidence and practical wisdom. 
(3) Such policies should enable people to flourish as autonomous 
human beings and to remove obstacles to such flourishing. 
(4) In order to promote this latter aim, these policies should seek to 
provide an adequate number and range of chances to succeed in 
competition for training, education and employment, especially 
where applicants suffer unjust discrimination because of their race, 
sex, sexuality, ability or other relevant factors. 
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The National Union of Teachers (circular 75/89 E & E0, Appendix A) 
suggests that the following model statement be adopted by schools 
in order to ensure equality of opportunity for teachers. 
"This institution is an equal opportunities employer. The aim of this 
policy is to ensure that no job applicant or employee receives less 
favourable treatment on the grounds of sex, age, race, colour, 
nationality, ethnic origin, marital status, sexual orientation, family 
responsibility, trade union activity, political or religious belief. 
Selection criteria and procedures will be kept under review to 
ensure that individuals are selected, promoted and treated on the 
basis of their relevant merits and abilities. All employees will be 
given equal opportunity and where appropriate special training to 
progress within the organisation. Applications from persons with 
disabilities who have the necessary attributes for a post are 
welcomed. The institution is committed to a programme of action to 
make this policy fully effective." 
This statement is useful as a model because of its assurance of 
monitoring, its reference to positive action and its commitment to 
implementation. It is also important because it links the 
discrimination of lesbians and gays to other forms of discrimination 
and oppression, as I have done throughout this thesis. Treating 
heterosexist and homophobic issues on a par with racist and sexist 
issues provides a wide-ranging and robust framework from within 
which day-to-day oppressive and discriminatory behaviour can be 
recognised and tackled. 
A similar statement should form part of the institution's policy for 
students, ensuring that they too will be treated fairly at all times 
and given equal access to any support and training they may need. 
Discipline. 
The discipline policy should positively support the central idea of 
equality of opportunity. In this way, sexist and heterosexist 
behaviour or remarks aimed at students or staff can be dealt with 
thoroughly and effectively. It is important to emphasise that 
heterosexist behaviour or remarks should be treated in the same way 
as racist or other forms of sexist remarks. The emphasis should be 
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on education of the offenders rather than their punishment because 
punishment alone very often reinforces students' prejudices and 
resentment. I have worked with many well-meaning people who have 
made the mistake of punishing students very harshly for sexist or 
racist remarks without bothering to counsel them about the 
offensiveness and inaccuracy of such remarks. 
Pastoral care. 
An institution wide policy on pastoral care is also necessary. This 
would identify the perceived needs of students in personal, social 
and academic spheres. It would also emphasise that students are 
encouraged to be self-reliant and to find valid bases for self-esteem 
in order to counteract the stereotypes and prejudices of society 
with respect to their race, class, sexuality, gender or ability. 
The importance of the pastoral curriculum (including Personal, 
Social and Health Education) and the context in which it operates 
should also be highlighted. 
Education in Sexuality. 
Such a policy is complementary to an equal opportunities policy, 
especially as it relates to sexual orientations because it ensures 
that a variety of sexualities are identified, discussed and studied. It 
also ensures that biological reproduction is not presented as the 
central, most important goal of sexual activity and that sex is seen 
as something pleasurable and enjoyable. This should, of course, be 
balanced with a realistic appraisal of the dangers and risks of sex 
(e.g. unwanted pregnancy, H.I.V., A.I.D.S. and other sexually 
transmitted diseases) and an appreciation that sexual acts, like 
other forms of human activity, are open to moral appraisal, 
depending on whether they promote others' welfare or cause them 
harm. 
The relationship between the core policies. 
These core policies have a dynamic, integral relationship. They 
support each other by indicating a wider rationale and framework 
for their formulation and implementation. For example, the policy on 
equal opportunities is closely related to the education in sexuality 
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policy. The equal opportunities policy indicates the range of 
different sexualities that should be studied (on the grounds that 
lesbians, gays and heterosexuals are all equally valuable and worthy 
of respect as autonomous human beings and should therefore be 
included in any education in sexuality course). The discipline policy 
supports the essential idea of equality of opportunity by stating that 
derogatory remarks or behaviour, whether they are racist, sexist or 
heterosexist, etc. should be taken seriously and should be dealt with 
in a firm but sensitive and educative manner. 
The pastoral care policy provides a broader framework for the 
successful implementation of the equal opportunities and the 
education in sexuality policies by responding to the need to discuss 
matters connected with equality of opportunity and sexuality 
sensitively and in the right sort of environment and by indicating the 
kind of knowledge and skills that will aid education and 
consciousness-raising in this area. 
The institution's development plan should draw these core policies 
together, indicating the ways in which they interconnect and support 
each other. It should also help to promote their successful 
implementation, development and evaluation. 
What follows is an outline of the practical steps that should be 
taken to formulate an equal opportunities policy or a policy on 
education in sexuality. The same steps apply broadly to any kind of 
core policy implementation: (1) identification of the main issue/s 
addressed by the policy, with opportunities to discuss them in depth 
and learn more about them, (2) the formulation of a working party, 
including teaching and non-teaching staff, governors and, where 
possible, students, whose remit is to produce the first draft policy 
as a basis for consultation and further discussion, (3) discussion of 
the first draft policy with students in tutorial time so that they can 
suggest developments and amendments, (4) in the light of comments 
received from staff and students, the second draft should be re-
circulated to staff and students for further discussion, (5) the final 
version of the policy should be presented to the whole (teaching and 
non-teaching) staff and the whole governing body for discussion and 
approval, (6) the final document should then be circulated to every 
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student and discussed with them in tutorial time, focusing on the 
important issues addressed and encouraging discussion of them. 
1. There is an urgent need to look at the concept of sexuality in all 
its complexities and to appreciate the many misunderstandings, 
prejudices and stereotypes that have grown up around it and 
obscured its understanding. Issues of sexuality should be discussed 
openly with the whole staff and governing body of a school or 
college and provision must be made for in-service training in this 
area. In-service training should be provided by expert agencies or 
individual consultants, but it must also be developed and delivered 
by teachers within the particular institution. This is an important 
prelude to the construction of an institution wide policy on 
sexuality. 
The training offered to teachers and governors should include 
activities designed to help them do four things: (i) increase their 
knowledge and awareness of lesbians and gays in society, (ii) enable 
them to explore their views of different types of sexuality and to 
challenge homophobic and heterosexist attitudes and beliefs within 
a supportive environment, (iii) appreciate the equality of lesbians 
and gays with heterosexuals; to understand that lesbians and gays 
are as valuable and worthwhile as other human beings, (iv) link 
lesbian and gay oppression to other forms of oppression (based on 
class, sex, race, ability, etc.). 
It is important that lesbians and gays are used as facilitators so 
that teachers who are unused to interacting with 'out' lesbians and 
gays are enabled to establish a dialogue with them. 
2. What should arise from this forum is the creation of a working 
party or ad hoc committee composed of representatives from the 
teaching and non-teaching staff, governors and, where possible, 
students, which would undertake to produce an institution wide 
policy on equality of opportunity and/or sexuality. Because lesbian 
and gay sexualities are universal phenomena (in the sense that they 
appear in all races, classes and periods of history, etc.), the 
presence of lesbians and gays in society must be demonstrated by 
discussions which range right across the curriculum. An institution 
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wide policy would ensure that lesbian and gay sexualities, lifestyles 
and issues are identified and discussed in all subject areas. 
Heads of Departments, pastoral, administrative and other middle 
managers, members of the senior management team and governors 
should be asked to discuss the document with their teams and 
submit plans for the implementation of its aims and objectives 
within their particular subject or responsibility area. 
3. The first draft should be discussed with the whole teaching and 
non-teaching staff, governors and, in the case of secondary schools 
and colleges, the students themselves. This seems to be an obvious 
point, but I have never yet worked in an institution where the 
students were fully consulted about such policies. The result is 
predictable: the students neither understand the rationale for the 
policy concerned nor feel sufficiently involved in its implementation 
to abide by it. Involvement in the evolution and implementation of 
policies should be a fundamental part of the students' education, 
providing an invaluable insight into the effectiveness of 
participatory democracy at a fundamental level. 
4. A second draft policy should be produced in the light of previous 
discussions and presented to the whole teaching and non-teaching 
staff, the governors and the students. Responses should be sought 
and the second draft document amended and developed as 
appropriate. It is particularly important at this second stage to 
ensure that the document is written and set out in a way that staff 
and students easily understand. 
The document should be discussed with students as part of the 
pastoral curriculum in tutorial time. This will provide an 
opportunity for well-structured, open discussion and consciousness-
raising. At this stage, teachers should be briefed on how to handle 
questions which may arise and to lead discussions successfully. This 
could be done by the people responsible for the delivery of P.S.E. 
within the institution or by outside agencies. Teachers should be 
briefed on how to handle questions relating to lesbians and gays 
sensitively in the classroom, drawing on their initial in-service 
training as outlined in the first stage of the process. Students' 
responses to the policy should then be noted in broad terms (perhaps 
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by the use of a simple pro-forma issued to all tutors) and their 
suggestions for amendments, additions or development should be 
adopted whenever possible and practicable. 
5. The second version should be amended and developed in the light 
of this discussion. The final version should be submitted to the 
whole staff and governing body for discussion and approval. 
6. The final document should be circulated to students and the tutors 
should use it to emphasise the institution's approach to lesbian and 
gay issues and the implications for codes of conduct, highlighting 
the need to combat sexist remarks directed at staff and students 
and to safeguard the rights of all individuals in the educational 
institution, whatever their sexuality. 
This is a long and complex process requiring careful planning, 
implementation and on-going monitoring and evaluation. 
The success of any policy depends, in the end, on the general ethos of 
the institution. If students are already encouraged to respect 
themselves and others within the institution, these policies will 
take root. There has to be an order of priority as far as the 
introduction of such policies is concerned. We cannot expect success 
in institutions where these ideals are not, at least to some extent, 
established. 
If a reasonably caring and supportive environment does not exist, 
this must be the first, most basic priority and policy development 
will have to wait. The term 'institution wide policy' is meant to 
convey the idea of a policy which, in a sense, transcends subject 
areas in that it applies not only to the overt time-tabled curriculum, 
but also to the covert or "hidden" curriculum, through which students 
learn things in an informal manner, via the attitudes of fellow 
students and teachers, teaching materials and styles and through the 
general ethos of the institution. 
An effective institution wide policy on equality of opportunity or 
sexuality will facilitate a radical and on-going reappraisal of the 
way sexuality is dealt with throughout the school or college. This 
will involve, for example, an evaluation of the books and materials 
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used, many of which present a heterosexual bias when they deal with 
relationships and ways of life. 
It is also important to ensure that the concept of the family is 
explored in all its diversity and complexity. This exploration should 
include negative as well as positive aspects of family life. The 
former should include an acknowledgement of problems of domestic 
violence and the sexual abuse of women and children predominantly 
within heterosexual families. At present, it is difficult for the 
children of lesbian and gay parents even to mention their families, 
let alone express public pride in them. Families can no longer be 
presented as an ideal expression of heterosexuality. 
The Organisation and Development of Educational 
Institutions. 
(I) The teaching staff. 
The most important way in which positive images of lesbian and gay 
sexualities can be promoted is through the institution's support and 
encouragement of lesbian and gay teachers in the process of coming 
out. The challenge we face is to create an ethos that will allow and 
positively support lesbians and gays to reveal their sexualities to 
everyone so that they can act as role models. This is the only really 
effective way of combating negative images. Of this the British 
government is well aware and from this realisation and this fear 
grew the opprobrium manifested in section 28 and its accompanying 
D.F.E. circulars. 
It is important that lesbians and gays are treated fairly and have 
equal chances of promotion within such institutions. The law 
promotes equal opportunities in employment with regard to sex and 
race, enshrined in the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 and the Race 
Relations Act of 1976. There is no legislation protecting the 
employment rights of lesbians and gays. On the contrary, as we saw 
in chapter four, legislation such as section 28 of the Local 
Government Act of 1986 creates the conditions where 
discrimination can be encouraged. This highlights the crucial 
importance of legal reform within the area of equal opportunities 
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and anti-discriminatory legislation relating to the employment 
rights of lesbians and gays. 
The initial selection and training of staff must also ensure that we 
recruit people who have had a broad experience of life. The education 
system should include some people who have left school, gone 
immediately to higher education and then returned to another 
educational establishment as teachers, but it should also include 
people who have worked in other areas and have decided to change 
career or return to teaching after a long absence. The latter category 
includes the large numbers of women who have interrupted their 
careers to look after a family. 
In-service training programmes should promote, develop and 
reinforce the essential components of a democratic education 
system. National government and L.E.A.s must supply the necessary 
resources to make in-service training widespread and available to 
a I I . 
This also applies to teacher-trainers: their recruitment, 
appointment and training. In addition, I feel that it is crucial that 
teacher trainers teach in the classroom for part of the time so that 
they can appreciate what practical steps need to be taken to support 
democratic education. 
Student teachers now spend much more of their time in school-based 
learning activities. This has meant that experienced school teachers 
are being asked to take on the role of tutor. This is commendable, in 
principle, but this initiative is severely under-resourced in terms of 
the time allocated to teacher tutors and the amount of money made 
available to the schools who support this kind of teacher training. 
The most worrying feature of this new teacher training initiative is 
that there will be very little time to discuss important social and 
political issues in the time allocated to teacher training colleges. 
There is, of course, no guarantee that schools which offer initial 
teacher training will include these crucial issues in their training 
programmes. Thus, exploration of important social and political 
questions, of the kind outlined in this thesis, becomes a 'hit and 
miss' affair. This has very serious consequences for the development 
and growth of democratic education. 
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We must either ensure that social, political and philosophical 
aspects of initial teacher training are dealt with in college in a 
well-structured manner, or that outside consultants are bought in by 
the schools concerned, thus guaranteeing that initial teacher 
training includes these important elements. 
(ii) The organisation of the democratic community of learning. 
The organisation of an educational institution, the way it runs on a 
day-to-day basis, its policies, rules and regulations will either help 
or hinder young citizens in their experience of democracy. If an 
educational institution is not democratic in its organisation, it has 
failed to show democracy at work. Student consultation and 
participation is crucial. School and college councils should be able 
to make decisions about many aspects of educational life and should 
at least have the opportunity to discuss the rules of a particular 
educational institution and wider educational policies, including 
curricula design and development. The precise extent to which 
students can participate in their education will be determined by 
their intellectual and emotional levels of development. In my 
experience, the more students are involved in this way, the more 
valuable the learning experience becomes, and this applies to people 
of all ages. 
(iii) The Role of Governors. 
The task of persuading governors of the necessity of identifying 
lesbian and gay issues within schools and colleges will be made 
easier if a cogent rationale of the kind I have outlined is presented 
to and fully discussed with them. 
These discussions should take place within a supportive 
environment. Essentially, governors should be reminded that all 
students have the right to a broad education which acknowledges the 
plurality of sexualities and ways of life that exist in contemporary 
society. This includes their ways of life and ways of life that may 
be unfamiliar to them. 
Governing bodies should also be reminded of their responsibility to 
ensure that all students are treated fairly and equally. This 
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obviously includes lesbian and gay students. Unjust prejudice and 
discrimination can only be effectively tackled if lesbian and gay 
issues are discussed openly everywhere within the school 
community. 
Some governors may be worried about breaking the law, particularly 
section 28 of the Local Government Act of 1988. In this case, their 
attention should be drawn to a circular issued by the Department of 
Education on 20 May, 1988 which states that, "Section 28 does not 
affect the activities of school governors, nor of teachers. It will not 
prevent the objective discussion of homosexuality in the classroom 
nor the counselling of pupils concerned about their sexuality. Such 
activities will continue to be governed by section 46 of the 
Education (no. 2) Act." (DOE 1988, paragraph 20). 
It will also be necessary to have an informed discussion of circular 
5/94 (examined in chapter 4) in order to respond to any concerns 
governors may have with regard to its advice. It is important that 
governors are fully involved in all the staff discussions that will 
take place as part of the policy formulation process. 
Conclusion. 
It is important for us to come to terms with the enormity of the 
problems faced by oppressed people in general and of lesbians and 
gays in particular. There is an urgent need for further educational 
research in this area, focusing on the complex ways in which 
cultures that support such oppression operate and the impact they 
have on young people and the wider society. 
Redman (Epstein, 1994) emphasises the importance of appreciating 
these complex modes of oppression in offering a critique of 
conventional approaches to education in sexuality: 
"Existing 'equal opportunities' approaches tend to assume that the 
needs of pupils beginning to identify as a lesbian or gay can be 
addressed by simply 'adding on' lesbian and gay issues to the 
existing curriculum as if they are somehow discrete entities or 
issues wholly divorced from other areas of sexuality education. Thus 
'tackling lesbian and gay issues' becomes a matter of 'positive 
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images' in text books, and classroom discussions on the value of 
extra strong condoms or the options for self-insemination. Valuable 
though such innovations would be, they do not go far enough. The 
problem lies in the fact that they work within a liberal framework 
that claims that gay and lesbian sexualities are 'different but equal'. 
While it would be nice if this were true, its assertion before the 
fact runs the risk of ignoring the very real ways in which lesbian 
and gay sexualities are subordinated, marginalised and constructed 
as 'other' both within the social formation at large and within 
schools themselves. Once it is accepted that schools operate as 
significant cultural sites in which the meanings of sexuality are 
constructed then it becomes necessary to address the precise ways 
in which schooling and school cultures operate to construct 
heterosexualities or homosexualities in relations of opposition and 
subordination. It is this, I would argue, that sexuality education 
should seek to address, as well as the more obvious issues that form 
the 'equal opportunities' agenda." (p. 144). 
It is important to recognise that educational institutions do not 
simply 'reflect' the prejudices and bigotry of the wider society, they 
are also places where particular cultures supportive of oppression 
are formed and maintained by the workers and the students within 
them. 
Whilst it is important to understand as much as possible about the 
complex powers of oppression at work in our educational 
institutions and the wider society, it is also important that the case 
for lesbian and gay oppression and their need for liberation is 
somehow articulated within school and college communities and 
within the wider democratic community. Lesbian and gay rights 
should be linked to the rights of other oppressed people and students 
should be helped to appreciate the importance of the liberation of 
the oppressed for the continuation and survival of participatory 
democracy. 
This process of understanding the complex and diverse modes of 
oppression as they actually operate in educational institutions 
should inform and support policy and curriculum development, 
providing a means for their modification and development in the 
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light of students' and the institution's perceived educational needs. 
Thus, understanding oppressive cultures and the development of 
policy and the curriculum are two on-going and complementary 
processes. 
The next chapter explores the facets of the overt curriculum which 
are conducive to encouraging exploration and education in lesbian 
and gay issues. 
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CHAPTER 7. 
LESBIAN AND GAY ISSUES IN SCHOOL AND COLLEGE 
CURRICULA. 
I am not arguing for the 'introduction' of lesbian and gay issues into 
school and college institutions, as if to interject a new set of 
experiences and issues. Lesbians and gays are, and have always been, 
part of our societies and cultures. Their presence involves us in on-
going issues and concerns. We must acknowledge lesbian and gay 
issues and contextualise them within the history of individuals, 
institutions, cultures and societies. 
This careful definition of our task provides an important response to 
people such as Roger Scruton who object to the introduction of 
certain subjects, seeing them as an attempt to project a particular 
political viewpoint. His solution is to banish them from the 
curriculum. Scruton's concerns are discussed later in this chapter, 
but it is important to state from the outset that whether or not we 
highlight subject areas involving race, gender or sexuality, the 
issues they engage with already exist and are already being 
discussed and explored by students. We can choose whether or not to 
recognise them, but the issues themselves cannot be reduced to 
'subject areas', nor can they be somehow cancelled out. 
The rationale for identifying lesbian and gay issues in 
education. 
This rationale is based primarily on the recognition that: (i) there 
are no moral grounds for the belief that lesbian and gay sexualities 
are inferior to heterosexualities, (ii) lesbians, gays and 
heterosexuals are all equally valuable and worthy of respect as 
autonomous human beings who have the right to live the lives they 
choose, (iii) we are educating students as present or future citizens 
of a democratic community. Within this context, students should be 
educated: 
(a) to understand themselves as fully as possible, (b) to plan their 
own ways of life and form their own views of life, (c) to appreciate 
and respect the diversity of the democratic community, including 
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cultures, beliefs and sexualities which differ from their own, (d) to 
understand something of the complex modes of oppression operating 
within their own youth cultures, within all institutions and within 
the wider community, (e) to appreciate the threat that such 
oppression poses to all members of the democratic community. 
There are other wide-ranging and diverse reasons why we should 
tackle lesbian and gay issues in our educational institutions: 
(1) Education in sexuality or personal and social education will 
necessarily include information about lesbian and gay sexualities, 
lifestyles and issues. Students themselves will ask questions about 
lesbian and gay issues within these contexts. Any attempt to 
restrict their questioning or ignore it means that their education 
takes place informally in a very distorted and biased manner. 
Further, we cannot design our curricula and schemes of work in this 
area on an ad hoc basis; it is not sufficient to answer these 
questions as and when they arise. It is also important to adopt a 
proactive educational approach, responding to lesbian and gay issues 
as part of a well planned and well thought out programme of 
Personal and Social Education, teaching about them and encouraging 
discussion of them in a balanced and supportive manner. 
(2) Unfortunately, students very often tend to link the spread of 
H.I.V. infection and A.I.D.S. with gays. We must present accurate 
facts. In my experience, some heterosexual students feel that they 
will not be liable to infection either because they are heterosexual 
or because they can somehow spot a gay or bi-sexual person and so 
avoid sexual encounters with them. We must deal with lesbian and 
gay issues before such questions arise so that students can explore 
these issues in a rational manner. This involves the production of a 
well planned and well thought-out curriculum. 
(3) The Education Act of 1986 helpfully points out that sex 
education must have "due regard to the value of family life." (sect. 
46). It follows that children must be encouraged to feel proud of 
their family backgrounds. It is inaccurate and dishonest to pretend 
that the heterosexual nuclear family is the only possible model for 
family life. For example, one quarter of London families include 
single parents. Many children do not live in nuclear families for 
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historical, social and cultural reasons, including racist immigration 
laws. It is therefore necessary that we present positive and 
accurate models of real family lives in all their richness and 
diversity. 
The identification of lesbian and gay issues within school 
and college curricula. 
Basic literacy skills, together with the more complex skills of 
reasoning and argument and the usual fairly broadly based curricula 
of school and college are important means of educating citizens to 
take their full place within the democratic community as 
independent thinkers, choosers and actors. These fundamental 
aspects of education help to provide the conditions within which 
lesbian and gay issues can be fully and fruitfully discussed. 
In addition to these important facets of education, I wish to identify 
the following areas of education which also help to provide the 
conditions for informed and fruitful dialogues concerning lesbian 
and gay equality and liberation: 
Anti-indoctrinatory and anti-discriminatory approaches to teaching, 
Personal and social education, including: political education, moral 
education, education in sexuality and anti-sexist education. This 
will lead us to an exploration of a number of diverse but relevant 
issues. 
The importance of personal and social, including political, moral and 
sex education should be highlighted since these aspects of education 
are often either neglected or ignored because they are perceived as 
controversial. Pressures on school timetables have increased due to 
the demands of the National Curriculum. There is considerable 
pressure to curtail or abolish courses in personal and social 
education, despite the fact that National Curriculum documents 
emphasise its importance. The pressure springs from the simple 
necessity of making room for the delivery of other core and 
foundation National Curriculum subjects. We have reached a point in 
Britain where we must fight for these subjects to be retained. It is 
therefore crucial that we are able to provide a rationale for their 
inclusion within school and college curricula. 
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The democratic state has a regulative function which helps prevent 
oppressive or discriminatory practices in education. The process of 
learning (including content, teaching styles and approaches) is of 
central importance and the state should exercise its control in this 
area to ensure that teaching takes place in an open, objective, and 
comprehensive manner. It should also ensure that the subjects I have 
identified are included within school and college curricula and 
safeguarded against neglect or abolition. This dispels the fallacy 
that education can be neutral in this respect. Amy Gutmann (1987) 
acknowledges that "All sophisticated liberals recognise the 
practical limitation of neutrality as an educational ideal: it is, in its 
fullest sense, unrealisable." (p. 35). 
ANTI-INDOCTRINATORY APPROACHES TO TEACHING. 
Chapter one argued for personal autonomy as a major aim for 
education within a democratic state. Teaching which is no more than 
rote learning or cramming is not a truly educational activity. What 
distinguishes education from other kinds of intellectual activity is 
the encouragement of reflection and the formation of independent 
judgements. Successful students question what they have learnt. 
They should be able to decide which views to accept and which to 
reject. We should train students to use what they have learnt 
throughout their lives. A good education is one that empowers 
students relevantly to transfer the concepts and skills they have 
learnt to all areas of their experience so that they can think 
autonomously and critically. Democratic education is, in this 
fundamental sense, radically anti-indoctrinatory. 
Indoctrination has become a pejorative term in our day, used by both 
the political left and right to attack trends in education with which 
they disagree. It is therefore necessary to examine the concept more 
closely in order to understand what is so disagreeable about it. 
Indoctrinatory methods of teaching threaten participatory 
democracy, stifling discussion, independent thought and judgement. 
Colin Wringe (1981) makes the important point that, "The democrat 
is committed to the view that in the long run there is no need to 
manage information; for the more information is available the more 
free-ranging discussion takes place under conditions in which 
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rational argument is possible, the more likely it is that people will 
come to see that some sort of democracy is the only tolerable form 
of government." (p. 35). 
Roger Scruton (1985) defines indoctrination by its method: "Not 
respecting the criteria of rational judgement, indoctrination 
prevents the exercise of those critical faculties which education 
sets out to develop." (p.16). A fundamental feature of indoctrination, 
for Scruton, is that it encourages students to arrive at "foregone 
conclusions", without examining alternative viewpoints. I would 
agree with Scruton's initial analysis and would characterise 
indoctrination as a closing of the mind to full, independent and 
unprejudiced rational judgement. This is affected principally by the 
teaching method, for example, cramping or forbidding discussion. 
Scruton particularly objects to political indoctrination. He suggests 
two ways in which the curriculum can be used to indoctrinate 
politically, "One is to introduce (my italics) 'subjects' whose major 
purpose is to project a particular set of political attitudes. The 
other is to subvert some existing subject in order to replace its 
methods, aims and subjects of study with 'politicised' alternatives." 
(Op. cit., p. 7). Scruton's objection to indoctrination is based on his 
belief that education is an end in itself. "Education in all its forms 
provides the pupil with something which is intrinsically valuable: 
access to information, understanding and knowledge, access to skill 
and access by means of which it must be interpreted." (Op. cit., p. 
44). He is against the idea that education should be used or 
manipulated in order to influence students in a certain way. That is, 
he is against education as simply a means to an end. According to 
Scruton, Marxists see schooling, "...merely as a social process, 
designed to produce a certain kind of citizen. Rather than acquiesce 
in the 'reproduction' of the existing order, therefore, we should re-
fashion the school as an instrument of social justice." (Op. cit., p. 
11 
Scruton's view of education is naive. Firstly, many of the subjects 
studied in educational institutions carry with them political, moral 
and social ramifications. These cannot be ignored. It is not the task 
of the teacher to 'cleanse' their subject of all political or moral 
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content, even if this were possible, but rather to identify relevant 
political, moral or social implications in a well-balanced and 
comprehensive manner. 
Secondly, we must accept that education influences people, 
particularly the young. Of course it would be wrong to manipulate 
the education of children and young people in such a way as to mould 
them into accepting a certain world-view, theory or piece of dogma 
uncritically, but there is nothing wrong in recognising that we have 
common aims in educating young people, one of which is preparation 
for life as fully participating citizens. A good, comprehensive 
education will involve some appreciation of the social, moral and 
political contexts of the subjects on offer in educational 
establishments. In this way, students will appreciate the relevance 
of these subjects to everyday life and will come to understand the 
forces which shape human history and endeavour. 
Scruton goes on to attack what he calls 'meta-disciplines', subjects 
which he deplores, accusing them of being indoctrinatory and 
subversive. He proposes the axing of such subjects as women's 
studies, black studies and anti-sexist and anti-racist education 
from the curriculum. To claim that these subjects are sometimes 
used to indoctrinate is one thing, but to conclude that they should be 
wiped off the educational map as a consequence is quite another. 
Just as it is often necessary to look at economic, political or 
philosophical factors relating to some aspect of the sciences, 
humanities or arts, so it is appropriate to examine relevant social or 
political factors in more detail, focusing on race, class, sexuality or 
gender. These subjects can be studied separately or they can be 
included within other disciplines which appear on school and college 
timetables. Both approaches are legitimate. 
There is no reason why these subjects cannot be studied in an open-
minded and objective manner, taking into account many different 
shades of moral and political opinion. There is nothing special about 
these subjects as far as teaching methods are concerned. The 
teacher has exactly the same responsibilities to remain as objective 
as possible, ensuring that students are acquainted with a broad 
range of views and to teach in an atmosphere of critical, well- 
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informed and well disciplined discussion. 
PERSONAL AND SOCIAL EDUCATION. 
Personal and social education is especially important in helping 
young people to mature. The pastoral curriculum is an essential 
aspect of young people's education. Pastoral care is only truly 
effective if it is grounded in the pastoral curriculum. Students 
should learn facts, opinions, attitudes and skills which will help 
them to develop into confident, mature and responsible young people 
at school and college and as adults in later life. Pastoral care is 
dependent upon the pastoral curriculum because without some sort 
of personal and social education, students will not have the 
necessary knowledge and skills for personal, social, vocational and 
academic growth. 
More concretely, if we are presented with students who lack 
personal and social education, our advice or counselling in academic 
or social contexts will be less effective. Indeed, we may find it 
necessary to talk about some important aspects of personal and 
social education before effective counselling or advice can take 
place. The pastoral curriculum creates a context within which 
pastoral care and the work of the pastoral team can flourish. 
Personal and social education includes subjects such as political, 
moral and sex education. It has an especially valuable role to play in 
developing the democratic personality, discussed earlier in chapter 
two. Every curriculum area has a part to play in students' personal 
and social development. 
The tutor group system in schools and colleges provides an 
integrative centre in which personal and social issues can be 
explored within a well identified and supportive group situation 
where people know each other fairly well and have established a 
reasonable amount of trust and confidence. Ideally, then, P.S.E. 
should take place within two contexts: (i) each curriculum area, (ii) 
tutorial groups, facilitated by a tutor who knows the group well. 
174 
Political education. 
Education is not an optional extra that the democratic state 
encourages and supports. Democratic education is one of the 
necessary conditions for democracy's growth and development. Colin 
Wringe (1984) emphasises that, "In so far as education is the 
process by which society renews itself and passes on its acquired 
knowledge and the values it regards as important, it is necessarily 
political." (p. 34). 
A political education involves people in studying democratic 
systems of government, their justification and their workings, 
experiencing democratic processes in action in the context of 
school, home, youth clubs, work, etc. and by involvement in decision-
making and implementation within these areas. Students should also 
examine the inequalities in our society, appreciating the impact that 
these inequalities have in stunting the growth of democracy. 
Educational institutions should ensure that students' experience of 
democracy is positive. Approaches to education should be anti-
indoctrinatory, hierarchical structures should be minimised, 
unnecessary secrecy and manipulative devices avoided. 
P.A. White notes that, "...the structure of education itself expresses 
a certain political stance." (Op. cit., p. 88). She believes that 
political education should exist as a distinct subject, but the 
curriculum as a whole should also contribute, to different degrees, 
to the student's education in this area. For example, even the 
seemingly mundane task of teaching a child to read and write is of 
crucial importance in facilitating and furthering her participation in 
democratic communities. 
White feels that a knowledge of political processes and the issues 
involved is essential. Joining the armed forces, being involved in 
public service, taking part in (or not taking part in) a strike can only 
be properly understood from a political perspective. Moral and 
political education are connected at this point because many 
political judgements involve a consideration of the ultimate values 
people hold and the reasons they have for various courses of action. 
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Some people, because of family connection or formal education, do 
have considerable knowledge of how power is exercised in our 
democracy and of how to come to positions in which they can 
exercise power and influence. This knowledge must be shared with 
as many people as possible through a political education which seeks 
to provide everyone with a good grounding in the mechanisms of 
national and local government and the major extra parliamentary 
influences at work in our society (e.g. multinationals and other big 
businesses, the unions, etc.) together with a broad curriculum. 
P. White sees political education as encouraging the citizen, "...to 
develop autonomy, to be able to distinguish what is in her interests 
from what she may currently want, or have been brought to want, 
and enables her to understand and participate in the exercise and 
control of power." (1983, p. 82). To some extent, educating young 
people politically is attempting to give them some insight into the 
way power is used and misused in our society. 
We cannot teach young people what lesbian and gay oppression means 
and why it is an evil if we do not examine our aspiring democracies, 
their laws, institutions and customs, and expose the positive and 
negative power structures within them. The oppressed have 
important stories to tell. The histories of women, people of colour, 
the disabled, lesbians and gays, etc. reveal these power struggles in 
all their ferocity, complexity and horror. This kind of political 
education is a necessary pre-requisite for any effective education in 
lesbian and gay issues and is a powerful means of raising 
consciousness in this and other related areas of oppression. 
Moral education. 
Moral education must involve: an appreciation of the many moral 
conflicts that exist in life, some of which are insoluble, an 
understanding of how moral decisions are influenced and made, and 
an appreciation of the part played by factors such as religion, 
culture, society and its institutions in the process of moral 
decision-making. 
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Morality has an important relationship with autonomy, for the 
morally responsible person is, inter alia, one who chooses freely and 
usually after some deliberation, to accept moral laws and duties. 
Of course, there are many people who live virtuous lives and who 
follow moral rules that they never question, but the moral life is 
full of problems, conflicts and dilemmas which the individual often 
has to face. In such situations, it is important for the individual 
freely to decide the best course of action, as opposed to simply 
following a law blindly (because this is what the community or 
culture requires of her, etc.). 
Moral conflicts cannot be avoided or shunned. Each individual must 
face them and decide which course of action to take. This involves at 
least questioning independently the right course of action and 
considering a variety of solutions to the moral problems concerned. 
Of course this may mean, in the end, either the acceptance or 
rejection of accepted moral codes. This is, in part, what it means to 
have a will of one's own, capable of deciding for oneself and 
overcoming external societal pressures. 
Joel Feinberg expresses this point well: "...the rational self sets or 
accepts for itself the rational law...to be autonomous in this 
normative sense means that one acts as a rational person, in 
accordance with rationally justifiable norms whose rational 
justifiability one accepts for oneself precisely because and insofar 
as one is rational. Insofar as the person and the criteria are rational, 
the criteria are not 'imposed from without', they are his or her own." 
(Doyle, 1973, p. 41). 
Students, particularly young students, must be encouraged to make 
independent moral judgements on, amongst a variety of other things, 
lesbian and gay issues. This will never be possible unless they are 
encouraged to make independent moral judgements on fundamentally 
important issues. 
Pedagogically, it is important to distinguish moral from religious 
judgements. Moral judgements are not necessarily religiously based. 
Further, one can be perfectly moral without being religious. This is 
an obvious fact that can be empirically tested by examining the lives 
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of morally good atheists and agnostics of the past and present. 
Students should be enabled to weigh the evidence when making moral 
judgements and to assess the role that religion and other 
institutions and traditions play in making such judgements. 
Paul Hirst (1974) acknowledges that the religious person and the 
secularist may share overlapping values or beliefs while differing 
about their justification. For example, many secularists and 
Christians share scientific, aesthetic and metaphysical 
understanding as well as moral and social ideals. 
Hirst sees religion as a private matter. "In so far as religious and 
non-religious people can agree about social principles, religious 
questions can be regarded as a private, personal matter. In so far as 
people can also agree on a secular basis on which to settle matters 
of disagreement about social issues, the more firmly privatised 
religious concerns become." (p. 3). He believes that, "To areas of 
secular thought, all religious thought and determination is 
irrelevant." (p. 2) 
We might adopt Wittgenstein's analogy of autonomous language 
games to illustrate this point. Moralities based directly on religious 
revelations or scriptures have a logic of their own which states that 
these revelations or utterances are the word of god and that they are 
therefore unconditionally and universally valid, just because they 
possess this quality of divine revelation. If one does not accept the 
existence of a deity, there is really nothing much more to be said 
and the rational foundations of this kind of theistically based 
morality crumble away, at least for the non-believer. 
Whilst religious people are at liberty to quote their scriptures and 
traditions in defence of their opinions, they must also realise that 
not everyone accepts their validity and that judgements about 
sexualities which are based on such sources are often contrary to 
empirical observation. 
Education in sexuality and anti-sexist education. 
The tutor group is the ideal forum for education in sexuality as part 
of the institution-wide P.S.E. programme. Here, the tutees meet 
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regularly with the person who is responsible for their welfare. If 
this person is trusted and respected, the atmosphere will be 
supportive and open during tutorial sessions. There is, after all, 
something rather contradictory about discussing human 
relationships and sexuality within a context of antagonism, tension, 
mistrust or animosity. 
The tutorial session is also a good opportunity to emphasise that 
sexualities are not only a means of sexual expression through a 
variety of sex acts, but often involve highly complex and intimate 
emotional relationships between human beings. The tutorial session 
is ideally the place where work done on sexualities in various 
subject areas throughout the curriculum is brought together and 
reinforced within the context of human relationships. 
Peter Redman (Epstein, 1994, ch. 10) points to the need for, "...a new 
agenda in the field of sexuality education as something more than a 
'moral issue', and one that gets to grips with relations of power, 
pupils' different 'sexual cultures', and the lived experience of their 
lives." (p. 134). Such education should take account of educational 
institutions as places where, "..understandings and practices 
concerned with sexuality are actively constructed, reproduced and 
lived out, both in the formal curriculum and the hidden curriculum." 
(p. 141). Educational institutions must take account of the fact that 
students bring with them a vast body of knowledge gleaned from 
various sources (e.g. friends, the media, books, etc.), some of which 
is inaccurate and misleading. 
It is important for educators to understand the sexual cultures that 
influence young people's attitudes and values. These powerful sexual 
cultures and ways of behaving are extremely complex and diverse. 
Redman quotes the following example (from Holland, 1990), "[A] 
transition from condoms with new partners to the pill with steady 
partners is laden with symbolic meaning and can be used to signify 
the seriousness of a relationship, a way of showing someone they 
are special. As one of our correspondents put it, 'I went on the pill 
for him.'...For the current generation of young women the pill...is 
closely associated with grown up status and grown up sex. This 
makes the prospect of long term condom use highly problematic." 
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(Op. cit., p. 145). 
Redman believes that the effective implementation of an education 
in sexuality programme requires us to look at the ways that 
heterosexualities are constructed and supported in the formal and 
informal curricula of schools and colleges and the ways in which 
lesbian, gay and bi-sexualities are marginalised or denied. 
We need to engage in more educational research in order to identify 
and understand the whole range and diversity of cultures within 
educational institutions, especially as they relate to this important 
area of the curriculum. To some extent, the work of Mairtin Mac an 
Ghaill (1991, 1994) has begun this important task, focusing on the 
areas of sexualities, masculinities and racism. 
Education in sexuality involves, not only 'the mechanics of sex', or 
"the processes of human reproduction", as circular 5/94 describes 
them. A person's sexual relationships also involve emotions, feelings 
and, importantly, relations of power. Young people should be 
educated to appreciate the immense complexity and diversity of 
human sexual relations. This will necessarily involve, not simply a 
study of what people do in bed, but wider social, political and moral 
relationships. Education in sexuality should also include an 
appreciation of the ways that heterosexual women are often 
exploited and, similarly, the ways in which lesbians, gays and bi-
sexuals are oppressed. 
It has long been acknowledged by organisations such as The Family 
Planning Association that the best way of educating children and 
young people about the wider moral, cultural, social and political 
aspects of sexuality is to abandon reproduction as the central 
concept. This is, of course, contrary to the approach taken in 
circular 5/94 discussed earlier in chapter four. 
I argued in chapter three that sex has many purposes, not least of 
which is pleasure. Most people do not intend to have babies when 
they have sex. Of course we must teach about the importance of 
behaving responsibly and ethically within sexual relationships, 
acknowledging the dangers of sexually transmitted diseases and 
unwanted pregnancies, the dangers of exploitation and abuse, but we 
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must not lose sight of sex as enjoyable and pleasurable. 
Sex as the secret danger. 
Our society has many taboos with regard to children and sex. Sex is 
seen as something dangerous from which children need to be 
protected. Yet Stevie Jackson (1984) rightly points out that the 
violence that our children are exposed to in the media is much more 
of a threat to their well-being. "Violent death on a large scale is not 
seen as a threat to their supposedly delicate psyches, but the most 
gentle act of sex apparently is." (Op. cit., p. 50). 
Jackson challenges the basic and widely held assumption that 
children are unable to understand sexual matters, that they lack the 
cognitive capacity to cope with it and because they cannot 
understand it, they would find it frightening and disturbing. In 
reality, children have no difficulty in understanding other types of 
pleasure, so why is sex an exception? 
Jackson cites the Mbuti, !Kung or Trobrianders whose culture is much 
more accepting of and open to sexuality. "They learn that sex is 
pleasurable, incorporate it unselfconsciously into their games, and, 
as they mature, gradually replace play by more adult forms of sexual 
expression." (p. 56). 
The most important argument against preserving sexuality as 'the 
secret' is that it reinforces ignorance, a factor that is particularly 
influential in rendering children powerless when it comes to sexual 
abuse. Giving children vague warnings about not talking to strangers 
or accepting sweets from them, accompanied by veiled references to 
'peculiar men' is inadequate. In fact, most children are molested by 
members of their families or close friends. 
Jackson is rightly concerned that if children are not educated 
sexually, "...they simply do not know what they are being warned 
against. Nor have they the means of reading the signs that indicate 
the possibility of a sexual approach, or of anticipating what might 
happen. Since they cannot see the threat, they have little opportunity 
of making an escape before it is carried out." (p. 59). 
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There is no justification for hiding sex from children. On the 
contrary, to attempt to do so is to place them in danger. All children 
have the physical potential to be sexual; the capacity for arousal and 
orgasm is present from birth. Children must be allowed to make 
sense of this capacity, to ask questions and to enter into 
discussions about sexuality. 
The lack of freedom of discussion and information about sex which 
children experience from an early age teaches them that sex is a 
rather unpleasant or "difficult" (Circular 5/94, para. 8, p. 6) area of 
life, which can only be discussed, at least partially, when the child 
is 'old enough', usually in adolescence. Until then, it is not 
permissible to explore one's body or ask questions about sex. "This 
alone tends to give sex an air of furtiveness, and all the protosexual 
learning of childhood- the guilt, anxiety and 'dirtiness' associated 
with particular activities or parts of the body- can only serve to 
intensify the problem of coming to terms with new sexual 
knowledge." (p. 102). 
There are further problems associated with preserving the secrecy 
of sex: when it comes to adolescence, how do we convey information 
that we have previously withheld? It is not surprising that many 
parents are embarrassed to broach the subject and that in some 
families it remains unmentionable. 
The Education Act 1993 and circular 5/94 are supportive of this 
conspiracy of silence within some families by allowing parents the 
right to withdraw their children from sex education lessons, thus 
exposing them to possible danger from inside and outside the family. 
Sex is as much an area of knowledge as any of the subjects in the 
curriculum. Children have as much right to a broad, well-balanced 
sex education curriculum as they do to a science or maths 
curriculum. Education in sexuality is an integral part of their 
preparation for life in the wider democratic community. 
Amy Gutmann (1987) describes conservative and liberal views of sex 
education. Conservatives claim that sex education should take place 
within the family, liberals claim that schools should have a part to 
play in education in this important area. Conservatives are worried 
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that in teaching sex education, schools may present values, ideas 
and ways of life which are not shared by them as parents (e.g. 
contraception and abortion). Liberals reply that teaching about such 
issues as abortion and contraception is not the same as advocating 
their use. Gutmann believes that "There is no way of resolving this 
controversy between conservatives and liberals on sex education by 
moving back and forth between the fundamentally different moral 
foundations of the state of families and the state of individuals." (p. 
108). 
Gutmann argues that sex education should be included within the 
curriculum under the same conditions as religious education. Parents 
should have the right to withdraw their children from sex education 
if they so wish. Gutmann gives two reasons for this conclusion. The 
first is her belief that sex is "...even more private (in the sense of 
intimate) than religion and at least as controversial." (Ibid.). The 
second is that "Mandatory sex education is as offensive to parents 
who believe in the sanctity of sex as mandatory prayer is to parents 
who do not believe in God." (Op. cit., p. 110). 
Gutmann's belief that sex is private is in direct opposition to the 
feminist claim that 'the personal is political'. The feminist 
argument is that sexual violence and sexual pleasure are political 
issues linked to the power structures within our patriarchal society. 
They reject the idea that 'what I do in my bed is my own business'. 
Lesbians and gays, for example, are oppressed precisely because of 
what they 'do in bed'. 
I find Gutmann's conclusion surprising and disturbing. What about the 
rights of children? Every child has the right to a well-balanced, 
broad and objective education in sexuality. Gutmann says that the 
state has a duty to ensure that education operates on principles of 
non-discrimination and non repression. One effective way of 
countering stereotypes and prejudices about certain forms of 
sexuality is by making sex education mandatory. 
As I argued in chapter five, the state must ensure that sex education 
is taught to all students, regardless of their parents' beliefs. It is 
against the spirit of democratic education to allow parents to close 
their children's minds to such subjects. Children cannot become 
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autonomous if their learning is censored in such an important area 
of knowledge. A well-balanced sex education programme will enable 
children critically to examine the many social and moral issues 
involved and either accept or reject their parents' views in this 
area. 
Gutmann defines sexist education as "...a set of educational 
practices: those that serve, often unintentionally, to restrict the 
quality or quantity of democratic education received by girls (or 
women) relative to that received by boys (or men)." (Op. cit., p. 111). 
She does not mention lesbians or gays in her definition of sexism. 
Yet young lesbians and gays are subjected to the most extreme 
forms of discrimination and heterosexism within educational 
institutions and the wider community. They have every right to 
examine their own sexuality in a well-balanced and objective 
manner, regardless of the views of their (mostly) heterosexual 
parents. 
I would argue for Gutmann's basic view that anti-sexist education is 
a vital part of education in a democratic society. If half the people 
in any society are excluded from full democratic and social 
participation for no good reason, we have to redress the balance. We 
must therefore widen the definition of anti sexist education to 
include the promotion of positive images of heterosexual women, 
lesbians and gays in order to counteract stereotypes and prejudices. 
Anti-sexist education involves not only a consideration of the 
material taught, the methods used to teach and the ethos of 
particular educational establishments. We must also understand the 
social and political contexts in which such education takes place. We 
must also try to enhance the self-respect and self-esteem of all 
students who are discriminated against and we must ensure that we 
promote their participation within the educational community and 
society at large. 
Lesbian and gay issues within the core and foundation 
subjects. 
Since the beginning of the nineteen seventies, with the rise of the 
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Gay Liberation Front, the importance of 'coming out' has been 
emphasised. 'Coming out' is essentially a lesbian or gay person's 
decision either to acknowledge their sexuality to themselves or to 
make it public. The latter form of disclosure involves a revelation to 
individuals, selected groups, or everyone. This personal decision 
publicly to reveal their sexual identity is crucial if lesbians and 
gays are to play a full part in society and challenge prejudice and 
misinformation. 
The decision whether to come out or not must remain with the 
individual alone. It is clearly undesirable for a lesbian or gay person 
to be forced into revealing their sexual identity. This would defeat 
the whole purpose of coming out in two respects: (i) it would cease 
to make this revelation a positive and safe experience for the 
individual concerned, (ii) it is unlikely that such forced revelation 
(what has become known as 'outing') would provide a positive 
example for others to follow. 
The task of the democratic community is not primarily to help and 
encourage those individual lesbians and gays who want to come out. 
It is rather to work for a much broader social change which will 
eventually mean that lesbian and gay citizens feel safe and 
confident enough to reveal their sexualities. 
I want to identify another form of 'coming out', grounded in our 
education system in general and our established school and college 
curricula in particular. Lesbians and gays have been driven 
underground, buried by centuries of oppression and dishonesty. It is 
hardly surprising, then, that they and their histories are often 
invisible in the established curricula of schools and colleges. Our 
task must be to reveal lesbian and gay histories and sexualities to 
educational communities through the life and work of those 
communities. School and college curricula should provide a context 
in which those individual lesbians and gays who wish it, are 
assisted in the radical political task of revealing their presence to 
others and thus helping to affect and reinforce radical social change. 
English language and literature are important vehicles for our 
understanding of sexuality in terms of relationships. Simon Harris 
(1990) outlines what he sees as the three main concerns of teachers 
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of English: 
1. The development of communication skills across the range of 
linguistic registers of reading, writing, speaking and listening. 
2. The development of responses to and involvement with a variety 
of texts and the issues they raise. 
3. The personal, social and moral development appropriate to each 
individual. 
Harris notes that an understanding of these central concerns helps 
us to understand why English has often been the spring-board for 
issue-based cross curricular development. Harris cites, as examples, 
three discussion documents issued by the former Inner London 
Education Authority (I.L.E.A.), abolished in 1990. These focused on 
the contribution of English to the issues of anti-sexism, beliefs and 
values, and gender (Harris, pp. 32-35). 
He makes the point that, "We are aware that students exist and 
experience things outside school and that generally those influences 
and situations have a more pervasive and effective result on them 
than most of what we try to do. So it becomes essential (and 
mutually beneficial) that we take account of and show an interest in 
these influences and experiences, if we are not to alienate students 
and if we truly desire to engage them actively in our lessons." (Op. 
cit., p. 35). Discussion centring on sexualities generated either by 
English texts or by personal experiences, is integral to this approach 
to English teaching. 
Harris highlights the importance of the library as a place where 
young people, coming to terms with their sexualities, can get 
reliable information. He quotes from someone's personal experience, 
"During my adolescence, realising that I was 'different', I 
increasingly identified the need to seek out alternative means of 
getting information about my 'difference'. No adult could be trusted 
enough to be questioned; the library was the only possibility." (Op. 
cit., p. 44). It is therefore important that libraries stock fiction and 
non-fiction which reflects lesbian, gay, and bi-sexual as well as 
heterosexual relationships. 
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Harris' book is an important means of encouraging and supporting 
English teachers in tackling lesbian and gay issues. He suggests 
ways in which these issues can be fed into Primary, Secondary and 
Further education. He also presents two case studies for use with 
upper school secondary students (based on the novels Who Lies 
Inside by Timothy Ireland and Annie on my Mind by Nancy Garden) and 
provides a very useful annotated list of materials for the use of 
English teachers. 
Science, particularly biology, has a part to play in leading students 
towards a deeper understanding of the physiological characteristics 
of both sexes and the physical expression of our sexual needs, wants 
and desires. We can see clearly, within this context, the need to 
balance this approach with one that also emphasises the emotional 
and interpersonal aspects of human sexuality. 
History too has an important part to play in helping people to 
appreciate lesbian and gay concerns. Courses on various aspects of 
the history of oppression often concentrate on racial oppression, 
whilst the history of lesbian and gay oppression is ignored. For 
example, studies of the Holocaust in Germany often stress the 
suffering and murder of the Jews, ignoring the annihilation of tens 
of thousands of lesbians and gays. No history course is accurate or 
worth-while if it fails to emphasise that history is a record of 
human activity and that as such it must include women and men from 
all cultures, races, classes, genders and sexualities, often suffering 
the same irrational forms of oppression. 
A person's sexuality is often an important motivating force in their 
lives. Where this is the case, mention must be made of it. It is also 
necessary to stress that although same-gender sexual relationships 
have existed throughout the history of the human race, various 
concepts and terminologies have been used to describe such 
relationships. For example, the term 'homosexual' is a nineteenth 
century construction and the term 'gay" appeared in the nineteen 
sixties. 
Many of these terms contain a wealth of interpretation and 
sometimes misinterpretation. For example, sexologists of the 
nineteenth century referred to lesbians and gays as 'inverts', 
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implying that gays were women somehow trapped in men's bodies 
and that lesbians were men trapped in women's bodies. 
To a large extent, history a collection of stories of how groups of 
people have attempted to dominate one another. One valuable insight 
is that very many forms of oppression have certain things in 
common. They are usually based on, or supported and encouraged by, 
misinformation, prejudice, stereotypes and bigotry. Consequently, 
common alliances are often forged between disparate oppressed 
groups with the aim of fighting oppression on a common front. By 
studying history, students who are oppressed in various ways may 
well be encouraged to see their oppression in a much wider context 
and seek more comprehensive political responses and solutions. 
Religious studies has an important part to play in helping students 
to appreciate the range of beliefs and attitudes that exist in 
relation to sexuality in general and lesbian and gay sexualities in 
particular. Many of our students belong to one or other of the world's 
major religions and they often have very definite beliefs about these 
subjects. Many lesbians and gays are active members of these world 
faiths. It is important that students are allowed to examine the 
bases for such beliefs and that agnostic or atheistic students engage 
in fruitful dialogue with other students on these issues. 
Oppression and the death of participatory democracy. 
Social, institutional and political change are the means by which 
lesbians and gays will achieve liberation. Detailed, practical 
proposals for institutional and curriculum change, and research into 
the ways in which heterosexism is encouraged by individuals and 
institutions are complementary and on-going processes. 
We must begin with the obvious, but often unheeded, assertion that 
it is necessary to understand both the nature of what we wish to 
change and the kind of changes we wish to make if these changes are 
to be effective. Here, extensive educational research is of vital 
importance, especially with regard to the ways in which educational 
institutions, their students and staff, reinforce various forms 
oppression and threaten the existence of participatory democracy. 
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CHAPTER 8. 
CONCLUSION: DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP. 
The major themes of this thesis are encapsulated in the concept of 
citizenship. My fundamental claim is that lesbian, gay and 
heterosexual citizens should have the same rights because (i) there 
are no rational or moral grounds for the belief that lesbians and gays 
are inferior to heterosexualities, (ii) lesbians and gays are equally 
valuable and worthy of respect as autonomous human beings with 
life plans of their own which they must be allowed to pursue 
without hindrance. 
The model of citizenship I am proposing is based on the twin 
democratic ideals of equality and liberty. Essentially, citizens 
should be treated equally unless there is a good reason for not doing 
so. They should also be free to choose their own ways of life and to 
make their own decisions as long as these do not threaten or harm 
other citizens. 
Iris Marion Young's model of citizenship proposes the creation of, 
"...a heterogeneous public that provides mechanisms for the effective 
representation and recognition of the distinct voices and 
perspectives of those constituent groups that are oppressed or 
disadvantaged." (Butler & Scott, 1992, p. 380). Thus, citizenship is a 
coalition of many different groups who retain their own diverse and 
distinctive identities, whilst sharing the essential ideals of 
citizenship. 
In chapter one, I argued that lesbian and gay liberation can only come 
about if we work towards a society based on the principles of 
participatory democracy. I also claimed that we must work towards 
achieving a revolution in society's attitudes and values so that the 
oppression of lesbians and gays can be actively combated. 
There is, as I pointed out in chapter five, a dynamic relationship 
between politics and education. Democratic systems of government 
should influence education policy and practice. Conversely, 
participatory democracy depends on education for the furtherance of 
its ideals, and ultimately, for its very existence. 
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humanitarian grounds. Rather, they are essential to minimise those 
social and economic inequalities which are incompatible with the 
civil and political equality that positive participation requires." (Op. 
cit., p. 380). 
In a moral democracy, pupils are given the knowledge, skills and 
attitudes necessary for public participation, enabling them to fulfil 
their roles as citizens adequately. 
In 'market' democracies, on the other hand, citizenship is interpreted 
in ways which emphasise responsibilities rather than rights and 
therefore advocate law-abiding behaviour, service to the community 
and national loyalty. In such a democracy, 'civil rights'- especially 
those associated with individual liberty and property ownership-
tend to have an elevated status and the egalitarian thrust of social 
citizenship is rejected on the grounds that it creates the kind of 
state-dependency, a second-class citizenship, it originally promised 
to eliminate. 
Within this perspective, citizenship is exercised, not by the 
extension of social rights, but by creating a property owning 
democracy. Only the expansion of 'popular capitalism' can free 
citizens from the stigma of social security and their reliance on the 
beaurocracies of the Welfare State. 
This kind of education for citizenship is very different from the 
moral democracy model. In a market democracy, political apathy and 
ignorance are widespread. Education for citizenship will have a 
marginal status in the curriculum, corresponding to the marginal 
status of politics in the lives of individuals. Further, "Since a 
market democracy prizes factual knowledge and vocational skills 
over social awareness or critical reflection, the political role of 
'general education' would not be seriously entertained...In a modern 
market democracy 'education for citizenship' must not only 
depoliticise general education; it must also depoliticise the concept 
of citizenship as well." (Op. cit., p. 382). 
In chapter one, I made the case for participatory democracy as the 
social prerequisite for radical social change. Elitist or Market modes 
of democracy of the kind outlined by Carr undermine all struggles 
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for equal rights and against discrimination and injustice. Such 
action is seen either as irrelevant to the pursuance of other more 
important goals, or a distraction or, worse still, as positively 
dangerous. 
In the end, Curriculum Guidance 8 can be taken to support either 
model. Like British democracy, it contains elements of both. 
Market and moral modes of democracy generate what T. H. McLaughlin 
(1992) describes as minimal and maximal senses of citizenship. 
Minimally, the idea of citizenship involves civil status: the 
possession of a passport, the right to vote, etc. Maximally, it 
involves social, cultural and psychological factors. "Thus, the 
citizen must have a consciousness of him or her self as a member of 
a living community with a shared democratic culture involving 
obligations and responsibilities as well as rights, a sense of the 
common good, fraternity and so on." (Op. cit., p. 236). 
The kind of virtues citizens should possess can also be seen in 
minimal or maximal terms. Minimally, loyalties and responsibilities 
are seen primarily as local and immediate. The citizen is law abiding 
and public-spirited (e.g., in the sense of helping neighbours). 
Maximally, citizens require a more extensive focus for their loyalty 
and responsibility. For example, they will question and extend their 
local horizons in the light of more general and universal 
considerations such as those of justice. They will also help to 
secure the kind of social conditions which will lead to the 
empowerment of all citizens. 
Minimal and maximal conceptions also apply to the concept of 
education for citizenship. Minimally, this involves providing 
information relating, for example, to the legal and constitutional 
background to citizenship and the development of virtues of local 
and immediate focus (e.g., those relating to voluntary activity and 
basic social morality). There is no requirement here for broad 
critical reflection and understanding. Nor is there a concern to 
ameliorate the social disadvantages that may inhibit students from 
developing into citizens in a significant sense. There is a danger 
that minimalist conceptions of education for citizenship may well 
lead to mere socialisation into the status quo. 
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What is needed is a maximalist interpretation of education for 
citizenship of the kind argued for throughout this thesis. McLaughlin 
sees this as requiring, "...a much fuller educational programme, in 
which the development of a broad cultural understanding and a much 
more extensive range of dispositions and virtues in the light of a 
general liberal and political education are seen as crucial." (p. 238). 
McLaughlin identifies minimalist aspects of the National Curriculum 
Guidelines for Education in Citizenship. For example, in the 
introduction, two ways are specified in which the school can lay the 
foundations for "positive participative citizenship": (i) by helping 
students acquire and understand essential information, (ii) by 
providing them with opportunities and incentives to participate in 
all aspects of school life. 
Education for citizenship is seen as developing, "...the knowledge, 
skills and attitudes necessary for exploring, making informed 
decisions about and exercising responsibilities and rights in a 
democratic society." (p. 2). 
Its aims are: 
"...to establish the importance of positive participative citizenship 
and to provide the motivation to join in; 
help pupils to acquire and understand essential information on which 
to base the development of their skills, values and attitudes 
towards citizenship." (p. 2). 
Later, however, the document appears to accommodate a maximalist 
interpretation. Here, education for citizenship involves acquiring 
certain positive attitudes: "...independence of thought on social and 
moral issues" and "..an active concern for human rights." (p. 4). Moral 
codes and values are to be explored in relation to difference, 
conflict, complexity and context." (p. 4). 
The document goes on to outline eight "essential components of 
content": "diversity, fairness and justice, co-operation and 
compassion, prejudice and discrimination, inequality, racism and 
sexism, knowledge of political systems and processes, an 
understanding of social, political and economic contexts in which 
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decisions about work, employment and leisure are made and 
different perceptions about the best forms of provision for public 
services." (section 4, p. 5). 
In addition to the National Curriculum Council's guidelines on 
education for citizenship, Colin Wringe (1992) identifies the notion 
of Education for Active Citizenship in the writings and public 
pronouncements of some politically influential individuals. His 
analysis is a good practical illustration of Carr's distinction 
between moral and market modes of democracy and also highlights 
McLaughlin's maximal and minimal senses of citizenship. 
Active Citizenship entails: 
(1) an understanding of the benefits of living in a democratic or free 
society; 
(2) respect for the rule of law; 
(3) a concern for obligations rather than rights; 
(4) voluntary community service for the benefit of the old, the 
handicapped and the environment. 
These themes are culled from such diverse sources as Douglas Hurd's 
article 'Freedom will flourish where the individual accepts 
responsibility' in the Independent, 13.9.89, a speech by John 
McGregor, the then Minister of State for Education at the 
Consultative Conference on Citizenship organised for the Speaker's 
Commission on Citizenship in Northampton on 16.2.90. A speech by 
John Patten, the then Minister of State at the Home Office to the 
Lions Club International Conference at Torquay on 4.9.90. An article 
by Anthony O'Hear, 'Not on the citizens' band wavelength', T.E.S., 
9.3.90. 
This kind of education means that respect for the law, for one's 
obligations, for democratic values, etc. are to be "inculcated". The 
meaning of this term is unclear, but it appears to involve certain 
responses being "implanted vigorously and without equivocation" (Op. 
cit., p. 30). There is to be no discrete subject area called Education 
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Whilst it is important to have a vision of the sort of democracy 
necessary to support lesbian and gay liberation, it is also important 
to have a realistic view of the British government's concept of 
citizenship. This will enable us to understand their wider view of 
democracy. 
The present British government acknowledges the importance of 
citizenship education. Some time ago, it set up a commission on 
citizenship under the then speaker of the House of Commons, Bernard 
Weather'II. The National Curriculum Council Circular number 6 
(October, 1989) and Curriculum Guidance 3 (March, 1990) set out and 
discussed five cross-curricular themes which are seen as essential 
to the whole curriculum. They are: economic and industrial 
understanding, careers education and guidance, health education, 
environmental education and education for citizenship. Curriculum 
Guidance 8: Education for Citizenship appeared in 1990 and 
established education for citizenship as part of the educational 
entitlement of young people aged five to sixteen in schools. 
The British government's interest in citizenship education is also 
evident from the many diverse pronouncements of prominent 
government figures, identified by Colin Wringe (1992) which I shall 
discuss later. 
The various pronouncements relating to the virtues of 'citizenship 
education' by the government and its ministers highlight the 
ambiguity of their position. There are at least two very different 
interpretations of what 'education for citizenship' means, each 
relying on very different wider interpretations of what democracy 
means: 
Moral and market models of democracy. 
Wilfred Carr (1991) makes a distinction between moral and market 
models of democracy, roughly corresponding to the participatory and 
elite models of democracy discussed in chapter one. "In a 'moral' 
democracy, the state has an obligation to redistribute the wealth of 
society in a more egalitarian way than a free market economy would 
naturally allow. Hence, the social rights embedded in the 
institutions of the Welfare State are not justified simply on 
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for Citizenship. Instead, it is to be taught across the curriculum and 
through extra-curricular activities. 
The concept of Active Citizenship is ambiguous, but Wringe wonders 
if "...the term 'active' was intended to stand in contrast to that of 
'critical' or 'reflective', as if today's all-action citizen had no time 
to bother his head about wider issues, or become involved in politics 
or consider serious collective undertakings. Both Action Man and the 
Action Bank are supposed to be swift and vigorous in their responses 
without asking too many questions beforehand, while persons with a 
'bias for action' may have little time for debating the whys and 
wherefores of what they do." (p. 30). 
What is needed is political education of the kind outlined in the 
previous chapter. Wringe contends that such political education has 
three principal educational goals: 
(1) that pupils should acquire skills necessary to undertake 
effective action in the community; 
(2) that they should acquire attitudes which incline and embolden 
them to do so on appropriate occasions. 
(3) Most importantly of all, the cognitive goal of developing the 
conceptual framework and minimal knowledge base necessary if 
pupils were to understand the social and political world around 
them. 
Wringe identifies an important problem: "Modern usage...extends the 
term 'citizen' to all inhabitants of the state who qualify for 
nationality and certain legal and social benefits and obligations that 
go with it. By thus extending the term, however, we lose the sense 
that a citizen is one who is expected to participate actively in the 
affairs of the city, and thus run the risk that the good citizen may 
simply become synonymous with a serviceable subject." (p. 31). 
Emphasis on what Wringe calls political literacy, as opposed to the 
ambiguity of "Active Citizenship" helps to avoid this danger. 
Among other things, it is held that active citizens should be more 
concerned about their obligations than their rights. This claim is 
ambiguous, but there are real dangers in playing down citizens' 
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rights. The liberal democratic tradition has always encouraged 
citizens to stand up for their rights. If human rights are being 
violated or ignored it is immoral to suggest that people should keep 
quiet about this situation. Further, "If people are truly citizens and 
not mere subjects, it is quite reasonable to ask what their country 
can do for them, as well as what they can do for their country. 
Community is a reciprocal relationship, and all have both rights and 
duties. It is only in totalitarian regimes that we expect people to 
say little about the former." (p. 34). 
Wringe concludes by observing that. "..if the citizens of the next 
generation are to choose the good effectively in political terms and 
eschew the evil...,they require political education of a sustained and 
extended kind that the proposals for Education for active 
Citizenship, even on the most generous interpretation of its stated 
aims, seems unlikely to provide." (p. 37). 
The National Curriculum Guidelines on education for citizenship (no. 
8), like the National Curriculum as a whole, do not contain a clear 
and detailed account of their fundamental aims, values and 
principles. Most importantly, they do not offer a clearly worked out 
conception of citizenship. Perhaps this is intentional. After all, 
Western-style democracies are not known for their eagerness to 
encourage the full and effective participation of all citizens along 
the lines advocated in this thesis. 
The failure of contemporary Western democracies to welcome and 
encourage full participation, in some cases discouraging it, is 
largely covert. Such democracies often pay lip service to the ideals 
of 'true democracy' without ever explaining precisely what is meant 
by the term. Thus, they are able to manipulate this ambiguity for 
their own purposes. What is needed in order to remedy this situation 
is that the concept be reclaimed and re-defined, thus avoiding a 
situation where it becomes so ambiguous as to be devoid of all 
meaning. 
I would argue for T.H. McLaughlin's view: what is needed is a 
formulation and specification of the shape that education for 
citizenship should take. We must also decide to what extent 
education for citizenship should "transmit a particular way of life." 
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(p. 243). This debate should be carried out nationally in order to 
come to some consensus on the public virtues, the common good and 
how citizenship is to be understood. This implies that we must 
challenge the trend of Western governments of discouraging 
consultation and discussion. 
Renewed interest in this important area of education, together with 
the N.C.C. guidelines, should be taken as a stimulus for further, 
better informed debate, rather than as firm guidance for action or 
curriculum development. Curriculum Guidance 8: Education for 
Citizenship states that, "It is intended as a framework for 
curriculum debate and is certainly not a blueprint or set of lesson 
plans. II 
The points made in this thesis with regard to the kind of education 
required in a democratic context provide a model of education for 
citizenship which could be used as a stimulus for such debate within 
democratic communities at all levels. The model of education 
proposed in this thesis may be summarised as follows: 
1. Building on the points made about toleration in chapter two, I 
support the claim that citizenship education involves, among other 
things, teaching people to at least tolerate diversity (as a minimal 
goal), but ultimately to accept and welcome it. 
In practical terms this involves four things: (i) understanding the 
many complex modes of oppression operating in educational 
institutions and the wider society, (ii) a recognition of our pluralist 
society as composed of different cultures, world-views, religions, 
and sexualities, (iii) the positive acknowledgement of the value of 
such diverse groups, (iv) effective opposition to, and eventual 
elimination of, oppression. 
With regard to toleration and gradual acceptance of diversity, 
particularly within a multi-cultural society, R.S. Sigel (Sigel & 
Hoskin, 1991) points out that both minority and majority students 
are in need of socialisation, "They must learn to accept the realities 
of multi-ethnic living, to become acquainted with, and respectful of, 
the value of living patterns of other ethnic groups, without blindly 
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assuming that their own culture is superior, and is therefore 
immune from change or improvement." (Op. cit., p. 6). 
In America, the idea of the multi-cultural 'melting pot' (the 
assimilationist model) has been dominant for a long time. 
Newcomers from other countries are expected to become 
'Americanised' as soon as possible, leaving behind the cultures and 
traditions of their former communities. This model must be 
abandoned in favour of cultural pluralism. "Cultural pluralists 
envision an organic relationship in which the individual freely 
partakes of his or her own distinctive heritage, but also becomes an 
integral part of the history and experience of the common culture." 
(Op. cit., p. 7). 
In 1911 Dewey wrote, "The intermingling in the school of youth of 
different races, differing religions and alike customs creates for all 
a new and broader environment." (J. Dewey 1966). The time has come 
to add sexualities to this spectrum of experiences. 
2. A broad education is required, enabling students to become 
acquainted with different ways of life and views of life. They should 
learn to think for themselves and formulate their own views and 
life-plans as autonomous human beings. A central aim of education 
is to encourage independent thought and judgement. 
3. Students should be entitled to Personal and Social Education, 
involving: (i) a realistic understanding of themselves, including their 
strengths and weaknesses, (ii) an appreciation of the society in 
which they live, its cultures, ways of life and institutions, (iii) 
their responsibilities within that society, (iv) nurturing in the skills 
and personal qualities which help participatory forms of democracy 
flourish, (v) an understanding of themselves intellectually, socially, 
morally and sexually, (vi) encouraging a respect for persons, their 
similarities and differences. 
4. As part of their personal and social education, students should be 
taught and encouraged to exercise desirable character traits or 
virtues which help to support and sustain participatory forms of 
democracy and, at the same time, develop the democratic 
personality. In chapter two, these virtues were said to include 
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altruistic attitudes, respect for persons, fraternity and tolerance. 
On the other hand, attitudes such as servility and willingness to 
'follow the crowd' should be discouraged. 
Orit lchilov (1990) makes the important point that, from a moral 
point of view, 'the good citizen' and 'the good person' overlap. This is 
based on the premise that 'preferring' participatory democracy is in 
itself a value judgement. It is a judgement of what kind of political 
and social arrangements are in the best interests of human kind, of 
what sort of polity will promote human flourishing. To this extent, 
to specify the sorts of knowledge, understanding and skills required 
of a good citizen is also to specify some of the ingredients that go 
into the making of a good person. 
D. Heater (1990) reminds us that. "...the ideal good citizen must be a 
paragon of multiple virtues, who brings to the fore different 
qualities according to circumstances. To assume, as so often 
happens, that certain components of civic virtue are the totality is 
to emasculate the word." (p. 193). 
We should attempt to specify the kind of virtues that are conducive 
to participatory democracy, but we must also be aware that 
democratic education should be geared towards the growth and 
development of the whole person, socially, psychologically, morally 
and sexually. This indicates the enormity and complexity of the task 
of educating citizens. It also implies that education must be seen as 
a life-long process of learning, both inside and outside educational 
institutions. 
5. Political, moral and sex education are also important aspects of 
students' personal and social education. 
Political education includes: (i) the studying of democratic systems 
of government, their justification and their workings, (ii) 
experience of democratic processes in action (at school, home, youth 
clubs, work, etc.) by involvement in decision-making and 
implementation on all levels, (iii) an examination of the inequalities 
in our society and understanding the impact that these inequalities 
have in stunting the growth of participatory democracy. 
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6. Moral education is important because citizens will often need to 
make independent moral judgements. and decisions on matters of 
political importance. Moral education attempts to answer the 
question, 'What is morality?' It also involves: (i) an appreciation of 
the many moral conflicts that exist in life, some of which are 
insoluble, (ii) an understanding of how moral decisions are 
influenced and made. (iii) This in turn requires an appreciation of the 
part played by factors such as religion, culture, society and its 
institutions in the process of moral decision-making. 
7. Sex education is an important means of encouraging students to 
understand themselves and others. Students should acknowledge and 
value their own sexualities and the sexualities of others which may 
differ significantly from their own. They should be taught to respect 
lesbian and gay sexualities in the same way as they are taught to 
respect other differences relating to class, race or gender. 
8. The approaches we adopt towards education within a democratic 
context are as important as the content of education. We should, for 
example, adopt anti-indoctrinatory approaches to education which 
encourage students to think and judge reflectively and critically. 
Ken Fogelman (1988) quotes a university student's view of his 
schooling, "What you're taught at school is to obey what you are told 
to do by a teacher. This is absolutely opposed to good citizenship. 
Good citizenship is that you use your brain and teach yourself about 
things. What you're told to do is: 'don't question, just do what you're 
told.' You're actually being taught to be a bad, unresponsive, passive, 
stupid citizen." (p. 81). We should not underestimate the enormity of 
the task involved in changing our educational institutions so that 
they put forward more proactive models of citizenship. However, it 
is essential that such change comes about if we are to support a 
citizenship which requires knowledge, critical understanding, skills 
and attitudes. 
Orit Ichilov (1990) supports this idea, "Democratic citizenship 
requires more than passive compliance: citizens are also required to 
make choices, decisions, and judgements, to criticise and object." (p. 
1). 
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We should ensure that equality of opportunity is promoted in all 
educational establishments, so that students are encouraged to 
participate as fully as possible within their educational institutions 
and the wider democratic community with due regard to their sex, 
race, abilities, class and sexual orientations. 
The way forward. 
Citizens within an aspiring democracy should have the courage to 
examine the ways in which they fail to live up to democratic ideals. 
The democratic state must encourage examination of its laws and 
institutions (similar to the kind carried out in chapter four) in order 
to reveal the ways in which it sometimes unwittingly oppresses its 
citizens and limits their freedom and participation. 
As citizens within an aspiring democracy, we must ask why the 
educational establishment at all levels has consistently ignored 
lesbian and gay issues within the curriculum. The answer to this 
question can be found in society itself. Prejudice, hatred, 
misunderstanding and ignorance abound. It is not surprising, then, 
that educational establishments reflect and perpetuate these 
attitudes. What is inexcusable is the way that educators have 
shirked their responsibilities in countering this discrimination, 
misinformation and oppression. 
Of course, some educators are not immune from these very 
prejudices, either because they see lesbians or gays as somehow 
'unnatural' or subversive or because of religious or other beliefs. 
However, this leaves us with a large body of liberal educators who 
do not share these beliefs. Why have they remained silent for so 
long? There are really two answers to this question. 
The first involves the fundamental lack of understanding of lesbian 
and gay issues. There is an urgent need for education in these 
matters at all levels. This must be complemented by an effective 
programme of consciousness-raising, especially within teacher 
training institutions. I have been appalled at the lack of 
understanding exhibited by many teacher trainers over the years. 
Even those who are sympathetic to the issues involved are extremely 
reluctant to do anything about it because of real insecurities about 
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their lack of knowledge and experience in this area. These issues 
must be discussed as part of initial teacher training courses and in-
service training programmes for teachers and support staff. 
The second answer to the riddle of non-involvement in these issues 
concerns the controversial nature of the subject. Given society's 
views and opinions, enshrined in anti- lesbian and gay legislation, 
how is it possible to withstand the hostility which might result 
from a programme of education in this area? 
The answer an individual gives to this question is of fundamental 
importance and goes right to the heart of what it is to be a teacher. 
A teacher who, as a matter of personal decision or policy, sets out 
to endorse everything that society thinks or believes, is worthless. 
The essential task of all educators is to teach students to question 
for themselves. This will sometimes involve questioning their own 
understanding and beliefs as well as the accepted beliefs of society, 
resulting in their acceptance or rejection. The fact that society 
disapproves of something does not necessarily mean that it cannot 
be discussed in the classroom if there are sound reasons for doing 
SO. 
I have put forward strong arguments that society's views about 
lesbians and gays are misinformed and prejudiced. Acknowledging 
lesbian and gay issues in educational institutions needs courage and 
conviction. This must be supported by a radical education and 
consciousness-raising programme for teacher trainers, teachers, 
governors and support staff. If this is not forthcoming there is little 
hope that teachers will have the confidence to make the necessary 
advances. 
There is also much work to be done within the teaching unions. 
Lesbian and Gay workers in Education (now known as School's Out!) 
has, over the years, made significant in-roads into lesbian and gay 
rights, particularly within the N.U.T. At least lesbian and gay rights 
are now seen by the union as a major issue. The next stage is to 
persuade and encourage teacher unions to use their considerable 
resources to promote and defend the rights of lesbian and gay 
students and teachers and to press for the necessary curriculum 
changes. 
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It is imperative that lesbians and gays take the initiative 
themselves. It is for lesbian and gay educators at all levels to join 
forces and make radical proposals for change. It is for them to argue 
the case with the government for the discussion of such issues and 
to devise courses for teacher trainers and teachers which will 
increase understanding and awareness of the complex issues 
involved. Lesbians and gays must set and control the agenda for 
change that will bring about their liberation. 
The A.I.D.S. epidemic has galvanised lesbian and gay communities 
into positive and effective political action. Organisations such as 
ACTUP, the Aids Coalition To Unleash Power engaged in acts of civil 
disobedience in order to force the Wellcome Group to reduce 
dramatically the price of the drug A.Z.T. so that everyone suffering 
from H.I.V. and A.I.D.S. related illnesses could afford it. 
Whatever is now known about the effectiveness or otherwise of this 
drug, we can see this struggle between lesbians and gays and a 
gigantic multinational company as a model for future political 
involvement and successful action initiated by lesbians and gays for 
the benefit of lesbians and gays and the wider society. 
The history of lesbian and gay movements, particularly in the 
nineteen seventies, teaches us that the most significant political 
gains were made by lesbians and gays themselves, fuelled by the 
anger of their oppression and the pride that comes from a strong 
sense of self-worth and power to affect change. 
The same pattern of self-help can be seen if we examine the 
political gains made within the black communities, particularly in 
the U.S.A. and South Africa. Here, black activists took the initiative, 
inspiring their peoples to fight for social justice, supported by their 
white fellow citizens. 
Lesbians and gays need to take up the challenge of citizenship 
education, fully supported by fellow heterosexual citizens, some of 
whom suffer other kinds of oppression because of their sex, race, 
class or ability. This must emphasise the necessity of listening to 
the diverse voices of the oppressed. It must also acknowledge the 
right of these oppressed groups to join together in order to identify 
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the many forms that oppression takes and fight it on a united front. 
Citizenship should not be presented as an assimilation of many 
cultures, beliefs, viewpoints, lifestyles and sexualities. Instead, it 
should be seen as the coalition of a diverse collection of individuals 
and groups, respecting each others' differences, and working 
towards the fundamental democratic aims of equality and liberty. 
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